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ABSTRACT 
Responding to concerns of terror around the world, law enforcement agencies are 
rapidly moving to utilize a range of surveillance technologies to address the threat. While 
the lead technology in this area is closed circuit television (CCTV), other technologies 
like radio frequency identification (RFID), global positioning satellite (GPS) technology 
and biometrics are also being expanded for use in monitoring human activity.  These 
systems share common features and can be interrelated and controlled with developing 
computer technologies.  They can also be used by government for a range of other 
purposes. However, use of these technologies has implications for individual privacy. 
This research examines the nature of privacy and existing legal protections.  It 
also investigates a range of approaches to govern the use of these developing 
technologies. It is a critical governmental function to administer the use of that 
technology to ensure that it is related to appropriate government purposes and that 
individual civil rights are protected.  To be successful, that governance scheme will have 
to address key privacy concerns while remaining flexible enough to adapt to changing 
technology.  Informed by this research policymakers will be better able to develop 
effective governance strategies. 
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Won't you tell him please to put on some speed 
Follow my lead, oh, how I need 
Someone to watch over me.1 
 
A. WHAT IS THE ISSUE 
The lyrics from the classic Gershwin tune echo the sentiment of security and 
comfort afforded by protective vigilance.  As concerns of terror have spread across the 
United States and around the world, law enforcement agencies are rapidly moving to 
utilize a range of technologies to provide that sense of comfort and security. It is a critical 
governmental function to administer the use of that technology to ensure that it is related 
to appropriate government purposes and that individual civil rights are protected.  To be 
successful, that governance scheme will have to address key privacy concerns while 
remaining flexible enough to adapt to changing technology. 
One example of the use of technology to address threats is the expansion of closed 
circuit television (CCTV) technology.  In the wake of 9/11, cities across America have 
been developing and implementing CCTV programs. These programs are often justified 
on the basis of combating terror acts.  CCTV systems are, however, part of a larger trend 
by government to use developing technology-based surveillance solutions to address a 
range of purposes.  In addition to CCTV, technologies like radio frequency identification 
(RFID), global positioning satellite (GPS) technology and biometrics are also being 
expanded for use in monitoring human activity.  These systems can be interrelated and 
controlled with developing computer technologies.   
The promise of surveillance technologies like CCTV is not solely, or, in some 
jurisdictions, even primarily, a surveillance measure designed for combating terrorism. 
Their uses are much broader. Technologies like CCTV can, and are, used by cities to 
                                                 
1 George Gershwin and Ira Gershwin, “Someone to Watch Over Me,” 
http://www.lyrics007.com/Gershwin%20George%20Lyrics/Someone%20To%20Watch%20Over%20Me%
20Lyrics.html (accessed March 15, 2008).  
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address more routine crime and disorder problems.  For example, CCTV has been used to 
secure downtown commercial areas and in high crime areas.  The goals of these systems 
are crime suppression and building public confidence.  There is also a growing movement 
to use a range of surveillance technologies, including CCTV, to manage traffic flow, 
enforce traffic laws, and for other regulatory purposes.  In addition to functioning as a 
preventative or deterrent measure, digitized technologies like CCTV can also serve to 
guide response.  For example, centralized CCTV systems permit greater command and 
control of resources deployed in response to emergencies both large and small.  
While the ability to observe and monitor individual conduct in public has always 
been available to government, technology has developed in such a way that government’s 
ability to efficiently monitor such conduct is greatly enhanced.   As technology in the 
area of computers and digitization advances at an increasingly rapid pace, government 
can collect and analyze greater amounts of information. The convergence of technology 
that provides greater ability to collect information through devices like digitized CCTV 
systems, with greater ability to store and analyze that data makes technology enhanced 
surveillance programs different from surveillance conducted without the benefit of 
technology. 
The government’s expanded use of converging surveillance technologies for a 
range of purposes has raised concerns among privacy advocates.  Those advocates 
contend that application of surveillance technologies in public places constitute an assault 
on personal privacy.  At the extreme, they paint a picture of an Orwellian state where 
conformity is the norm and free thought and expression are repressed.  The advocates 
contend that the law affords minimal protections for privacy. They offer a range of 
solutions from the prohibition of data collection tools to restrictive legislation that would 
place substantial burden on governmental agencies that seek to employ technology like 
CCTV for observation of public areas. 
In response to concerns raised by the privacy advocates, proponents of the use of 
technology in public surveillance offer the suggestion that no real privacy interest exists 
for action in the public space.  They point to an absence of constitutional prohibitions on 
visual surveillance programs in public space. They cite the long history of constitutional 
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jurisprudence suggesting law enforcement observations of activity in the public space is 
completely permissible.  Much of the response focuses on challenges to data collection.  
Little effort is made to address what, if anything, will be done with information collected 
on public activity.   
The issue at hand is the need to develop governance strategy for use of a range of 
developing technology. That strategy must understand and respect the use of developing 
technologies for a number of permissible governmental purposes in prevention, 
deterrence, and response.  It must also respect the power of these new tools and potential 
impact they may have on individual rights.  
B. WHY IS THE ISSUE IMPORTANT 
The competing positions of privacy advocates and proponents of use of digitized 
surveillance technology provide policymakers with choices for determining how to 
properly govern the use and deployment of CCTV and other digitized surveillance 
technologies.  As those technologies develop and become increasingly available, more 
and more jurisdictions will likely come to use them for a range of purposes.  Though use 
of some technologies will relate solely to law enforcement purposes (e.g., CCTV cameras 
for observation of high crime areas or attempting to identify contraband); others will have 
functions that can be converted to law enforcement purposes (e.g., using traffic 
monitoring cameras to look for a vehicle fleeing the scene of a crime). 
The implementation of these technologies involves competing values.  Privacy 
advocates seek to advance values of personal freedom threatened by technology.  
Proponents of these technologies contend that implementation provides greater security 
and efficiency in a range of government operations.  The current environment lacks clear 
guidelines for policymakers to balance these competing concerns. 
There are also financial costs as well.  The capital investment in computer and 
related equipment and software development for operation of these systems is significant.  
Failure to account for privacy concerns has resulted in abandonment of several 
surveillance schemes after the expenditure of substantial amounts of public funds.  These 
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experiences demonstrate the need for development of principles that can guide 
policymakers in their collection and use of public surveillance information.  Failure to 
create and operate under a set of guidelines exposes policymakers to the real possibility 
of establishing expensive surveillance systems that cannot be utilized. 
C. HOW THIS ANALYSIS WAS CONDUCTED 
Development of adequate governance strategies for the governmental use of 
developing digital surveillance technology, like CCTV, in public areas requires an 
understanding of the concept of privacy and how it relates to surveillance.  Certain 
aspects of privacy may warrant greater protection, while others may not be greatly 
affected by public use of enhanced surveillance technology.  There also may be aspects 
of surveillance that can actually support and enhance privacy. 
In understanding the concepts of privacy and surveillance and their interrelation, 
analysis should focus on existing legal safeguards. Governance guidelines must be 
grounded in existing laws and legal principles.  This will involve primarily a 
constitutional analysis of the protections extended to privacy.  It will also analyze other 
legal protection afforded to privacy at the federal and state levels.   
The next analytic step in the development of a governance strategy is to 
understand the range of digital surveillance technologies available and the uses, 
capabilities, and limitations of those technologies.  Understanding the relation of CCTV 
to a digital family of technologies that can utilize common databases will help to develop 
guidelines that address all aspects of the surveillance technology, not just the collection 
of data from one source, but the use of that data as part of a related database.  Guidelines 
that recognize the trends in technology driven data collection and usage will be more 
flexible and able to address a range of differing technologies.  Understanding technology 




The final step in development of a governance strategy is to look at examples of 
how privacy concerns in the deployment of technology are and can be addressed.  
Examining the experience of a country like the United Kingdom which has extensively 
employed CCTV systems can provide insights into governance issues for CCTV use.  
Contrasting those experiences with countries like France and Germany where CCTV is 
less pronounced, can provide further insight on governance structures. In addition to 
looking to international experience, examining the experience of Chicago, where there 
has been extensive litigation and court supervised regulation of surveillance activities 
provides further insights. 
D. KEY FINDINGS 
The application of the analysis outlined above presents policymakers with 
substantial guidance for the development of governance strategies with respect to use of 
surveillance technology in public areas.  
1. Understanding Privacy 
While privacy plays a role in promoting human freedom, it is not a unitary 
concept.  Deconstructing privacy into differing component parts provides insights into 
what limits must be drawn and where aspects of privacy may need to be compromised.  
For example, the states of privacy such as seclusion and intimacy, critical to human 
development, require substantial protection.  They are, however, not greatly impacted by 
public surveillance.   
Other aspects of privacy are affected by developing technology. Reserve, the 
ability of an individual to control disclosure of personal information, is potentially 
impacted by growth of computer managed databases of digitized information. Unless that 
data is safeguarded the ability of individuals to control access to information about 
themselves is impaired.  Similarly affected is that aspect of privacy referred to as 
anonymity, moving in public without being known. Anonymity has both positive and 
negative, even dangerous, implications.  Social psychology research has established some 
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of the negative values that privacy brings.  On the other side of the ledger, there are 
positive values of anonymity in fostering political and cultural critique and discussion. 
Policymakers armed with an understanding of the differing aspects of privacy can 
better modulate their governance strategies to mitigate adverse effects. In some 
circumstances, applications of some technology that may affect only limited aspects of 
privacy may be acceptable.  Technology that interrupts other aspects of privacy may not 
be accepted. 
2. Understanding Surveillance 
Important issues are raised by examining in greater depth the concept of 
surveillance. For example, with regard to CCTV usage in public places, it is unclear 
exactly what is properly considered surveillance. Some definitions suggest that 
surveillance only occurs when the techniques are individuated.  Thus, the general 
observations of crowds are not surveillance.  Whether or not this definition of 
surveillance is accepted, it suggests that it is the individuation of the activity of 
observation that should cause concern.  Without individuation, the impact on privacy is 
much more limited.  This line of thought should suggest differing rules of governance 
based on the use of the surveillance technology with enhanced protections where the 
observation activity is individuated.  
Contrasted with general observation that is not individuated is the perfect 
surveillance state raised by the concept of the “Panopticon.”  The Panopticon is a form of 
prison design that allowed for individuated observation and management of information 
about all the individuals residing a particular cell house.  All the activities of individuals 
were observed and recorded. The purpose of this perfect surveillance was to raise he 
specter of potential discipline, thereby ensuring conformity.  Creating the perception of 
continual government observation and knowledge of individual activity was a key to this 
control.   
The Panopticon effect raises important considerations for governance strategies 
regarding a range of aspects of the operation of public surveillance programs.  The issue 
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of notice, for example, should be addressed in a way that it informs individuals without 
becoming oppressive.  General observation should not be equated with individual 
observation to look for infractions requiring the imposition of discipline.  This permits 
the individual to operate with some aspect of anonymity. 
Moreover, understanding the concept of total surveillance demonstrated by the 
Panopticon should lead governance strategies to address the issues regarding the 
operation and use of databases containing surveillance information.  It is the recording of 
this data that directly impacts the reserve aspect of privacy. Controls on dissemination 
and use of collected data may mitigate concerns over the impact on this state of privacy.  
A final conclusion drawn from the analysis of the Panopticon is the notion that 
surveillance technology can actually serve to provide a check on government itself. 
Where surveillance programs are operated in a transparent fashion subject to public 
oversight, the operation of the government can be understood and examined.  
Accordingly, public accountability should be addressed in system governance. 
3. Understanding Constitutional Protections 
Analysis of existing constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates that significant 
protections are afforded to certain aspects of privacy.  For example, there are substantial 
constitutional protections for seclusion and intimacy.  Though protections for seclusion 
are largely restricted to the protection of areas like homes and residences, they extend to 
other areas and even public areas where bodily integrity and private communications are 
concerned.  
Privacy states of anonymity and reserve have received lesser protections. 
Anonymity is protected only to the extent that impacting it affects the exercise of free 
speech or assembly.  As to reserve, while there is some expression of concern over 
impacts on this value by large and complex compilations of computerized data, there is 




However, there is strong suggestion that concerns about reserve, if not appropriately 
addressed by government, may give rise to future court intervention to provide 
protections.    
Constitutional protections are important considerations in development of 
governance strategies.  Use of collection devices must be consistent with constitutional 
protections extended to seclusion and intimacy. Anonymity must be assured for the 
exercise of protected association and expressive activity. Moreover, safeguards should be 
employed to protect surveillance data collection consistent with respect for the privacy 
value of reserve.    
4. Considering Other Legal Protections and Issues  
In addition to constitutional protections for privacy, there are also protections that 
apply through federal statutes, state law protections and private rights of action.   Most all 
these legal protections do not to extend to public surveillance activities, except those 
related to private communications. They do, however, provide some helpful principles for 
review in developing governance strategies.  Federal statutes addressing the 
government’s electronic surveillance of communications provide models for governance 
of individualized public surveillance activity.  They address important concepts like 
authorization, oversight, notice and retention of information.  Moreover, some recent 
state law cases raise the specter of a growing body of state law providing greater 
protection from individuated surveillance in public.  These cases demonstrate a concern 
for surveillance directed at individuals without standards and oversight.   
With respect to state law, certain provisions may actually pose impediments to 
protecting privacy interest, particularly with respect to compiled databases. State open 
records and freedom of information laws, designed to provide protections for 
transparency in government and citizen access to information, can actually serve to 
impair privacy rights.  Unless appropriately addressed in governance strategies, these 
laws may require collection of data that is not required for system operation and 
unacceptably wide dissemination of data to third parties. 
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A final area of legal analysis concerns the right of remedy for impermissible 
intrusion on privacy rights.  While many states have private remedies available for 
privacy right violations those rights are largely inapplicable to publicly observed conduct.  
In contrast, there is a robust body of federal remedies for privacy violations that implicate 
constitutional protections.  Availability of remedy to individuals whose rights are violated 
should be part of a comprehensive governance strategy. 
5. Assessing Technology   
The assessment of technology reveals that CCTV is one of a wide array of 
developing digital technologies that can be used by government to observe human 
conduct.  The purposes for and the ways in which those technologies are applied vary 
widely.  In gross terms they can be analyzed in three groups of uses: detection of 
dangerous items and individuals; area observation and monitoring; and tracking 
individuals.  The use of CCTV technology pervades all three groupings.   
In the first group of uses, technologies, to the extent they can be focused solely on 
unlawful items or persons with a limited liberty interest, do not raise significant 
cognizable privacy concerns. These technologies can be highly intrusive.  Additionally, 
the technologies that drive these surveillance systems are, as yet, unable to operate with 
sufficient accuracy and reliability to be employed.  However, if and when these 
technologies can be employed with sufficient reliability to show in a binary fashion, the 
presence or absence of contraband, or the presence or absence of a person wanted on a 
warrant, they may be able to be employed with little concern over privacy implications.  
The lesson from these technologies for governance is to attempt to reduce surveillance 
technologies to binary outputs that indicate only the presence or absence of a person or 
material in which there is legitimate government interest.  Additionally, the use of this 
technology has implications for data storage and subsequent use.  This technology should 
only be employed in areas where detection is of critical importance (airports, public 
building and the like).  Moreover, there is little reason for lengthy retention of this type of 
data. 
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The second group of uses embraces a wide number of visual and other sensor 
technologies that can be used to monitor human conduct in a given space.  These 
technologies are not generally concerned with the identity of individuals.  Instead, focus 
is on conduct and acts within areas that require some form of supervisory attention.  
Those areas may include: the surroundings of critical infrastructure; high crime areas; 
commercial areas or streets; and roadways.  The purposes for observation may also vary.  
It may be to prevent crime, reduce traffic congestion, or direct response activities.     
Whatever the purpose, the government interest is principally satisfied in real time so there 
is little need to maintain data for lengthy periods of time.  Unless the data is stored for 
long periods and individuated for some purpose, there seems to be little privacy impact to 
its collection. 
In the third group of uses, technologies include a number of digital systems, 
CCTV, RFID, GPS, biometrics and cyber tracking, which are directed to track human 
activity.  All these systems can be interrelated through computerized databases.  
Moreover, even where the primary purpose of the system is not law enforcement, the data 
can be analyzed and used for law enforcement purposes.  For example, data from traffic 
observation CCTV cameras in the vicinity of a bank robbery may be used to determine 
the identity of persons in a getaway car, or RFID and CCTV information from a toll way 
pass system may be used to track a suspect.  It is this concept of tracking individual 
activity in public space that impacts significantly the privacy states of anonymity and 
reserve.  Given that fact, addressing this type of collection activity may warrant special 
consideration in the development of governance strategy.  In developing such strategies, 
policymakers should consider heightened standards for initiating tracking activities, the 
duration and conduct of those activities, and greater supervisory oversight.   Additionally, 
there should be considerations regarding notice and redress for the subject of such 
tracking. 
Much of the use of CCTV and other digitized surveillance technology for human 
tracking turns on the use of large computerized data bases. It is perhaps the storage and 
use of digitized surveillance data bases that raises the most substantial privacy concerns.  
Even where all data involves matters of public record, the compilation and analysis of it 
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has been shown to implicate privacy concerns.  In this sense, the privacy value of the 
whole is worth substantially more than the sum of the parts.  The failure of government to 
properly account for and protect the privacy interest of reserve, which is potentially 
impaired by large collections of data, has derailed several multi-million dollar state and 
federal programs designed to use computer data bases to provide intelligence data on 
human activity.   
6. Case Studies of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany 
Studying the development of CCTV in the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
provides some interesting insights for developing governance strategies here in the 
United States. In the United Kingdom, the legal environment for CCTV was relatively 
unconstrained at the start.  This allowed for a substantial proliferation of CCTV systems.  
In the wake of a high profile case where CCTV data was disseminated to the 
media and broadcast and in the face of the adoption of a data protection law, structures 
were developed to begin regulating CCTV.   The system in the United Kingdom is 
predicated on self-regulation in accordance with a CCTV code of conduct.  This system 
provides flexibility to permit CCTV growth, but some critics contend that the regulation 
lacks aggressive enforcement.  
In contrast to the United Kingdom, both France and Germany have much more 
stringent legal regulation of data protection and the use of CCTV for surveillance of 
public areas. In Germany, for example, there is a requirement for state legislation before 
CCTV cameras are permitted.  In France, there are substantial administrative 
requirements that must be satisfied.  In both countries, the use of  CCTV is significantly 
less than the United Kingdom.  However, news reports from both countries, particularly 
France suggest they may be adapting their laws to allow greater use of CCTV particularly 
for anti-terrorist purposes.   
The key lessons from these case studies seem to be a convergence of thought 
regarding the use of surveillance technology.  In the United Kingdom, there is a growing 
recognition of privacy implications of surveillance and the need to regulate it to protect 
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privacy interests.  In France, there is recognition that the stringent administrative 
requirements retard application of CCTV and deprive government of a useful security 
tool.  Understanding the effects of differing governance schemes and the need to balance 
between weak self-regulation and detailed centralized regulatory schemes provides 
helpful guidance to policymakers. 
7. The Chicago Experience 
The Chicago experience through its two federal court consent decrees also 
provides policymakers with important insight on how to develop governance of 
surveillance systems.  Under the first consent decree Chicago operated with a 
procedurally detailed regulatory structure which did not afford sufficient flexibility to 
operate a public CCTV surveillance system.  The modified consent decree which still 
imposes requirements for written policy development, training and audits, affords 
significant flexibility to allow for the operation of a large CCTV surveillance network.   
This experience demonstrates that systems can operate effectively within constitutional 
bounds with some regulation and oversight.  It also demonstrates the importance of audits 
or other processes to maintain system accountability. 
8. Next Steps 
This research suggests that the next steps in harnessing the value of digitized 
surveillance technology like CCTV center on developing a governance strategy that 
addresses privacy concerns.  There are a number of policy models that can be utilized to 
effect governance.  Some are statutory with detailed mandates for conduct.  Some, like 
the concept of self-regulation, are more flexible and likely more adaptable to manage a 
rapidly changing technology.  Rigid statutory or regulatory structures will likely stifle 
deployment of emergent technologies.  However, there will likely need to be some blend 
of legislative and regulatory approaches.  For example, legislative enactments may be 
required to protect surveillance data from third party access, but subject access could be 
managed by a self-regulated process.  
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While there are differing structures offered by a variety of sources for addressing 
the privacy considerations of digitized surveillance data collection and use, they all seem 
to coalesce around a set of common principles. Those principles, articulated in the 1970s 
as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP), provide a framework for development 
of governance strategies.2  They include requirements of: Notice/Awareness; 
Choice/Consent; Access/Participation; Integrity/Security; and Enforcement/Redress.  
Government policymakers in implementation of CCTV systems or any other 
digitized surveillance system should consider the FIPP in the application of the entities 
that are addressed in their system of governance.  Additionally, policymakers should be 
mindful of the following concepts in their policy development and system operation: 
• Privacy is not a monolithic concept 
• Privacy is constitutionally protected 
• Application of surveillance technology in public generally does implicate 
the fourth amendment 
• Technology can and should be used to mitigate impacts on privacy 
• Complex data bases in and of themselves have significant privacy 
implications 
• Measures must be in place to ensure that practice conforms to written 
policies through supervision, training, discipline, and retraining of 
employees and internal and system audits. 
• The pace of change in technology requires periodic review of policies and 
practices to ensure they are meeting governance goals 
Developing an adequate governance system is a crucial component in the over all 
development and operation of CCTV and other digital surveillance systems.  This 
consideration should be addressed early in the process so that system design can be 




                                                 
2 U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Fair Information Practice Principles, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (accessed February 2, 2008). 
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E. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The threat of domestic terrorism combined with the increase in availability and 
sophistication of surveillance technology in publicly accessed areas and the advancing 
ability of the government to store and analyze massive amounts of public data has 
substantial implications for the privacy of citizens.  Technological advancements in the 
areas of CCTV surveillance, biometrics, sensor technology, GPS and RFID monitoring, 
combined with enhancements in computer technology to store and analyze data collected 
from public sources, have implications on personal privacy.  Existing legal protections do 
not address the complete spectrum of privacy concerns. Development of consistent and 
understandable ethical and legal standards and an accepted governance strategy for the 
application of surveillance technology in public areas will enhance the ability of local 
governments to employ developing surveillance technology consistent with legitimate 
privacy concerns.  It can also help shape the design and development of surveillance 
technology so that it meets security requirements and protects privacy.  
1. The Rise of CCTV Surveillance in the United States Post 9/11 
The rise of CCTV surveillance in the United States post 9/11 offers perhaps the 
most vivid example of government employment of surveillance technology in public 
areas to address terrorist threats and the absence of comprehensive privacy protections. 
While the United Kingdom has long had an aggressive program of utilizing CCTV to 
address terrorist threats, other European countries have been more circumspect in 
application of CCTV technology.  Large scale government use was not common in the 
United States prior to 9/11.  Subsequently, the use of CCTV for surveillance of public 
areas has begun to be entertained in the United States.   
The first large scale public area CCTV system was initiated in Washington D.C. 
shortly after the attacks in September, 2001.3 While initially designed for 
                                                 
3 Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C., “MPDC's Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
System,” 
http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,1238,q,541201,mpdcNav_GID,1545,mpdcNav,%7C31748%7C.asp 
(accessed September 17, 2007). 
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counterterrorism, the Washington D. C. system has been expanded to address ordinary 
crime problems in neighborhoods.4  A similar phenomenon has occurred in Chicago.  In 
2004, Chicago announced development of a camera system characterized as the “most 
extensive in the United States.”5  The Chicago CCTV plan encompasses development of 
a surveillance system that includes both downtown areas and high crime neighborhoods.6  
Despite the lack of clear empirical evidence of CCTV impact on crime reduction, CCTV 
has been extremely well received by the residents of the high crime areas.7 
The 2005 terror attacks in the United Kingdom served to bolster the position of 
many U.S. CCTV advocates.  The Constitution Project notes in its “Guidelines for Public 
Video Surveillance” 
Within days of the July 2005 bombings on London’s subway and bus 
system, authorities had identified the bombers, retraced their paths, and 
detained suspected accomplices thanks in part to footage from London’s 
elaborate public video surveillance system. While the cameras did not 
prevent the attacks, their value in the subsequent investigation has 
reinvigorated movements, both in the United States and elsewhere, to 
develop similar systems. From Washington, D.C. to Paris, France to 
Cicero, Illinois, local officials are expressing renewed interest in video 
surveillance.8 
                                                 
4 Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C., “MPDC's Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
System,” 
http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,1238,q,541201,mpdcNav_GID,1545,mpdcNav,%7C31748%7C.asp 
(accessed September 17, 2007). 
5 The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance (Washington D.C.: The 
Constitution Project, 2007), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Video_Surveillance_Guidelines_Report_w_Model_Legislation4.pdf  
(accessed September 17, 2007). 
6Steven Kinzer, “Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Camera,” The New York Times, September 
21, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/national/21cameras.html?ex=1190174400&en=8b9b4d48e88d756f&e
i=5070  (accessed September 17, 2007). 
7Mark J. Konkol, “Do Cop Cameras Give Crooks the Blues: Jury is Still Out,” Chicago Sun Times, 





+street+  (accessed September 17, 2007). 
8 The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance. 
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More recent terrorist activity in the United Kingdom has further reinforced support for 
CCTV in combating terror. In a recent New York Times article outlining the Lower Manhattan 
Security Initiative (LMSI), the value of London’s similar CCTV system was highlighted. The 
LMSI is a $25 million program utilizing CCTV to monitor license plate information on vehicular 
traffic.  The system is similar to the “Ring of Steel” a CCTV system in London to monitor access 
into the central London area.  The article observes:  “For all its comprehensiveness, London’s 
Ring of Steel, which was built in the early 1990s to deter Irish Republican Army attacks, did not 
prevent the July 7, 2005 subway bombings or the attempted car bombings in London last month.  
But the British authorities said the cameras did prove useful in retracing the paths of the suspects’ 
cars last month, leading to several arrests.”9  
While these systems may not prevent any given act of terror, as noted above, they clearly 
prove useful in bringing to justice the alleged perpetrators of such acts. Regarding the recent 
London attacks, within hours after the discovery of an explosives-laden vehicle left in central 
London, law enforcement officials were in pursuit of suspects.  CCTV cameras had captured a 
good likeness of one of the terrorist suspects.10  The quick apprehension of those suspects could 
be reasonably assumed to have prevented additional terror attacks, at least by that cell. 
Washington D.C., Chicago and New York are not the only American cities in the process 
of implementing CCTV to address terrorism and street crime.  Recently joining the ranks of those 
cities are Baltimore,11 Newark,12 and Charleston, SC.13 In a 2007 report, the American Civil  
 
 
                                                 
9 Cara Buckley, “New York Plans Surveillance Veil for Downtown,” The New York Times, July 9, 
2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/nyregion/09ring.html?ex=1341633600&en=2644be97bd9577f9&ei=5
088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rssp  (accessed September 17, 2007). 
10 Ian Stewart, “Glasgow Attacks Seen Tied to London Bombs,” The Washington Post, June 30, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063000562.html (accessed 
September 17, 2007).  
11 Martin O’Malley, “Mayor O’Malley Unveils New CitiWatch Control Center,” City of Baltimore 
Press Release, May 12, 2005, http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/news/press/050512.html (accessed September 
17, 2007). 
12 William S. Sessions and Michael German, “Cameras Alone Won’t Stop Crime,” The Star Ledger, 
Newark, New Jersey, August 19, 2007, http://www.nj.com/starledger/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-
0/118750266928240.xml&coll=1#continue  (accessed September 17, 2007).   
13 Glenn Smith, “Cameras May Join City’s Crime Fighting Arsenal,” The Post and  Courier, 
Charleston, South Carolina, August 29, 2007, 
http://www.charleston.net/news/2007/aug/29/cameras_may_join_citys_crimefighting_ars14298/ (accessed 
September 17, 2007). 
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Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California noted that some thirty-seven California 
municipalities had implemented CCTV programs, with most having been installed in the past few 
years.14   
These recent developments regarding the use of CCTV are not the only areas 
where technology is applied to “public space.”   As noted above, the expansion of 
surveillance is seen in the use of biometric encoded identity cards used by a range of 
business and government agencies, the use of GPS coding on communication devices like 
cell phones and use of computer tracking and data mining techniques.  Like the use of 
CCTV, government’s use of these surveillance technologies is also growing.  These 
technologies all raise some common questions concerning the issue of personal privacy.  
2. Controlling the Government’s Implementation of Surveillance 
Systems and Management of Data 
In response to increased surveillance and the absence of legal protections for 
individual privacy rights, groups like the Constitution Project and the ACLU are urging 
imposition of legal restrictions.  The Constitution Project has prepared extensive model 
legislation to address privacy concerns.15  The ACLU of Northern California 
recommends that use of CCTV technology be stopped.16 
Dissatisfaction with the extent of current federal legal protections for privacy has 
led some states to extend privacy protections under state law. This can be seen in state 
court decisions regarding government use of tracking devices to monitor movement in 
public areas. Two states, Oregon and Washington, have moved from the federal 
conclusion that application of these devices in public has no protected privacy 
implications.   
As the government refines its ability to track individuals with common devices 
like public area CCTV and cell phones that emit GPS signals, this debate will likely 
                                                 
14 Mark Schlosberg and Nicole A. Ozer, Under the Watchful Eye: The Proliferation of Video 
Surveillance in California (San Francisco: American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, 2007), 
http://www.aclunc.org/issues/government_surveillance/aclu_issues_report_on_the_proliferation_of_video_
surveillance_systems_in_california.shtml (accessed January 13, 2008).  
15 The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance. 
16 Schlosberg and Ozer, Under the Watchful Eye. 
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intensify in coming years. Privacy concerns have already resulted in the elimination or 
restriction in the use of programs that involve analysis of public activity.  For example, 
concerns raised by civil right groups led to elimination of the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism 
Information Exchange (MATRIX)17 program, which involved the collection and 
compilation of individual activity from public information.   
The absence of accepted rules of governance protecting privacy presents an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs for state and local governments attempting to operate 
surveillance programs and develop the technology to support those programs. The 
existing legal theories that provide only limited privacy protection in public space were 
developed in the absence of technology that allowed government the ability to collect and 
analyze massive amounts of data to track the public conduct of individuals. The absence 
of clear guidelines on the use of public surveillance data constrains the ability of state and 
local governments to direct investment to technologies that will meet future legal and 
ethical scrutiny.  This state of affairs is also unsatisfactory for citizens who may be 
operating under false expectation that their individual conduct is not the subject of 
government surveillance. 
Governmental leaders committed to utilizing technology should recognize 
legitimate privacy concerns, especially with regard to compiled surveillance data, and 
implement protective measures. Failure to do so may undermine public support and result 
in litigation or onerous legislation burdening such programs. However, the development 
of safeguards needs to be accomplished in a way that does not deny government the use 
of surveillance technologies that can reduce terror threats, hinder the ability of 




                                                 
17 William  J. Krouse, “The Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot 
Project,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004) 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32536.pdf (accessed January 26, 2008).  
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F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is the impact of the emerging technologies on existing protections for 
privacy?  What are the elements of privacy that should be generally accepted as critical to 
a democratic society, particularly in the wake of the development of these emerging 
technologies?  Understanding those essential elements, what types of guidelines can be 
developed for governmental officials that can protect the legitimate privacy interests of 
citizens while at the same time allowing for the introduction of technological surveillance 
techniques that can enhance public safety and security? 
G. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Based on the information gleaned through the methodology outlined above, the 
essentials of a governance scheme for development and use of emergent surveillance 
technologies can be developed.  Drawing on these essential elements, states and localities 
can be informed in the development of statutes, ordinance or appropriate regulatory 
processes to govern the implementation and operation of surveillance technologies.  Such 
guidelines can be used not only in the operation of systems, but also to influence the 
industry developing technology so they can be directed in their efforts to produce 
technology that will be purchased and used. Implementation of uniform standards that 
acknowledge and provide protection for individual privacy should also serve to enhance 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION   
The literature in the area of privacy and privacy protection is extensive. 
The body of literature directly applicable to emergent technology is also growing. 
While applications of emergent technology vary widely, there are common themes that 
run through the literature.  Those themes include an outline of the way in which 
technology can greatly enhance security, but oftentimes with hidden costs to privacy.  
There is also dissatisfaction with the existing protections for privacy in the U.S.   This 
literature review included a survey of literature relevant to the area of privacy and the 
legal theories used to address public privacy concerns.  Also reviewed is literature 
discussing the impact of privacy caused by several areas of emerging surveillance 
technology.  The issues of governance are brought into focus through examination of case 
studies of CCTV deployment in other countries and the experiences of Chicago in the 
management of its surveillance programs.   There is also ample literature examining a 
range of approaches to privacy governance.   
B. UNDERSTANDING  PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 
A wealth of literature on this issue, and a few important journal articles, relate the 
issue of privacy to American Jurisprudence.  In his article, “The Struggle of a Democracy 
Against Terrorism—Protection of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the 
National Interest—the Proper Balance,”18 Emanuel Gross provides an excellent survey of 
the literature defining privacy.  In his references at notes 6 through 26, Gross identifies 
numerous works addressing the essential elements of privacy.  He also cites several 
important journal articles that reflect the thoughts of American legal scholars on privacy 
and the need for protections.  Those works include the seminal work of Warren and 
                                                 
18 Emanuel Gross, “The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human Rights: 
The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance,” Cornell Int’l L. J. 37 (2004): 27.  
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Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,”19 as well as more recent scholarship on the question of 
privacy’s definition. While a range of approaches can be utilized with regard to defining 
privacy, this analysis will focus primarily on the analytic frame developed by Alan 
Westin.20 
In addition to exploring the theoretical underpinnings of privacy, there is also a 
need to examine how those rights intersect with surveillance.  The work of philosopher 
Michel Foucault provides an interesting perspective on surveillance its impacts on the 
relationship between the individual and the state.  This work has spawned a substantial 
degree of international thought on the social and psychological impacts of surveillance.21  
C. CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVACY 
Analysis of the state of the law on privacy is bountiful.  The issue of privacy is 
addressed in numerous written court opinions, legal treatises, and law journal articles.  
The sources of law addressing privacy include: federal constitutional and statutory 
requirements; state law requirements; and private rights of action statutory requirements; 
and common law requirements.  One of the more important summary works in the area is 
Wayne Lafave’s six volume treatise on the law of search and seizure.22  This work is a 
compendium of the most important case laws and statutes regarding search and seizure in 
the United States.  
1. Federal Constitutional Requirements 
The federal constitutional protections for privacy are primarily found in the 
provisions of the fourth amendment.  That amendment protects persons and their homes 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion.  With regard to the protections of the fourth 
amendment, the primary case interpreting the reach of constitutional protections is the 
                                                 
19 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard L. Rev. 4 (1890): 193. 
20 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1970). 
21 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
22 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 4th ed., 6 vols. (St. 
Paul: Thomson/West, 2004). 
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U.S. Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States.23  Examining Katz and its progeny, 
along with the substantial body of legal commentary discussing those cases, provides a 
solid base for understanding legal theory regarding privacy in public areas.  For example, 
some of the cases decided subsequent to Katz, provide greater refinement to the 
dimensions of fourth amendment protection.24  It is also important, however, to delve 
into the range of additional protections for privacy under the first, ninth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution so that the body of case law on public privacy is placed 
in a larger context. 
With respect to the application of developing surveillance technology, the most 
significant recent case law development is found in Kyllo v. United States25 and the 
literature discussing that decision. Understanding Kyllo, and its application in subsequent 
court decisions and the opinions of legal commentators will illuminate the likely shape of 
future decisions on the application of new technologies affecting privacy.   
The literature tracking Supreme Court developments in the evolution of privacy 
protection, or as some critics would argue, absence of privacy protection is fairly dense.  
It gives a good understanding of the strengths and limitations of current federal 
constitutional jurisprudence on the subject. 
2. Federal Statutory Provisions 
In his article “Symposium: The Power and Pitfalls of Technology-Enhanced 
Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officials,” Ric Simmons provides an excellent 
summary of the statutory requirements enacted for the government’s use of technology to 
electronically intercept communications.26  The literature analyzing the promulgation of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III)27 provides 
                                                 
23 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
24 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 
(1989). 
25 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
26 Ric Simmons, “The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology: Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law 
Enforcement Officials,” New York Univ. Annual Survey of American Law 60 (2005): 711. 
27 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000). 
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insight on how governance strategies can be formulated.  The case law and commentary 
analyzing the applicability of Title III and its expansion with the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)28 provide a menu of issues that require 
consideration in governing technology to ensure privacy protection.  
3. State Law Requirements 
While the Constitution provides uniform protections for privacy across all fifty 
states, under our federal system states can provide enhanced protections.  The federal 
Constitution provides only a common baseline for the protection of individual rights.  
While for many years most state constitutions were thought to provide no greater 
protections for individual rights than those provided by federal law,  that paradigm is 
breaking down.  Examination of the law in this area will show that states are diverging 
from the “lockstep” approach.29 One such example is the decision of the Oregon State 
Supreme Court decision in State v. Campbell. 30 There that court provided additional 
protection against public surveillance activities.  
As technology develops, it is likely more states may diverge from the federal 
baseline and provide enhanced privacy protection.  These enhanced standards will have 
to be accommodated in the collection and use of any unified data collection and analysis 
system.  Analysis of state law decisions diverging from the lockstep doctrine provides 
insight on should be beneficial in assessing the likely requirements for technology 
implementation.  While the literature is scarcer on these subjects, review of primary 
source materials such as subsequent state court decisions should provide good insight into 
the developing body of state constitutional law regarding privacy protection. 
                                                 
28 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (EPCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (2000). 
29 Robert F. Williams, “State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping,” William and Mary L. Rev. 46 (2005): 1499; Helen W. 
Gunnarsson, “The Limited Lockstep Doctrine,” Ill. Bar J. 94, no. 7 (July 2006): 340. 
30 Oregon v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988). 
 25
4. Private Rights of Action 
The issue of remedies for violations of privacy rights is important for governance.  
Common law provisions providing a private right of action for privacy infringements are 
outlined in the Second Restatement of Torts.31   While the protections of tort law 
generally do not extend to governmental action because of immunities extended to 
government and governmental actors, the theories of legal protections for privacy may be 
instructive in developing remedies for persons whose privacy rights are violated. Also 
important to defining the picture of privacy protection is an understanding of the private 
right of action offered under federal law codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
This private right of action approach is in many ways more similar to the 
European models that provide substantial protections to privacy.  Review of these legal 
protections may provide theoretical underpinnings for guidelines to protect privacy 
interests.  They may be particularly helpful for understanding how to protect against non-
governmental use of surveillance data. 
D. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
As digital technology matures and computer capacity continues to there is an 
increasingly sophisticated array of surveillance tools and techniques to gather and 
compile information on individuals.32  There are a range of new technologies that 
implicate privacy concerns.  Commentators analyzing the technologies have used a 
variety of formats to assess those technologies.  Those approaches have centered on 
intrusiveness of the technique,33 expectation of privacy in the area of examination34 and 
even analysis of individual personal privacy expectations and measures taken to protect 
                                                 
31 The Restatement (Second) of Torts (New York: West Publishing Company, 2006), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm (accessed March 4, 2008).  
32 Richard Posner, Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 88-9. 
33 Simmons, “The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology”; Patrick J. McMahon, “Counterterrorism 
Technology and Privacy,” Cantigny Conference Series (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2005). 
34 Andrew Taslitz, “Enduring and Empowering: The Bill of Rights in the Third Millennium: The 
Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 65 (2002): 125. 
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privacy.35  When analyzing the literature on surveillance, it may help to group the 
technology into five areas: contraband identification technology; area surveillance 
technology; tracking technology to monitor activity of suspect persons; cyberspace 
tracking; and developments in surveillance data management.  
1. Contraband Identification Technology  
The literature on the use of contraband detection technology continues to grow as 
technology solutions for the detection of contraband continue to refine.  Much of the case 
law on the use of detection technology arises out of the use of canines and field testing 
equipment for detection of narcotics.  This area of analysis of technologies that can only 
detect the presence or absence of a contraband substance is referred to by commentators 
as “binary search” technology.36 Much of the literature centers on three cases. 
Examining legal developments in light of U. S. Supreme Court decisions like 
United States v. Place,37 United States v. Jacobsen,38 and, most recently, Illinois v. 
Caballes39 provides insight into how law enforcement can use binary search technology 
to address issues related to contraband.  While the bulk of the analysis on this topic has 
focused primarily on the issue of narcotics, there are wide number of implications for 
development of binary search technology.  The federal government is piloting various 
explosive detection technologies to secure public areas like airports and rail and bus 
stations and platforms.40  A similar argument can be made for technology such as 
millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray technology that could be used to detect weapons 
                                                 
35 Lee Tien, “Doors, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain Role of Precautions in Fourth 
Amendment Law,” DePaul Univ. L. Rev. 54 (2005): 873. 
36 Ric Simmons,  “The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World 
Safe for Binary Searches,” Tulane L. Rev. 80 (2005): 411. 
37 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
38 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
39 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
40 Thomas Frank, “Security Devices Falter in Rail Tests,” USA Today, February 13, 2007. 
 27
or bombs.41  Review of the official websites of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) demonstrates a range of uses envisioned for these technologies.  
In light of the case law and commentary discussion of the binary search concept, 
the privacy features of CCTV surveillance could likely be enhanced by the addition of 
developing technologies such as ”intelligent video” and “facial recognition.”  These 
technologies would focus the area surveillance on suspicious conduct, patterns, or 
persons.  For example, intelligent video technology allows cameras to be programmed 
with algorithms allowing them to alert when suspicious conduct is recognized (e.g. 
leaving an unattended bag in a crowded terminal lobby or approaching and throwing and 
object over a perimeter fence or barrier).42  This technology is relatively new and has 
generated relatively little peer reviewed literature.  This is likely a result of the fast paced 
movement of technology in this area. 
2. Area Surveillance Technology 
The primary method of area surveillance involves the use of CCTV.  The 
literature demonstrates that anti-terror and law enforcement are only some of the 
functions related to area surveillance.  It also illustrates the applicability of digitized 
surveillance technology to area surveillance to such as traffic enforcement and 
monitoring, as well as, direction of response assets.   Moreover, the literature 
demonstrates that the use of CCTV is not limited to the United States.  On the contrary, 
there is extensive experience in the use of CCTV in the United Kingdom.  The British use 
of CCTV is particularly interesting in light of the common legal experience of both 
                                                 
41 Jon S. Vernick et al., “National Challenges in Population Health: Technologies to Detect Concealed 
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countries and their commitment to civil rights. The extensive use of those systems has 
generated substantial literature on the subject of CCTV usage.43  
While in the United States the use of CCTV covering public areas is solidly 
accepted as permissible under the fourth amendment, the discussion hardly ends there. 
There is a developing body of literature discussing the efficacy and privacy implications 
of such programs.44  Examination of the literature on this subject suggests that a properly 
designed area oriented surveillance program can be squared with privacy concerns and 
protections. 
3. Tracking of Suspect Persons 
The tracking of individuals can be accomplished through a range of technologies. 
These technologies include CCTV, GPS systems,45 and RFID systems,46 and biometrics.  
These programs represent a shift of focus to activities of a specific individual.  This 
seems to shift the nature of the privacy concerns implicated. 
There is a growing body of material discussing the use of devices to track 
individuals even when that tracking is limited to public space.  Beginning with the U.S. 
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Supreme Court decision in United States v. Knotts47, there has been commentary and 
significant state case law developments concerning technology-aided, individualized 
surveillance occurring in the public space.  Additionally, the relative maturity of GPS 
technology and satellite tracking capabilities has generated additional literature on this 
subject.48  Add to these technologies the introduction of tracking through cellular 
communications technology49 and RFID tracking,50 and there is a mature body of 
literature exploring the implications of tracking capabilities on the privacy.   
A related form of tracking revolves around the concept of identification 
technology, specifically biometrics.  Biometrics is technology that uses certain biometric 
features like fingerprint, hand geometry, retinal scan or facial geometry to establish 
identity.51  Newly developed federal programs utilizing this technology include: U.S. 
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (VISIT) program (which seeks to 
track the comings and goings of foreign nationals);52 the Travel Worker Identification 
Credentials (TWIC) (which would allow the federal government to positively establish 
the identity of all persons working in the transportation field);53  and the registered 
traveler (RT) program (which allows travelers expedited passage through airport security 
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lines).54  Literature on these three particular federal programs demonstrates the range of 
capabilities for passive tracking of individuals through biometrics. This type of tracking 
to gain control of U.S. borders was strongly advocated by the 9/11 Commission.55  
4. Cyberspace Tracking 
 Just as tools are developed to track individuals in physical public space, there is 
increasing ability of the government to track activities, preferences and movement in 
cyberspace.   The tracking of a person’s movements on the internet raises considerable 
privacy concerns.  There is significant literature that examines the privacy implications of 
two government programs initiated by the FBI.    
Through the “Carnivore” program, the FBI was able to trap internet56 
communications of suspect individuals without application for a warrant.   Carnivore 
demonstrates the ability of the government to monitor individual conduct which can 
relate directly to the most intimate and private thoughts.  Utilizing Carnivore the 
government can track all of an individual’s electronic contacts.  It collects and stores 
communications for later review if a warrant is issued.  Commentators have noted this 
poses substantial implications for personal privacy in the digital age.57  Similar concerns 
are posed by the FBI’s keystroke logging systems like “Magic Lantern.”58  This program 
allows the government to access computers remotely and then monitor all the activity on 
the keyboards.   
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5. Technology Developments in Surveillance Data Management 
In addition to the use of cyber tools directed toward the computers of suspect 
individuals or organizations, another government use of computer technology raises 
significant privacy concerns. That tool is the use of powerful and complex government 
computer systems to coordinate and analyze massive amounts of data about individuals.  
An example of this type of computer use in the law enforcement context is the MATRIX 
program which was a computer program designed to mine data from a range of private 
and public databases. The development of similar programs is being researched by TSA 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify individuals that pose 
potential threats.  These databases have generated significant commentary from a range 
of privacy advocacy groups concerning the potential impact they have on personal 
privacy.59.  They are also the subject of several governmental reports and analyses with 
respect to privacy impacts. 
E. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS  
The proliferation of emerging surveillance technology has led to the development 
of a range of governance schemes.  Most all the legal commentary referenced in this 
literature review involves proposals for management of emerging surveillance 
technology.  While some of the proposed guidance is contradictory, there is amazing 
consistency around those central principles articulated in the FIPP.  This is true of 
systems adopted in the United Kingdom, the date protection principles adopted 
throughout Europe, or the principles offered by groups like the American Bar association 
or the Constitution Project. The range of possibilities for governing surveillance and the 
methods for implementing that governance is presented in great detail throughout the 
literature on this subject.    
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III. UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 
While privacy has been characterized as one of the most important values of 
human culture, it is not a unitary concept.  Understanding what exactly constitutes 
privacy and its function in democratic society is a first step in determining how and to 
what extent it should be protected.  Both the positive and negative dimensions of privacy 
must be analyzed.    
In juxtaposition to the individual right of privacy is the responsibility and the 
power of the State to maintain a level of common security and compliance with accepted 
social rules.  Defining what is and is not surveillance is an important fist step.  The 
Panopticon described by Foucault offers the example of complete surveillance where 
behavior is controlled through observation by an almost omniscient authority.  This 
extreme form of government control demonstrates the negatives of surveillance, but also 
offers some positive possibilities. Understanding those positives and negatives, especially 
as they interplay with privacy, can help in the development of guidelines that preserve the 
positive elements of both. 
A. UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 
Arriving at an accepted definition of privacy is, in and of itself, a difficult task.  
Emanuel Gross notes that “… the vast literature in the field teaches us that it [privacy] is 
one of those concepts that everyone understands but cannot be defined in an objective 
and descriptive way that clearly expresses the scope of its application.”60  His construct is 
that privacy definitions can be placed in three categories: privacy as moral claim or right; 
privacy as an exercise of control over personal information; and privacy as matter claim 
or right.61  However, further exposition of each of these categories seems to lead to 
similar tenets that underpin the privacy definition.  Where the focus is as a claim, control 
or accessibility, the central premise seems to be on the type of information about the 
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individual to be disseminated.  In short, it is the process of information dissemination, or 
perhaps more appropriately the restriction of dissemination of information about an 
individual, that is the key to privacy.  
Perhaps one of the better definitions of privacy is the one offered by Westin.  
While his assessment of privacy is based on a theory of a claim of right, the definition 
offered seems equally applicable to a control or accessibility based theory.  Westin posits  
[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual 
to social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal 
of a person from the general society through physical or  psychological 
means, either in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy, or, when 
among larger groups in a condition of anonymity or reserve.62  
Westin acknowledges the individual’s desire for privacy competes with a similar 
compelling desire for social interaction.  The appropriate balance between the two 
competing desires is weighted with the final balance being struck based on personal 
preference and societal influences.63 
1. States of Privacy (How It is Achieved) 
Westin’s definition offers four mechanisms by which individuals achieve privacy: 
solitude; intimacy; anonymity; and reserve.  Examining each of these mechanisms, in 
turn, provides insight in how surveillance technology intersects with privacy rights.  Each 
of these mechanisms presents differing degrees of challenge for protection against the 
intrusion of surveillance.   
Solitude is perhaps the most perfected degree of privacy.  It is the state of being 
separated from society physically and psychologically. The individual in solitude is 
unobserved by the group; this is the state where the individual can be “…especially  
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subject to that familiar dialogue with the mind or conscience.”64 It is in this solitude that 
original thought can occur and the mind can achieve peace.  It presupposes an absence of 
any surveillance. 
Intimacy is the action of disseminating information about one’s self to a small 
unit or group.  The purpose of intimacy is to reveal highly personal information.  Westin 
describes it as a “corporate seclusion” for purposes of achieving “…a close, relaxed, 
frank relationship between two or more individuals.”65  Intimacy generally encompasses 
relations among family, friends, and close work associates. Unlike solitude which 
presupposes no surveillance, there may be some intersection with the exercise of 
intimacy. 
In contrast to solitude and intimacy, which are exercised away from the general 
public, a state of anonymity is exercised in the general public.  Anonymity is “…when 
the person is in public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, the 
freedom from identification and surveillance.”66  It is the ability of the individual to 
“…merge into the ‘situational landscape.’”67  This state of privacy is profoundly affected 
by enhanced surveillance technology.  This is so because it is not only can conduct that 
can be observed and catalogued — the perpetrator can be identified. 
The final state of privacy, reserve, like anonymity, is an exercise of privacy in 
public.  The concept of reserve is that of placing “…psychological barriers against 
unwarranted intrusion….”68 This occurs by limiting the communication of information 
about one’s self to others.  Westin equates this “mental distancing” to “social 
distancing.”69 Citing the work of Simmel, Westin notes this reservation of information is 
that deemed necessary by the individual to “…protect the personality.”  It is the holding 
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back of information to preserve a public perception of who the individual truly is.70  
While reserve may be undermined by surveillance, it is not directly affected the way 
anonymity is affected.  Instead it is more directly affected by dissemination of 
information gained through surveillance. 
Having identified the states of privacy and how they may be impacted by 
surveillance, there is a need to understand why privacy is important.  Why it is valued.  
Perhaps the best way to do that is to examine the functions that privacy serves for both 
the individual and the society. 
2. Functions of Privacy (Why It is Important) 
The four functions of privacy identified by Westin provide a good starting point 
for understanding why privacy is important.  Those functions include: personal 
autonomy; emotional release; self-evaluation; and limited and protected 
communications.71  Examining the applications of the states of privacy to these functions, 
it becomes clear how surveillance can serve to undermine important features of both 
individual development and support for democratic processes. 
Personal autonomy is the ability to control the information about one’s self, to 
maintain one’s independent identity.  To protect that autonomy, individuals build 
defenses that provide increasing restriction on access to information.  Westin, relying on 
the work of researchers like R. E. Park, Kurt Lewin, and Ervin Goffman, notes that these 
restrictions on  access form “’zones’” which are like concentric circles emanating out 
from one’s inner personality at the core.72  As one proceeds from the core, where one’s 
“ultimate secrets” are held and not shared, the next level are those secrets shared with 
intimates, then secrets shared with friends, and, finally, the circle of information shared 
with casual acquaintances.73 
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Piercing those circles that surround the individual’s core secrets undermines 
independence.  It leaves the person susceptible to “ridicule and shame” placing them 
within the control of those who know their secrets.74  While at first blush it would not 
seem that public surveillance technologies can impact the core privacy values of 
individual autonomy, the ability to compile and manipulate massive amounts of data 
about individuals can give insights into a range of personal information.  Technology is 
able to compile information about websites being visited, places a person goes and even 
the most fundamental genetic information about an individual’s make-up. 
Emotional release is the second function of privacy outlined by Westin.  This 
concept is recognition of the fact that there is a balancing between many social roles a 
person plays and the individual needs to retreat and receive mental relief.  Privacy affords 
the individual the opportunity to let down his or her guard.  Emotional release is also seen 
in the relief from the stimulation of daily life, the ability to vent and express anger over 
the life problems one confronts and restorative relief from public failures.75 Even with 
new enhanced surveillance technologies, it is unlikely that these privacy functions will be 
affected.  
Emotional release also involves management of the body and its functions.  This 
includes privacy for procreation, bodily excretions, dressing and medical treatment.  
Privacy for these functions has long been engrained in society.   However, despite the 
longstanding protections for this aspect of privacy, the advent of DNA collection and 
analysis threaten these privacy protections. 
A final area of the function of emotional release outlined by Westin is that of 
protection for non-compliance from social norms.  This aspect of emotional release relies 
substantially on anonymity.  Release is predicated on the fact that minor transgressions 
can occur in public (i.e., speeding, jaywalking, and consensual sexual indiscretions)  
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without resulting in social sanction.76 The advent of sophisticated surveillance 
technology like CCTV can and, in cases like traffic enforcement, is rapidly shrinking the 
area of public deviance based on anonymity. 
Self evaluation is another function served by privacy.  Like personal autonomy 
this function relies on solitude and intimacy. Withdrawn from society, the individual has 
time to reflect on ideas and original thought.  In the company of trusted confidants, the 
individual can discuss and examine new thoughts and concepts.77   Like individual 
autonomy, the exercise of the self evaluation function might be affected by surveillance 
systems that are calculated to assess individual preferences and areas of interest and 
inquiry. 
The final function of privacy is to support limited and protected conversation. The 
purpose of this conversation is twofold.  First, it serves as a catalyst for evaluation of 
ideas and thoughts and for receiving advice and counsel.  Second, it serves as a 
mechanism for distancing individuals from others.  Depending on the level of intimacy to 
the individual, information communicated becomes more limited and circumspect.  As 
with other privacy functions, the development of new surveillance technologies has even 
invaded the search for knowledge and information that occurs across the public space of 
the internet. Moreover, through tracking and other types of electronic surveillance, the 
identity of parties engaged in communications can be identified, and under certain 
circumstances, the content of their conversation invaded. 
In addition to importance for the individual, privacy is also important to 
organizations and society. The individualism achieved through personal autonomy is a 
key to the development of “… the pursuit of pluralism necessary to create the democratic 
existence.” 78  Westin notes that functions of individual privacy are repeated in 
organizational conduct.  Organizational autonomy derives from individual autonomy. 
Release from public roles derives from emotional release. Evaluative decision making 
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derives from self evaluation. Protected public communications derive from individual 
limited and protected communications.   The functions of individual privacy buttress the 
organizational structures that support western democratic systems.79 
3. Negative Aspects of Privacy (How It Threatens Us) 
While most of the scholarship on privacy focuses on its positives, particularly in 
its contribution to democratic societies, some aspects of privacy can lead to adverse 
results.  Gross notes in his work that “…in the absence of privacy many wrongful, 
fraudulent and hypocritical acts world wide might not have been committed….”80  Of 
particular concern is public anonymity.    While perhaps essential to the public non-
conformance and civil disobedience and providing some healthy emotional release, 
anonymity can have a darker side.  Those aspects are well explored in the work of Philip 
Zimbardo.81 
The non-conformity that is fostered by anonymity has been shown to enhance 
aggression in individuals and increase their ability to inflict pain on others.  Zimbardo 
catalogues the results of three studies that examine the effects of anonymity on human 
behavior.  The experiments include examination of women administering electric shock, 
children in Halloween costumes, and masked warriors.  In each of these studies, the 
existence of anonymity affected behavior in a negative fashion.  Zimbardo delineates this 
feature of anonymity as “deindividuation.”    
In a study of women delivering electric shock, Zimbardo found that when the 
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would deliver electro shock for a period twice as long as when they were identifiable.82 
He concluded that “[t]he sense of a lack of personal identifiably can also lead to 
antisocial behavior.”83 
The Halloween costume experiments conducted by Scott Fraser and cited by 
Zimbardo, further document a relationship between anonymity and anti-social conduct.  
Those experiments involved studying the effects of costumes and masks on aggressive 
play among children.  Zimbardo notes that “[t]the data [from the Fraser study] are 
striking testimony to the power of anonymity.  Aggression among these young children 
increased significantly as soon as they put the costume on.”84 
Citing the work of cultural anthropologist R.J. Watson, Zimbardo notes that 
anonymity as social phenomena can exacerbate destructive tendencies.  Watson studied 
the  actions of warriors in societies  based on whether or not the warrior’ appearance was  
altered for battle,  Zimbardo observes that “…90 percent of the time when victims of 
battle were killed, tortured or mutilated, it was by warriors who had first changed their 
appearance and deindividuated themselves.”85  
Zimbardo’s conclusions about anonymity’s dangers run squarely in opposition to 
some of Westin’s positive conclusions.  With respect to anonymity, Zimbardo observes: 
People can become evil when they are enmeshed in situations where the 
cognitive controls that usually guide their behavior in socially desirable 
and personally acceptable ways are blocked, suspended or distorted.  The 
suspension of cognitive control has multiple consequences, among them 
the suspension of: conscience, self-awareness, sense of personal 
responsibility, obligation, commitment, liability, morality, guilt, shame, 
fear, and analysis of one’s actions in cost-benefit calculations. 
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The two general strategies for accomplishing this transformation are: (a) 
reducing the cues of social accountability of the actor (no one knows who 
I am or cares to) and (b) reducing concern for self-evaluation by the actor. 
86 
In light of the work of social psychologists like Zimbardo, the full application of 
the states of privacy may not be fully appropriate to the public sphere.  That work, at 
least, should caution us that some aspects of privacy in the public sphere should be 
appropriately restricted; this brings to the fore the concept of surveillance. 
B. UNDERSTANDING SURVEILLANCE 
Just as the concept of privacy requires some examination, so too does the concept 
of surveillance.  David Lyon offers a relatively simple definition. “Surveillance refers to 
the monitoring and supervision of populations for specific purposes. “87   He goes on to 
note that “[s]urveillance—literally, some people “watching over’ others—is as old as 
social relationships themselves, but the phenomenon has acquired new and distinctive 
meanings in the modern era.”88 
A more comprehensive definition of surveillance is offered in A Report on the 
Surveillance Society, the work of the Surveillance Studies Network, for the United 
Kingdom’s Information Commissioner.89  That work provides this definition of 
surveillance: 
Rather than starting with what intelligence services or police may define 
as surveillance it is best to begin with a set of activities that have a similar 
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systematic and focused attention paid to personal details, for the sake of 
control, entitlement, management, influence or protection, we are looking 
at surveillance.90 
This definition adds important components to understanding surveillance. Perhaps most 
importantly, it links the concept to identifying individuals.  It is not just a generalized 
overlook of the crowd, although the technology may be used to gather the big picture 
view.  Ultimately, observations must be linked to the individual to be surveillance.  
Moreover, this definition recognizes that the results of surveillance activity can be (and 
usually are) manipulated in a variety of ways all linked to the individual. 
The Report’s definition also requires the observation to be systematic in nature.  
Unlike the historic concept of surveillance described by Lyons, with people watching 
over each other, this definition presupposes a more organized and comprehensive 
examination. The only real controversial component of this definition is the requirement 
that the surveillance be routine.  While such a definition may characterize surveillance in 
the United Kingdom, it is unclear why occasional surveillance could not occur.  Despite 
this quibble, the Report’s definition provides a good starting point for understanding 
surveillance.   It links together the concepts of observation and the compiling and 
processing of the data generated by observation. 
1. Enter the Panopticon 
If privacy is the individual’s attempt to limit and control the ability of others to 
discover information about himself or herself, the perfect form of surveillance is the 
Panopticon.  This concept discussed extensively in the work of philosopher Michel 
Foucault, was originally devised in the eighteenth century by Jeremy Bentham, as a 
schema for the operation of a prison. Examination of this extreme form of surveillance, 
that destroys almost all vestiges of privacy, provides insights into the advantages and 
disadvantages of surveillance. 
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The Panopticon has two dimensions.  The first, and perhaps most well known, is 
the architectural dimension of the Panopticon.  It was a design for a prison cell house that 
maximized the ability of guards or warders to keep watch over the prison inmates.  The 
design involved the placement of a watchtower, with large windows, in the center of the 
cell house, encircled by galleries of cells.  The interior of the cells were backlit and 
visible to the guards who would occupy the tower.  This would allow the guard to view 
completely the activity in any cell. While the tower is windowed, allowing the guard to 
view out into the cells, venetian blinds are placed over the windows, to obscure the view 
from the cells into the tower.  Thus, the inmate cannot tell when, or if, he or she is being 
observed at any time.91 
As Foucault describes the effect of Bentham’s Panopticon,  
…the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power.  So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions; that the perfection of 
power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this 
architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a 
power relationship …. In view of this Bentham laid down the principle 
that power should be visible and unverifiable.  Visible: the inmate will 
constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from 
which he is spied upon.  Unverifiable: the inmate must never know if he is 
being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always 
be so…. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen 
dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen without ever seeing; in the 
central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.92   
The primary feature of the architectural schema of the Panopticon is faceless and 
constant surveillance or perception of surveillance.  It is a shift of power from individual 
to control by unseen authority.  While the design was to control prisoners, Foucault notes 
that the concept is easily transferred to functions such as education, medical treatment, or  
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production.93  The Panopticon is a device for efficient exercise of power from a central 
source over the individual.  It is a mechanism designed to enforce a code of discipline 
relating to individual conduct. 
2. Positive Attributes of the Panopticon   
While most of the privacy rights advocates who discuss the Panopticon focus on 
the negative impacts on privacy, the system is not without positive attributes.  The ability 
to create the perception of observation (even when it may not actually be occurring) 
makes for an efficient use of power in controlling behavior.  Moreover, as Foucault notes, 
the observational aspects of the Panopticon can also be used to monitor the power of the 
state. With respect to the open nature of the Panopticon that protects it from being a tool 
of tyranny, Foucault observes: 
…the arrangement of this machine is such that its enclosed nature does not 
preclude a permanent presence from the outside: we have seen that anyone 
may come and exercise in the central tower [of the Panopticon] the 
functions of surveillance, and that, this being the case, he can gain a clear 
idea in which the surveillance is being practiced. In fact, any panoptic 
institution, even if it were as rigorously closed as a penitentiary, may 
without difficulty be subjected to such irregular and constant inspections, 
and not only by appointed inspectors but by the public…. There is no risk, 
therefore, that the increase in power created by the panoptic machine may 
degenerate into tyranny;…. The Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an 
observer may observe at a glance, so many different individuals, also 
enables everyone to come and observe any of the observers.94 
The transparent nature of the properly operated Panopticon allows for protection against 
improper exercise of government power.  The notion of random inspection is much easier 
to effectuate in modern surveillance systems where the results of surveillance are 
digitized and stored. 
In light of the assessments by Zimbardo and others about the potential antisocial 
effects of anonymity, the imposition of panoptic surveillance in public places may serve 
to reduce antisocial conduct.  At the same time, in light of the observations by Foucault, 
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the panoptic mechanism itself can help to guard against government overreaching or 
abuse through monitoring of the government surveillance activities. 
3. Specter of the Total Panopticon 
While the Panopticon was a matter of architectural design to effect observation, 
that was not the only feature.  The system of observation envisioned by Bentham was 
only part of the equation.  In addition to observation, there was also to be a 
comprehensive system of documentation.  It is this later feature of the Panopticon that 
may be the most troubling for civil libertarians. 
In the context of a penitentiary, the Panopticon “… was also a system of 
individualizing and permanent documentation.”95  The observations made were 
documented in reports on each inmate “… making it possible to assess each case, each 
circumstance, and, consequently, to know what treatment to apply to each prisoner 
individually.”96 With the advent of digitization technology, that allows for the 
cataloguing and compiling of massive amounts of data, it is this documentation feature of 
the Panopticon that can dramatically shift power between the individual and his or her 
government.  The ultimate effect of this compilation of data that allows the subsequent 
manipulation of the individual is not known.  However, the dramatic shift in power 
between the individual and government needs to be recognized. 
C. SUMMARY 
Assessing the states of privacy and their functions will be helpful in crafting 
public policy regarding surveillance.  There are certainly areas of privacy that need 
extensive protection, not only for the sake of the individual, but for society as well.  
However, there are some areas where privacy, especially in the form of anonymity, may 
lead to undesirable behaviors that need to be restrained. 
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Just as understanding the nature of privacy is important so too is understanding 
the nature of surveillance.  The extreme example of the Panopticon demonstrates the 
positives and negatives of extensive surveillance systems.  It also points out features like 
observation of the surveillance mechanisms themselves that can serve to address 
concerns over civil liberties abuses.   
Both the features of privacy and surveillance must be considered in the 
formulation of policy to manage emerging surveillance technologies.   Both have the 
potential for profound impact on human behaviors.  Both have the potential for profound 
impacts on democratic institutions and individual rights.   
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IV. CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVACY  
The states of privacy offer a good framework for analysis of the general state of 
privacy protection in the United States.  While some commentators have suggested scant 
protections, that criticism seems inaccurate.  Some of the states of privacy seem to be 
afforded significant protection.  Those protections are perhaps better characterized as 
uneven and not well suited to guard against intrusion by some aspects of advancing 
technology.   
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVACY. 
While some commentators contend that privacy rights are relatively unprotected 
under the U.S. Constitution, an examination of the law suggests otherwise.  Initially using 
Westin’s model of four states of privacy, the following conclusions can be drawn about 
legal protections. 
1. Solitude 
With regard to the state of solitude, legal protections seem fairly significant.  
Under the fourth amendment, a person and his or her home and papers are secure from 
government intrusion except upon probable cause of some criminal act.  Protections for 
the personal privacy state of solitude begin in the home and emanate outward. Those 
protections, at least with respect to the physical dimensions of the home, have 
consistently been also held to be relatively inviolate. The privacy of the person outside 
the home has been afforded protection, but in a more limited sense. 
As early as the late 1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed protections for 
privacy against the use of surveillance technology directed at activity in the home.  In 
Olmstead v. United States,97the Court addressed the issue of the privacy of telephone 
communications emanating from a residence. The Court took a trespass-based analysis of 
the fourth amendment and concluded that it only protected against surveillance that 
would constitute something in the nature of a trespass to a person’s property.  Because  
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the action of the government in the Olmstead case involved wiretaps to phone lines which 
were off the subject’s property, the Court held there was no search of either an 
individual’s house or person.   
In reaching its conclusions, the Court in Olmstead rejected the proposition offered 
in Justice Brandeis’ dissent.  He argued that the protections of the amendments were 
much more expansive: 
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope.  
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.  They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against 
the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights, and the right most valued by men.98 
By the mid-1960s with widespread government use of surveillance technology, 
particularly to conduct wiretaps, the Court moved away from its trespass-based analysis 
for extending fourth amendment protections In Katz the Court articulated a test for 
evaluating fourth amendment protections that was not based on trespass analysis.  Rather, 
the determination of whether government’s public surveillance violates fourth 
amendment provisions was focused on whether the individual in question had an 
expectation of privacy in the area being subject to search and whether society accepted 
that expectation as reasonable.  In Katz, the Court found that the FBI’s actions in placing 
a bug on the roof of a public phone booth violated the defendant’s fourth amendment 
rights.  The Court noted a reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed phone booth, 
even when that phone booth was located in a public area.  While the Katz decision did not 
involve the issue of solitude in the home, it clearly extends the protections for privacy in 
the home and beyond, by shifting the analytic focus on protecting privacy expectations 
not just in the geographic limits of the home. 
                                                 
98 Olmstead, 277 U.S at 478. 
 49
a. Solitude in the Home 
The most recent examination of privacy protection against home 
surveillance in Kyllo harmonizes the trespass and expectation of privacy analysis to 
provide extensive protection for privacy in the home. The Kyllo case involved 
examination of government use of a thermo-imaging surveillance technology to 
determine whether or not a home was being used to grow marijuana.  Government agents, 
operating from a public street, directed the thermo-imaging device against the exterior 
walls of Mr. Kyllo’s home.  Based on the high volume of heat detected, the officers 
inferred that heat lamps were in use in the home.  Based on this information, a warrant 
was issued, and upon entering the Kyllo home, a marijuana-growing operation was 
discovered. 
In holding that the application of this surveillance technology violated the 
fourth amendment, the Court in Kyllo noted the special protection that the interior of a 
home enjoys in fourth amendment jurisprudence.  The Court observes: 
… in the case of the search of the interior of homes— the prototypical and 
hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy— there is a 
ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal 
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be 
to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
anyinformation regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,” [citation omitted], constitutes a search— at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.99 
In reaching its conclusions, the majority relied on a lengthy line of cases 
supporting the special status of the home.  Quoting Silverman v. United States,100 the 
Court observed “’At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man 
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to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.’”101 Careful examination of the case of United States v. Karo102 demonstrates 
the special nature of intrusion in to the home. 
In Karo, the Court found that the use of a beeper that had been secreted in 
a container of ether did not violate fourth amendment protections.  Government agents 
had planted the beeper in an attempt to track unauthorized possession of the substance. 
The Court in Karo concluded that the use of a beeper to track the location of the ether 
within a residence was unlawful.  The decision in Karo stands in stark contrast to an 
earlier decision in the case of Knotts. In Knotts, the Court concluded that the use of 
surreptitiously planted beepers to track an ether container, as it traveled over public 
roadways, was completely permissible.  The distinguishing feature between the use of the 
beeper in Karo, as opposed to Knotts, was the location of the beeper in the home.   
The protection of the interior of the home as a sanctuary was conceded by 
the dissent in Kyllo as a well-established principle.  The Court, citing the prior decision in 
Payton v. New York,103 noted that “…searches and seizures inside a home [emphasis 
provided] without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”104  However, the dissent 
argued that the observation of the heat emanating from the exterior walls of the residence 
constituted nothing more than observation of something that was in plain view of the 
public.  
Just as the case law consistently protects the interior of the home, the 
exposure of items to public view has long been found to destroy the privacy interest.  
Both the majority and dissenting opinions note the effect of plain view on the type of 
protections afforded to things inside the home.  Citing cases involving rulings on 
discoveries made through aerial surveillance and inspection of garbage left for collection  
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outside the curtilage of the home, the dissent observed “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”105   
Despite the commitment of both the majority and minority opinions in 
Kyllo to the dedicated space on the home’s interior as a place of privacy, the majority 
clearly noted that this space has already decreased with the advent of modern technology.  
As the majority noted:  
as the cases discussed above [on aerial surveillance] make clear, the 
technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, 
we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house and 
its curtilage that once were private. [citation omitted]. The question we 
confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to 
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.106 
Though the majority and dissenting opinions in Kyllo both concluded that 
exposure to public scrutiny outside a home divested the owner of protected privacy 
interests, the majority sought to place limits on application of technology that would 
allow observation.  Its opinion attempts to create a bright line rule prohibiting 
government use of surveillance technology directed against homes where that technology 
is not generally available to the public.  The dissenting Justices reasoned that emanations 
from the house should be addressed under the plain view doctrine.  They proposed 
making a distinction between a technology that penetrated into the home (“through-the-
wall” technology) and one that simply measured emanations (“off-the-wall” 
technology).107  The majority opinion rejected such a distinction, concluding that either 
would constitute an unacceptable invasion of protected privacy.  
While the Kyllo decision advances privacy protections for solitude in the 
home, the decision is not an absolute one.   It contains a caveat that privacy is only 
protected against surveillance techniques that are not generally available to the public.  
This leaves the bright line protections uncertain in the face of advancing technology. 
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b. Integrity of the Person 
While, initially, the notion of privacy protection was based on laws of real 
property like trespass and, therefore, limited to places like the residence, the advent of 
technology compelled an adjustment of those property-based doctrines.  Following the 
logic of the Katz decision, the Court confirmed the protections of the person in the case 
of Terry v. Ohio.108   The decision in Terry ensured a degree of personal integrity and 
solitude for persons in public places. 
In Terry, the Court addressed the privacy rights of persons in the public 
sphere.  Citing its recent decision in Katz, the Court noted: 
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen 
on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to 
dispose of his secret affairs. For, as this Court has always recognized, "No 
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear 
and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S.250, 251 (1891). We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation 
of privacy," id., at 361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is 
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.109 
Terry provides protection for solitude of the individual on the street.  It allows the 
individual can come and go unmolested.  The protections were given despite growing 
national concerns over crime.   
The protections against physical intrusion of the person or his or her 
conversations provided by Terry and Katz under the fourth amendment were 
supplemented by protections under the fifth amendment concerning compelled self 
incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona,110 the Court expanded the fifth amendment right 
outside the context of court testimony noting that the “…Fifth Amendment privilege is 
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available outside of criminal court proceedings….”111   The Court later observed in Davis 
v. Mississippi,112 “the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily 
questions concerning unsolved crimes,” but “they have no right to compel them to 
answer.”113 
c. Limits of Solitude in Public Places 
The legal protections of the individual to ensure physical integrity and 
solitude in public places are not without limit as the Court decisions in Katz and Terry 
both observed. Legal protection under the fourth amendment limits only unreasonable 
searches.  While the Court in Kyllo established a bright line that limited intrusion into the 
home in almost any case where probable cause was absent, the Court has been less 
receptive to limiting the use of technology or sensors that do not interfere with accepted 
expectations of privacy or where a heightened law enforcement interest can be 
demonstrated. 
(1)  Sensor Technologies and Limited Expectations of Privacy. 
Two Supreme Court cases showcase the willingness of the Court to allow application of 
technology in the public realm.  Those cases demonstrate that expectations of privacy can 
be affected by the nature of the activity in which a person is engaged and the nature of the 
activity or substances being subjected to sensor analysis.  As to the former category, in 
the Knotts case the Court analyzed the expectation of privacy in activity on a public 
street.  Government agents had placed a transmitter in a barrel of chloroform.  The barrel 
was subsequently tracked as it traveled over public roadways.  Because the surveillance 
conducted was limited to conduct which could be publicly observed, the Court concluded 
there was no expectation of privacy that warranted protection.  The insertion of the 
beeper into the ether occurred before it was transferred to the subject being followed and 
no use was made of the device to track the barrel once it reached the suspect’s property.  
The barrel was visible in plain view outside the cabin on the property. 
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The Court spent much time focusing on the absence of an accepted 
privacy interest in travel on the public way noting “[A] person traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”114 The Court also noted the generally more limited expectation of 
privacy in automobiles.  The clear implication of Knotts is that the nature of the public 
conduct (i.e., driving on a public road versus a telephone conversation) influences the 
extension of protection the law is willing to afford. 
A second area of public conduct where privacy expectations are 
clearly diminished is in the area of possessing or transporting contraband.  In Caballes,  
the Court addressed the use of drug sniffing dogs to detect the presence of narcotics.  
While a driver was stopped for a routine traffic violation by one Illinois State trooper, 
another trooper with a trained narcotics sniffing dog who happened to be in the area, 
arrived on the scene.  The dog conducted a walk-around the vehicle and alerted to the  
presence of narcotics. 
In addressing this issue the Court in Caballes noted: 
Official conduct that does not "compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy" is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S., at 123.  We have held that any interest in possessing contraband 
cannot be deemed "legitimate," and thus, governmental conduct that only 
reveals the possession of contraband "compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest." Ibid. This is because the expectation "that certain facts will not 
come to the attention of the authorities" is not the same as an interest in 
"privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable." [citation 
omitted].115 
In upholding the use of the evidence secured as a result of the 
canine sniff, the Court, citing its decision in Place, reiterated the fact that a canine search 
was sui generis  “because it ‘discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 
contraband item.’"116 The Court reaffirmed its previous conclusion in Place that 
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government conduct of a sensor analysis that disclosed the presence of contraband in a 
closed container located in the public space did not implicate protected privacy interests. 
The approval of the canine “technology” to conduct olfactory 
sensing of an object to determine the presence of contraband was distinguished from the 
thermo technology utilized in Kyllo.  The Court noted that the canine sniff which detected 
only contraband was significantly less intrusive than the thermo imaging that could be 
utilized to determine intimate details, like the lady of the house repairing from her bath, a 
fact that was afforded privacy protection.117 Thus, what is sometimes characterized as the 
“binary” nature of the technology itself may well affect conclusions about the ability of 
whether or not the technology designed only to detect illegal activity could ever 
unreasonably intrude on privacy interests.  The Court’s final conclusion in Caballes is 
quite telling in this regard:  
The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity 
will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's 
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the 
trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic 
stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that 
no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.118 
The dissenting opinions in Caballes, particularly the dissent of 
Justice Ginsburg, express concern over the possibility of expansion of the binary search 
approach to other contexts.  Both speculate as to the ability to use this technology on 
parked cars, cars sitting at long traffic lights, or even persons walking down the street.119 
Justice Souter raises concerns in his dissent over the efficacy of the sui generis canine 
technology.  While the majority opinion assumes the accuracy of highly trained canines, 
Justice Souter expresses concern over what level of falsely positive identification of 
contraband would still be acceptable under the majority’s analysis for use of the 
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technology.120  The questions of expansion and reliability of the search technology and 
the resultant interference with protected areas of solitude remain unanswered by Supreme 
Court decision.  
(2)  Government Interest and the “Special Needs Doctrine.” While 
much of the privacy jurisprudence has centered upon the expectation of privacy on the 
part of the individual, there is apparent Supreme Court support for the application of 
surveillance technology that may invade protected privacy interests when there is a 
showing of special need on the part of the government.  In two recent Supreme Court 
cases, the justices have differentiated between methods for “ordinary crime control” and 
search or surveillance techniques designed to protect against special threats.  The 
application of this doctrine to protect against terrorist threats like bombings is clear from 
these decisions. 
This “special needs” doctrine was originally articulated to address 
special circumstances where surveillance was being conducted in public areas to address 
governmental concerns that were administrative or regulatory in nature.  The doctrine 
articulates circumstances where searches of individuals or spaces occupied by them 
would be permissible irrespective of individual privacy interests.  In Griffin v. 
Wisconsin,121  the Court extended application of the special needs doctrine to searches of 
the home of a probationer, pursuant to a Wisconsin statutory penal scheme: 
we have permitted exceptions when "special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, we have held that 
government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-
related searches of employees' desks and offices without probable cause, 
[citation omitted], and that school officials may conduct warrantless 
searches of some student property, also without probable cause, [citation 
omitted]. We have also held, for similar reasons, that in certain 
circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a 
regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause 
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requirements as long as their searches meet "reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards." [citations omitted]122 
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmonds,123the Court specifically 
addressed the subject of terror prevention while  addressing the application of the 
“special needs” doctrine to the use of drug inspection checkpoints.  The City of 
Indianapolis had created a series of traffic checkpoints to utilize canines to check vehicles 
for the presence of narcotics.  The City reasoned the checkpoints were sufficiently similar 
to and no more intrusive than the sobriety checkpoints that had already been approved by 
the Supreme Court in Sitz v. Michigan.124  In rejecting the application of the “special 
needs’ doctrine to these checkpoints, the Court noted that the City’s purpose was the 
pursuit of ordinary crime control, relating to narcotics, and differentiated the drug 
checkpoint from the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz that were designed to effectuate a 
regulatory scheme of roadway safety.  Significantly however, the Court in Edmonds went 
on to note: 
Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement 
checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some 
emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of 
Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an 
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist 
attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a 
particular route. [citation omitted]. The exigencies created by these 
scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities 
might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to 
be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that 
may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline 
to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately 
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.125 
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This position articulated in Edmonds was vigorously affirmed by 
the dissent in Caballes. There Justice Ginsburg drew a significant distinction between 
narcotics sniffing dogs and those used to search for explosives.126   
The dicta in the Supreme Court cases addressing application of the 
“special needs” doctrine suggest that where a surveillance program can be closely linked 
to anti-terror strategies, there may be some room for application of surveillance 
techniques that affect otherwise protected privacy interests.  Rather than looking at the 
individual’s expectation of privacy, in cases of surveillance pursuant to an anti-terror 
program, the existence of an appropriate regulatory or statutory scheme may result in 
permissible surveillance programs that impair some privacy interests in public spaces. 
2. Intimacy 
Just as there is protection for solitude through the sanctity of the home, protection 
is also extended to intimacy.  Those protections find root both inside and outside the 
protections of the fourth amendment.  For example, in Kyllo, the majority opinion 
discusses the fact that protections for the home are designed to protect intimacy.  The 
Court notes “[i]n  the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the 
entire area is  held safe from prying government eyes [emphasis provided].”127  The 
dissenting justices were similarly concerned with invasive technology that exposed 
intimate details, but they concluded the “off-the-wall” technology of thermo-imaging 
revealed no such intimate details.128   
The protections of intimate conduct exceed the fourth amendment concept of 
privacy protection.  Beginning in the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to craft a 
body of law to protect the rights of citizens in their most intimate relationships.  These 
cases touched on the most intimate of human relationships: procreation; marriage and 
childbirth.  The first of the cases, Griswold v. Connecticut,129 involved state regulation of 
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information regarding birth control to marital couples.  In Griswold, there is an 
articulation by Justice Douglas of the “zones of privacy” that are protected by the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance. [citation omitted] Various guarantees create 
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of 
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of 
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination 
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government 
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment 
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 130 
Applying this concept of a penumbra, subsequent Court decisions have suggested 
that the protections of the fourteenth amendment seem to apply to the aspects of intimate 
association.  As the Supreme Court noted in the decision in Roe v. Wade,131   
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line 
of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. 
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court 
or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in 
the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486 
(Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the 
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal 
rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are 
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included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that 
the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 
453-454; id. at 460, 463-465 [p153] (WHITE, J., concurring in result); 
family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); 
and childrearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.132  
Protections for intimate relationships are clearly provided by the Constitution, 
whether under the fourteenth or ninth amendment.  Moreover, those protections extend to 
the exercise of the underlying relationships that form the right, not just the location, 
where they are exercised (e.g., the home).  While the Supreme Court in its 1984 decision 
in City of Dallas v. Stanglin133 rejected a challenge to dance hall restrictions that was 
based in part on claims of protected intimate social association, it noted the vitality of 
those protections.  Citing a prior decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,134, it 
observed ‘“…the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain 
intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State 
because of the role such relationships have played in safeguarding the individual freedom 
that is central to our constitutional scheme.’”135  
The protections for intimacy seem to be quite strong and comprehensive.  
Interestingly, in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in Stanglin, we find them even 
extended to development of friendship and social relationships at a dance hall (although 
he felt that Dallas’ restrictions did not sufficiently impair those rights).136  Moreover, 
those associational protections extend beyond familial types of relationships.  
Associational protections are also extended to political, religious and cultural 
matters.  While not always intimate in a family sense, these protections allow for the 
establishment of associational relationships for a range of activities covered under the 
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first amendment.  In Roberts, the Court discussed the importance of protecting close 
relationships that foster individual growth and development. 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed 
to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation 
of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of 
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. [citation omitted]. 
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this 
type of constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of 
personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of 
the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they 
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual 
and the power of the State. [citations omitted].137 
The Court in Roberts went on to recognize a continuum in relationships that run 
from the most intimate family relationships to affiliations in large organizations that are 
much more attenuated.  These relationships are important to individual thought and   
development.  While the Court noted that the more attenuated relationships do not require 
associational protection under the rubric of the first amendment, there are close 
associational relationships outside intimate family relationships that are afforded such 
protections.   
While intimate relationships and associations related to the exercise of first 
amendment rights are not afforded absolute protections, they must be considered and 
effectively addressed in the execution of surveillance.  With respect to any surveillance 
technology that might adversely impair or interfere with those protected relationships, 
there is a strong likelihood that a court challenge to that technique or practice would be 
successful. 
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3. Anonymity 
Perhaps the state of privacy that is offered the least protection under the law is 
that of public anonymity.  While the state of solitude enjoys extensive protection under 
the fourth amendment, and intimacy is protected under a range of provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, anonymity finds little protection under the Constitution.  Protections are largely 
limited to the first amendment.  Moreover, a range of statutory provisions that limit or 
constrain anonymity in public have been found to pass constitutional muster.  Overall, a 
fair characterization of the law with respect to anonymity is that it generally ranges from 
non-supportive to hostile. 
The only area in which anonymity has been afforded constitutional protection has 
been in those cases where the Court has found it a necessary prerequisite to effective 
political activity.  In NAACP v. Alabama,138 the Court addressed the ability of members 
of political organizations to maintain their anonymity.  In  NAACP v. Alabama, the Court 
addressed the compelled disclosure of membership information for the National 
Association of Colored People (NAACP).   
In overruling a decision of the Alabama Supreme Court and denying access to the 
NAACP membership records, the Court observed: 
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with 
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on 
freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases 
above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional 
rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship 
between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. 
…Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in 
advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy 
in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to 
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group 
espouses dissident beliefs. [citation omitted].139  
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So long as the surveillance techniques employed were not designed or applied in a 
way that served to chill the exercise of associational rights by techniques like the 
identification and cataloguing of group members, it is likely those surveillance techniques 
would be permitted. 
Outside the concept of protecting anonymity for the purpose of effectuating 
associational rights protected by the first amendment, anonymity in the public sphere 
receives little protection.  In fact, in a recent Supreme Court decision in Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial Circuit Court, Humboldt County,140 the ability of law enforcement to compel 
identifying information was addressed. The Hiibel case involved a challenge to a Nevada 
“stop and identify” statute.  When police stop an individual based on the reasonable 
suspicion he or she is involved in criminal activity, the statute provided that the 
individual can be compelled to provide identifying information.    
The Court rejected Mr. Hiibel’s argument that compelling him to provide his 
name constituted a violation of rights secured by the fourth and fifth amendments.  The 
Court observed that there was a long history of cases that indicated police inquiries into 
identity were permissible under the fourth amendment.  The question that remained 
unanswered prior to the Hiibel case was whether or not penalties could be imposed for 
maintaining anonymity in the face of police inquiry.  In upholding the Nevada statute, the 
Court concluded:    
The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in 
the course of a Terry stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
is determined "by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate government interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648,654 (1979). The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an 
immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The 
threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a 
legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop 
itself: it does not change its duration, [citation omitted], or its location, [citation omitted]. 
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A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is 
consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
The Supreme Court found similarly unpersuasive Hiibel’s argument that 
compelled disclosure of identity constituted a Fifth Amendment violation. 
In this case petitioner's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any 
articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to 
incriminate him, or that it "would furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute" him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 
(1951). As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only 
because he thought his name was none of the officer's business. … While 
we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose 
his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada 
Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the 
disclosure would tend to incriminate him. 
The Court in Hiibel noted that some seventeen states have similar statutes 
requiring persons to identify themselves in response to police inquires.  The Court also 
recounted extensive legal history supporting the authority of government to seek 
identifying information from persons in public.  While compelling a person’s identity 
under Hiibel requires the law enforcement officer to have reasonable suspicion for 
stopping someone in the first place, it clearly eliminates any argument that anonymity in 
public is constitutionally protected. 
4. Reserve 
The final state of privacy, reserve, finds sparse protection under federal law.  Two 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have addressed the issue of privacy in government data 
compilations.  Both have provided insight into concerns over the importance of 
protections for this aspect of privacy, especially in the light of government controlled 
computerized data compilations.  Both decisions were decided on more narrow grounds 
that avoided directly addressing the issue of constitutional protection of privacy. 
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In Whelan v. Roe,141 the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to a New York 
statute that created a database of all prescriptions issued for certain controlled substances.  
The challenge was based on claims that the creation of such a database raised a specter of 
potentially embarrassing private information being made public and that the existence of 
this possibility might inhibit persons from seeking needed medication.  In a unanimous 
opinion, the Court found that state interest in controlling access to dangerous drugs and 
stringent statutory and regulatory safeguards over collected data, outweighed any 
possible constitutional privacy protection that might be implicated in the data collection.   
In concluding its opinion, the Court observed: 
A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the 
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive government 
files.[footnote omitted] The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare 
and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction 
of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require 
the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which 
is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is 
typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to 
avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances 
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New 
York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, 
evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest 
in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which 
might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure.142  
While the Court notes the potential threat to privacy inherent in the data collection 
to essential governmental operations it avoided directly addressing the issue.  Instead it 
found adequate the protections imposed under state law. The clear language of the 
Court’s opinion leaves unresolved the question of privacy under the Constitution. 
The absence of clear guidance in the opinion is compounded by a debate over 
interpreting the opinion.  In the concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Stewart 
highlight opposing opinions on the question of whether the data compilations implicate 
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protected privacy interests.  In Justice Brennan’s concurrence, he observes that “[t]he 
Court recognizes that an individual's ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ 
is an aspect of the right of privacy, [citation omitted], but holds that in this case, any such 
interest has not been seriously enough invaded by the State to require a showing that its 
program was indispensable to the State's effort to control drug abuse.”143 
Justice Stewart offers an opinion that no constitutional protection for privacy is 
available in this case. Justice Stewart observed:  
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, the Court made clear that although 
the Constitution affords protection against certain kinds of government 
intrusions into personal and private matters,[footnote omitted] there is no 
"general constitutional `right to privacy.' . . . [T]he protection of a person's 
general right to privacy - his right to be let alone by other people - is, like 
the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of 
the individual States." Id., at 350-351 (footnote omitted).144 
A second Supreme Court decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press,145 also addressed extensively the subject of privacy 
without providing a precedential ruling.  In Reporters Committee, the Court reviewed 
decisions concerning a request under the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for 
criminal history data.  A network news station was seeking the rap sheet of a government 
contractor.  The rap sheet contained information generated from disparate government 
records of arrests of an individual over time. 
The Court in Reporters Committee, characterized the matter in dispute as follows: 
…the issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain 
information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that 
information. Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records 
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archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a 
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.146 
With regard to the question posed at the beginning of its opinion regarding 
extension of privacy to information that once had been public, the Court reached the 
following conclusions:  
In sum, the fact that "an event is not wholly `private' does not mean that an 
individual has no interests in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the 
information." Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with 
Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, 
University of Kansas Law School, pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26-27, 1974). The 
privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial character of 
that interest is affected by the fact that in today's society the computer can 
accumulate and store information that would otherwise have surely been 
forgotten long before a person attains age 80, when the FBI's rap sheets 
are discarded.147  
The Court noted that a range of legal sources supported such a position. 
In addition to the common-law and dictionary understandings, the basic 
difference between scattered bits of criminal history and a federal 
compilation, federal statutory provisions, and state policies, our cases have 
also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of 
certain information even where the information may have been at one time 
public.148 
While there is little precedential value outside the state and federal statutes 
directly considered in both the decisions in Whelan v. Roe and Reporters Committee, 
these decisions demonstrate concern over reserve as a protected state of privacy.  The 
absence of a precedential decision that links reserve to a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest, however, exposes this state of privacy to varied and possibly limited 
enforcement.   
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While the opinion in Reporters Committee notes the interpretation of the 
provisions of the federal FOIA statute is not controlled by state law, the converse is also 
true.  Federal FOIA only governs the production of documents or compilations in the 
control of the federal government.  The protection extended to data compilations under 
state FOIA statutes are governed under state law.   Thus, the net result of failure to 
develop a body of federal constitutional law directly addressing reserve means that 
protection of surveillance data drawn from public conduct will vary from state to state.  
5. Summary 
The legal protections for the states of privacy vary substantially.  The states of 
solitude and intimacy are afforded significant protections under the Constitution.  
However, there remains considerable room for the conduct of surveillance in public space 
consistent with protection of these states of privacy.  The state of anonymity has limited 
protection for associational rights, but generally seems disfavored with regard to the 
extension of legal protections.  The state of reserve seems to be a matter of great interest 
and concern to the Supreme Court, but as of yet, it has not been extended constitutional 
protection.  In the absence of such protections for reserve, there is likely to be varied 
protection of this privacy interest from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
B. PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY FROM OTHER LEGAL SOURCES 
In addition to protections under the U.S. Constitution, protections for privacy are 
found in other legal sources.  The federal Constitution provides only a common baseline 
for the protection of individual rights.  Federal legislative enactments, state law 
protections, and federal and state remedial statutes can provide a private right of action 
for an individual whose protected rights are violated. 
1. Federal Legislative Protections 
Legislative enactments at the federal level have been introduced to provide a 
common standard for privacy protections particularly in field of electronic 
communications. In the wake of the 1967 U.S. Supreme decision in Berger v. New 
 69
York,149 the U.S. Congress promulgated a statute to govern access to telephone 
communications.  In Berger, the Court found that the provisions of a New York law 
permitting wiretaps violated fourth amendment protections.  The Court concluded that the 
sweep of the law was too broad and procedural protections inadequate to protect privacy 
rights.  Informed and controlled by the Supreme Court decision in Berger, Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) was created to regulate 
wiretap activity by law enforcement.150   
Wayne Lafave, in his treatise on arrest search and seizure, discusses the history of 
Title III noting how its provisions were generally crafted to address the fourth 
amendment concerns articulated in Berger.151  Title III controls the warrant process for 
electronic surveillance of communications.  This process allows law enforcement 
officials to make an application based on probable cause of certain criminal activity for a 
authorization to conduct wiretaps.  These applications must be presented to a judicial 
officer and must outline with particularity matters like: the facts supporting probable 
cause for belief the suspect is involved in criminal activity; reason why other 
investigative procedures are unsuitable; and the basis for conclusion that the places being 
subject to intercept will likely be involved in the criminal conduct.  The order authorizing 
the intercept must specify the person or persons whose communications can be 
intercepted, the type of communications to be intercepted and the criminal activity to 
which it relates.  The orders for interception cannot be unlimited in duration.  They are 
limited to 30 days with the possibility of extensions being granted upon subsequent 
application.  Within a reasonable time after the surveillance has concluded, notice must 
be provided to the subject.  This notice must include an inventory of the activity.  Where 
information is gathered in violation of the provisions of Title III, the statute requires it be 
excluded from use as evidence in a criminal proceeding.152   
 
                                                 
149 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
150 Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20. 
151 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Volume 2, Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
152 Ibid. 
 70
One of the critical features of Title III is the concept of “minimization.” 
Minimization is the concept of limiting intercepts only to specific conversations relevant 
to the criminal investigation.  “’Minimization’ was deemed essential to satisfy the fourth 
amendment's particularity requirement, compensating for the fact that law enforcement 
was receiving all of the target's communications, including those that were not evidence 
of a crime.”153    
Title III protections were subsequently expanded through the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)154 to address forms of electronic 
communications other than voice.  Despite the enhancements in protections for electronic 
communications, some commentators like Dempsey have indicated that enhanced 
digitization of communication and the growth in dependence on those communications 
should engender an increased review of Title III.155  For example, Dempsey argues that 
refinement in search capabilities of internet tools may allow for greater protections in the 
area of minimization.   
Technology, however, may offer a solution, producing more effective 
minimization than is available in the context of voice communications. 
Whether law enforcement accesses e-mail from the telephone company (or 
access provider) while in transmission, or from an e-mail service provider 
while it is in storage incident to transmission, it may be relatively easy for 
the service provider to perform the minimization. The service provider can 
use screens or filters to select from the e-mail messages to or from parties 
identified in the order only those containing certain key words or phrases 
that would be identical to those used by monitors in the voice context. 
[citation omitted].156 
The standards of regulation for use of wiretap information have been already been 
applied by some courts to the use of covert video surveillance in private places.   In 
United States v. Torres,157 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the 
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model of regulation from Title III to the use of video surveillance.  There the court noted 
that where the terms of video surveillance complied with the same requirements for 
interception of oral communications under Title III the requirements of the fourth 
amendment were satisfied.158   The commentator Ric Simmons notes that subsequent to 
the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of this position it has been adopted by U. S. Courts of 
Appeal in six other circuits.159   While application of Title III protections has only been 
applied to covert video surveillance in private areas where fourth amendment rights are 
clearly present, this structure can also be instructive for regulation of public surveillance.  
Where techniques are applied that  may be considered to be extremely intrusive, like 
prolonged tracking of individuals through extended areas of private space, the 
prophylactic use of Title III standards may be advisable. 
2. State Law Protections 
In addition to the protections afforded by federal law, states are free to expand 
those rights and provide additional protections for privacy.  In fact, there has been a 
growing trend in recent years for states to provide additional protections for civil liberties 
under the provisions of their own state constitutions. While for many years most state 
constitutions were thought to provide no greater protections for individual rights than 
those provided by federal law,  that paradigm is breaking down.  States are diverging 
from what commentators refer to as the “lockstep” approach.160  The lockstep approach 
is the concept that provisions in state constitutions that mirror provisions in the federal 
Constitution are interpreted by state courts in an identical fashion to the federal 
provisions.  
An examination of the case law demonstrating departure with the lockstep 
approach is found in the Oregon Supreme Court’s review of the use of tracking devices.  
That opinion demonstrates the possibility of enhanced state protections for privacy rights.  
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In the Knotts case the Court affirmed the use of electronic tracking devices in tracking 
vehicles in public areas.  In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that vehicle 
tracking beepers do not implicate any legally protected privacy interest was the Oregon 
State Supreme Court decision in State v. Campbell. 161 In that case the court concluded 
that the provisions of the Oregon Constitution, though similar to the provisions of the 
fourth amendment to the federal Constitution, were more expansive in protecting privacy 
rights of individuals.  Under Oregon law, a warrant is required for law enforcement 
investigation involving the placement of tracking devices.  
The trend of state court divergence from federal precedent with respect to public 
surveillance is also seen in a 2003 decision of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Jackson.162  In that case, the Washington Court addressed the use of GPS devices to track 
vehicles.  The court concluded that Washington State Constitutional protections for 
privacy would require a warrant before law enforcement could use GPS locators to track 
suspect vehicles on public streets.  
As technology develops it is likely more states may diverge from the federal 
baseline and provide enhanced privacy protection.  These enhanced standards will have 
to be accommodated in the collection and use of any unified data collection and analysis 
systems.  In addressing governance issues, policymakers need to be mindful of the fact 
that federal law is not necessarily dispositive of the issue.  States like Oregon and 
Washington diverging from the lockstep doctrine may assert additional protections.  A 
developing body of state law on the subject will certainly influence not only how 
surveillance systems will function in any given jurisdiction, but also how the information 
gathered can be transmitted or exchanged between governmental users. 
In addition to the existence of state constitutional provisions that can affect 
privacy considerations, states are free to promulgate a range of penal and civil statutes to 
address violations of individual privacy rights.  For example, Illinois recently enacted 
criminal penalties for persons using CCTV surveillance technology to monitor 
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individuals in areas of public accommodation like tanning salons, hotel bedrooms, 
restrooms and similar areas.163   As of December 2007, 19 other states had similar 
legislation, with four other states in the process of promulgating such legislation.164  
While this legislation applies to the use of surveillance technology in areas of public 
accommodation that are generally considered as private, nothing precludes more 
expansive state legislation to limit surveillance in other public areas. In fact, expanded 
state legislation to enhance protection for privacy is the very approach advocated by 
privacy advocacy groups like the Constitution Project with its model legislation. 
In addition to constitutional or legislative enactments directly addressing privacy, 
states have laws to address transparency in government that will have a range of 
consequences on privacy protection, some unintended, for operators of CCTV and other 
surveillance systems.  Most all states have statutes addressing retention and access to 
information collected and maintained by governmental agencies.  In Illinois, for example, 
those statutes are the Local Records Retention Act165 and the Freedom of information 
Act.166 These types of statutes are typical for most states and directly impact on the data 
gathered by surveillance systems. 
Under the provisions of state document retention statutes like the one in Illinois 
copies of digital recordings made by a CCTV network must be maintained in accordance 
with retention schedules approved by the local records commission.  The length of 
storage time imposed directly impacts on privacy issues and affects the capacity of the 
recording system.  Most privacy advocates argue for short retention periods.  While law 
enforcement may want longer periods of retention, there is a significant financial cost 
associated with such a practice.  The longer the retention requirement, the larger the 
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digital/video storage capacity is required in the system.  That capacity impacts directly on 
price (i.e., the number of servers required to store the information).  Ultimately, these 
legal requirements will place a capacity limit on the operating system. 
While retention statutes place a constraint on the intake side of the ledger, 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) statutes, like the one in Illinois, place requirements 
on information outflow.  Operation of digital surveillance systems, like CCTV, will 
generate substantial amounts of information on public activity in which there is no 
significant government interest.  However, this surveillance information will doubtless be 
sought by a variety of individuals or organizations for a range of reasons.  Without 
provisions explicitly exempting data collected from digitized public surveillance systems 
this data may be required to be disseminated in response to public requests.  Such third 
party dissemination raises significant privacy concerns.  In fact, privacy advocacy groups 
generally recommend the statutory protection against dissemination under FOIA and 
other statutes. 
Response to public information requests raises issues that not only implicate 
privacy concerns, but also practical operational concerns for policymakers regarding 
responding to FOIA requests.  Personnel resources required for response to requests, as 
well as liability issues raised for improper dissemination, are major areas for concern.  
Any system design must address the administrative costs and privacy implications of 
public dissemination of information. 
3. Private Rights of Actions 
The protection of privacy is a private right of action recognized by the common 
law adopted in the tort laws of most states. The common law has provided individuals 
with a private right of action for damages and injunctive relief in response to actions that 
impinged upon protected privacy interests.  The common law provisions protecting 
privacy are outlined in the Second Restatement of Torts.167  They include activities such 
as: intrusion on seclusion; appropriation of another name or likeness; publicity given to 
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the private life of another; and publicity placing someone in a false light.168  These 
protections for privacy are applicable in over half the states.169  
This common law approach to privacy protection has substantial limitations.  It 
has almost universally been interpreted by courts as being largely inapplicable to conduct 
observed or recorded in public.170  Moreover, immunity statutes often make it difficult to 
bring actions against governmental entities which would be the operators of large 
surveillance systems.  The remedies provided under existing tort law are largely limited 
to private parties engaged in conduct on private property.  
A more robust private right of action is provided under the provisions of federal 
law.  As noted above, there are extensive privacy protections provided under the 
provisions of the U. S. Constitution.  Governmental action in violation of those 
constitutional provisions is actionable under provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  That statute 
provides individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated with a remedy for 
money damages and injunctive relief.  Individuals who prevail in asserting rights under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to attorney’s fees under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  
These statutes provide individuals with powerful tools to redress the failure of 
government to respect constitutionally protected privacy rights.171  
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V. IMPACTS OF MODERN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
ON PRIVACY 
The development of surveillance technology has occurred in two significant areas.  
First, the ability to collect data through surveillance has been significantly enhanced 
through developments in technology.  Second, the ability to store, categorize and analyze 
that data has also been revolutionized.  Together technological advances in both these 
areas pose significant implications for privacy protection.  While current legal authority 
provides some constraints on surveillance, data collection and manipulation, the 
technological advances have in some cases outpaced controls or exploited gaps in those 
protections.  In assessing those technologies, focus will first be placed on developments 
in the area of data collection; then it will turn to surveillance data manipulation and 
analysis.  
A. DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE DATA COLLECTION 
As digital technology matures and computer capacity continues to increase, 
society is confronted with an increasingly sophisticated array of surveillance tools and 
techniques to gather and compile information on individuals.172  A range of new 
technologies implicate privacy concerns.  Commentators analyzing the technologies have 
used a variety of formats to assess those technologies.  Those approaches have centered 
on intrusiveness of the technique,173 expectation of privacy in the area of examination174 
and even analysis of individual personal privacy expectations and measures taken to 
protect privacy.175   
This analysis will focus on developing technologies from the perspective of 
public safety professionals operating in public space.  The focus is not on the impact of 
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the technology, but rather, the purpose for which it can be utilized in supporting a range 
of homeland security strategies.  Using this approach there are essentially three areas of 
surveillance for purposes of analysis: detection of dangerous items, substances, or 
persons, based on physical characteristics; observation or monitoring of public areas; and 
surveillance that tracks or monitors the activity of suspect persons. 
Certain items of technology, CCTV for example, can be utilized across the full 
range of surveillance purposes.  Examining these technologies and the way in which legal 
and ethical guidelines have progressed to address privacy concerns can be helpful to 
developing a comprehensive set of guidelines that balance public safety concerns with 
privacy considerations.   
1. Detection of Dangerous Items or Persons 
Detecting the presence of suspect items is a function that occurs everyday in a 
range of public venues across the country.  Use of magnetometers and x-ray technology 
has long been accepted at public airports.  The use of this technology has been expanded 
to areas such as public places of amusement and public and private schools as public 
officials look to secure those areas from dangerous items like guns.  These systems are 
often augmented by CCTV technology that allows control room personnel to visually 
identify suspect items and the location of the item.  
Detecting the presence of suspect persons, until recently, has involved much more 
primitive forms of technology.  Use of visual technology has largely been confined to 
circulating to law enforcement or posting in public places the photographs or artists’ 
renditions of wanted persons. Recent development in CCTV technology may someday 
allow for identification based on physical characteristics. 
Detection technology can be divided into two categories.  The first category 
includes those technologies that can be programmed to only alert the surveillance 
operator of the existence of contraband items.  This sort technology is sometimes referred 
to as binary.  An example of it is the canine sniff.  A second kind of detection technology 
is the technology that exposes a range of concealed items.  This technology allows for 
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identification of contraband items only through additional processes like physical search 
or application of more refined visual analysis tools.  These technologies include the 
magnetometer, x-ray technology, chemical analysis and explosive detection technology 
and the newly developed millimeter wave technologies. 
a. Binary Technology  
Much of the “binary search” technology176 revolves around a form of 
olfactory sensing.  The predominant system used for that sensing has been canines used 
to sniff for narcotics and explosives.  However, while canines are still used extensively 
for this function,177 there is now a shift to mechanical sensors.  Post 9-11 saw a 
proliferation of explosive trace detection technologies at airports.  Those technologies 
initially included explosive trace detection (ETD) for checked and carry-on luggage of all 
passengers.178  ETD systems have been augmented with scanners for liquid 
explosives,179 document scanners,180 and trace detection portals181 to be used to check 
passengers for trace evidence of contact with explosives.   
While special rules have been applied with regard to application of search 
technologies at places like airports,182 the growth of these binary surveillance 
technologies may well have applications outside of the airport context. In fact, the 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Website notes that these technologies are 
being piloted with respect to securing rail transit.183  News reports have also related TSA 
attempts to pilot sensor technology for use in rail facilities.184  
In the area of narcotics detection there has recently been development of 
commercially available portable mechanical sensors to address this issue.185 These 
sensors, while targeted to emanations from the manufacture of methamphetamine, are not 
in principle unlike biological and chemical sensor equipment long available for military 
use.  An extensive commercial market is now growing for the civilian use of these sensor 
technologies. While the bulk of the legal analysis on this topic has focused primarily on 
the issue of narcotics, there are significant homeland security implications.  Development 
and utilization of these technologies in a binary format to detect the presence of 
explosives is viewed as key to the ability to safeguard the national transportation. 
Binary contraband detection protocols may even be extended into searches 
conducted across cyberspace. In a legal note for the Yale Law Journal, Michal Adler 
discusses legal issues that surround the possibility of net-wide searches for digital 
contraband.186  Using the example of child pornography that could be tagged or 
specifically identified by law enforcement, the possibility exists to track that pornography 
to the computer hard drive of the person who possesses it.  The hard drive search would 
only detect contraband and not search other items.  While the item is contraband and this 
is generally afforded no protection, the search would necessarily invade a hard drive that 
might well be in a person’s residence.  It is unclear with the current state of the law  
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whether such a net-wide search would be permitted or precluded by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Adler posits that the result may largely depend on the danger posed by the 
contraband being sought.187  
Professor Ric Simmons, based largely on critiques from the dissenting 
opinions of Caballes, outlines some of the key factors that need to be considered in the 
application of the binary technology.188  Those considerations include questions of 
accuracy and invasiveness. 
(1) Accuracy. Assessment of system accuracy involves three 
inquiries.  The rate of false negatives; the rate of false positives; and the positive 
predictive value.  A false negative is an occurrence where the technology fails to detect 
the presence of the contraband item that it is designed to identify.  The false negative 
does not implicate legal or privacy concerns but it has serious implication for operational 
security concerns.  The false negative results in contraband escaping detection. 
On the other hand is the false positive.  This is the circumstance 
where the sensor or testing mechanism wrongfully identifies the existence of contraband 
where none exists.  In mechanical sensor devices, there is frequently a relationship 
between the rate of false negative and false positive.  The more sensitive the analytic tool, 
the more prone it is to attribute a false positive.  Dulling the analysis may reduce the false 
positive rate, but raise the incidence of false negatives. 189  
Positive predictive value concerns the false positive rate as it 
relates to the number of persons subjected to the detection technique.  Simmons explains 
this phenomenon as follows: 
The positive predictive value is calculated by dividing the total number of 
true positives by the total number of positive responses returned by the 
device. For example, let us assume that in the course of one year, a drug 
dog conducts 1000 sniffs for narcotics, and alerts 100 times out of the 
thousand. Of those 100 positive alerts, 90 are accurate and 10 are false 
positives. This translates into a 1% false positive rate (10 false positives 
                                                 
187 Adler, “Note: Cyberspace, General Searches,” 1119. 
188 Simmons, “The Two Unanswered Questions,”  448. 
189 Ibid., 451-53. 
 82
out of 1000 attempts, meaning that only 1% of subjects are falsely accused 
by the dog), but a 90% positive predictive value (90 true positives out of 
100 positive responses, meaning that once the dog returns a positive 
response, the law enforcement agent can only be 90% sure that contraband 
is actually present).190 
Significantly when the number of the population subjected to the 
detection technique is high and the likelihood of the existence of any contraband item in 
that population is low, the positive predictive value shifts dramatically. Simmons 
illustrates: 
… the positive predictive value will vary widely depending on the actual 
frequency of the illegal activity that is being investigated. In our example 
above, 9 out of every 100 subjects carried narcotics, but if the dog were 
randomly sampling the general population, the number might be closer to 
9 out of 100,000. Assuming the dog still falsely alerts 1% of the time (a 
consistent 1% false positive rate), he will now falsely accuse 1000 
individuals (and correctly alert to the 9 carrying narcotics), but because 
there are so many fewer true positives, the positive predictive rate would 
be dramatically lower than in the previous example: 9 out of 1009, or 
0.9%. In other words, if the search is for a type of illegal activity that is 
very rare (or at least very rare among the pool of subjects being searched), 
the vast number of innocent subjects will inflate the absolute number of 
false positives, and make the binary search much less accurate.191 
While the Court in Caballes recognizes that no detection 
technology is perfect, it leaves unclear the acceptable rate of failure that will result in 
unwarranted searches or other intrusion into personal privacy. Certainly a critical driver 
in determining what is an acceptable rate of false positives or predictive value is the 
danger posed by the contraband.  Where the contraband sought is nuclear material or a 
potentially deadly chemical or biological substances, the courts will likely accept a higher 
rate of false positives or a lower predictive value.  Moreover, as Simmons’ work points 
out, the positive predictive value of the tool can also be shaped by its utilization.  Using 
technology that has a low false positive rate may be unacceptable if it is applied in high 
volume populations where the likelihood of occurrence of contraband is low.   
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(2) Invasiveness. The second unanswered question goes to the 
issue of invasiveness of the search process.  This seems to be a relatively easier question 
to resolve than the question of accuracy for searches that are truly binary in nature.  
Inasmuch as the surveillance technique reveals the presence or absence of an item in 
which there is no privacy interest, i.e., contraband, the only invasion into personal liberty 
is restraint on movement that may have to occur for the surveillance to be conducted. 
Certainly prolonged restraint would not be permissible, but whether or not requiring 
individuals to pause for a few seconds, wait in line or perform limited physical 
movements like raising their arms, are matters open to question.  Actually, this is not an 
issue of “search” under the fourth amendment so much as it is in “seizure.”192  While this 
may implicate significant liberty interests, the effect on privacy seems de minimus. 
While Caballes offers considerable support for the application of 
binary surveillance technology where accuracy and lack of invasiveness can be 
demonstrated, a further consideration that should factor into decisions on the use of 
binary search technology, or any technology for that matter, is the danger posed by the 
contraband itself.  This factor is discussed at length by Judge Posner in Catastrophe.193   
Certainly searches for potentially catastrophic items like 
explosives, particularly as they may be introduced on an aircraft, will likely allow 
implementation of binary search technology with both higher false positive and lower 
positive predictive values that would be afforded for a search for narcotics or drugs on 
the street.  Such exigent circumstance might also allow for greater license with regard to 
the invasiveness of such surveillance.  Application of the special needs doctrine 
referenced in Caballes and Edmonds would certainly support such a contention.  The 
notions of special needs to combat unusual and extraordinarily dangerous threats may 
extend as well to non-binary object surveillance.  
 
 
                                                 
192 Simmons, “The Two Unanswered Questions,” 459-61. 
193 Posner, Catastrophe. 
 84
b. Non-Binary Detection Technology  
Non-binary technologies are ones that identify not only contraband, but 
also a range of other items that an individual may possess.  While there may be no 
privacy interest in contraband, there is a privacy protection in those non-contraband items 
possessed by an individual.  Examination of the contents of man’s pocket or woman’s 
purse undoubtedly raises issues of privacy related to isolation and the ability to withdraw 
information about ones self from others. 
Some of the newly developed non-binary technologies go beyond 
indicating the presence of items an individual possess to showing detailed images of the 
individual’s body.  This challenge to physical integrity goes to the heart of privacy 
protected by the state of isolation and intimacy. The implication of developments in this 
non-binary object identification technology can be advanced by examining developments 
in concealed weapons identification technologies like millimeter wave and backscatter x-
ray especially in contrast to enhancements in object identification through CCTV. 
(1)  Concealed Weapon Search Technologies. Just as there have 
been evolutions in binary object surveillance technology looking for explosives, there 
have also been revolutionary developments in non-binary technology searching for 
concealed weapons. Technology like magnetometers, used for the detection of dangerous 
objects, have long been used in airports and other public buildings like courthouses and 
even the Capitol. This technology measures disturbances in an electromagnetic field to 
determine the presence of concentrations of metal associated with weapons like knives 
and firearms.194  It has been consistently found to constitute a search.195  The use of these 
search devices has been permitted under two theories: regulatory search essential to 
facility operation; or consent search under a notion that the individual consented to the 
procedure by entering the area where the magnetometers were established.196   
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Use of magnetometers has expanded to other public venues like 
schools, and public places of amusement like stadiums and large sporting events.  Courts 
have found these non-intrusive search techniques to be consistent with fourth amendment 
protections.  Recently several lower courts have even upheld a policy of the National 
Football League to implement a policy of more highly intrusive physical pat-down 
searches to accomplish the same goal of searching for dangerous contraband.  However, 
as demonstrated in the recent Eleventh Circuit decision upholding pat-downs at Tampa 
Stadium, these searches are permissible because the subjects consented to them.197  A 
completely opposite conclusion was reached where the City of Columbus, Georgia 
sought to use magnetometers to screen a crowd of non-consenting demonstrators.198  
Seeking to increase the effectiveness of the magnetometer, the law 
enforcement community has been looking to develop technology to enhance the ability to 
screen for concealed weapons at a distance.  Beginning in the mid 1990’s, the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) began analyzing the feasibility of certain technologies to provide 
law enforcement officers with stand-off capability to detect the presence of concealed 
weapons.  Those technologies examined included millimeter wave technology and 
backscatter x-ray technology.  The goal of the NIJ research was to develop technology 
capable of alerting law enforcement personnel of the existence of weapons from a 
distance of up to 30 feet.199  As Jon Vernick notes in his work assessing developments in 
concealed weapon detection development, this technology may be used to replace pat 
down searches in those places where it is permissible such as incident to a Terry200 stop, 
during administrative searches at entrances to airports and some public buildings and in 
processing persons incident to arrest.201  In these circumstances, where physical search is  
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permitted, the use of this technology might well be considered less intrusive.  However, 
this technology to conduct suspicionless searches of the general population raises 
different questions.202 
Millimeter wave and backscatter x-ray promised higher resolution 
and better ability to determine the presence of weapons than did the magnetometer.  Such 
technology would likely make searches both more efficient and effective.  Consequently, 
both technologies have been selected for piloting by the TSA for use in transportation in 
enhancing transit security.203   
Millimeter wave technology involves the use of radio frequency 
waves bounced over the subject.204 Differences in irradiation from the subject allow for 
the creation of pictures of suspect items.  Tests of the technology allow for identification 
of weapons from portable detectors up to twelve feet away.205 One of the beneficial 
features of this technology is that suspect items like knives or guns appear as darkened 
objects on a lighter grey field.  The technology does not delineate body features.206  The 
TSA reports this technology is currently used in safeguarding several federal, state, and 
local public buildings as well as a number of international airports.  It is reported to 
expose the subject to significantly less energy than exists in a cell phone transmission.207 
Another concealed detection device utilizing different technology 
is the backscatter x-ray.  Backscatter x-ray technology involves high speed scanning with 
low level x-ray beams.  The radiation that is reflected back is translated by the computer 
into high resolution images.  These images depict not only metallic and non-metallic 
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items that may secreted on a body,208 they also include high resolution depiction of the 
body itself.  In fact, the TSA has installed privacy filters on the backscatter x-ray 
technology it is piloting to eliminate depiction of sensitive private areas of the body.209 
The backscatter x-ray technology is reported as “…equivalent to the ambient radiation 
received in two minutes of airplane flight at altitude.”210  
As demonstrated above by the TSA’s attempt to mask private areas 
of the body, proponents of both the millimeter wave and backscatter technologies are 
attempting to move these surveillance techniques close to binary search technology.  The 
TSA descriptions of use of both backscatter211 and millimeter wave212 technologies 
emphasize the fact that operators are not provided with intimate details of the body. In 
addition, in response to the highly revealing features of backscatter x-ray technology, the 
TSA has taken additional measures to ameliorate privacy concerns.213   
Those measures include making the use of the technique voluntary 
for those passengers who would otherwise be subject to physical pat-down searches. TSA 
has introduced operational procedures that have the individuals’ monitoring the images 
offsite, away from the checkpoint, with no visual of the person being screened, only the 
computer image.  Information about the images is then phoned to the personnel at the 
checkpoint.  The checkpoint personnel never see the backscatter image.  Moreover, those 
images are not stored, printed or transmitted.214 
Moving to a completely binary technology in the area of concealed 
weapons may be extremely difficult to achieve. In addition to technology challenges of 
blinding the scans only to the presence of “contraband” concealed weapons, in many 
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states carry of concealed weapons is permitted.215  In fact, federal legislation permits 
retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed weapons nation-wide.  While there 
are some areas like airports and public buildings that are accepted under this legislation, 
it does extend to most other public areas.  Thus, unlike, drugs or explosives, items 
identified by concealed carry searches may not in fact be “contraband” at all depending 
on the location of the search.  This undercuts the entire theory of binary search which is 
predicated on the absence of privacy interest in contraband.  
Even if the technology could be made binary by enhancing 
imagery and use in areas where weapons would be contraband, e.g. airports, the 
application of this technology is subject to the same scrutiny with regards to the issues of 
accuracy and invasiveness discussed above with respect to approved binary search 
technology like canine sniffs.  If the invasive technology can be programmed to alert only 
the operator with a positive or negative indicator for the presence of weapons or other 
contraband, this type of technology might then be available for use in public areas to look 
for dangerous contraband. 
One last issue with regard to concealed weapons technology is the 
issue of public concern over interference with reasonable expectations of privacy.  Some 
polling evidence suggests that such technology would receive general acceptance.  
Vernick notes in work concerning studies he conducted about privacy expectations and 
gun scanners: 
Study findings might be used to conclude that society does not recognize a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding gun scanners. The strongest 
evidence for this conclusion derives from the overwhelming general 
support for police use of gun scanners. When asked, "Overall, do you 
favor or oppose police using new weapon detection devices in high crime 
areas?", eighty-six percent favored or strongly favored such uses. Overall 
support varied surprisingly little by age, race, or gender. [footnote 
omitted] 
Despite the high levels of general support for the technology, study 
findings suggest less societal consensus for certain uses of the technology. 
Specifically, when asked about support for random, suspicionless scans of 
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persons on the street, fifty-five percent expressed support. [footnote 
omitted] Although this is still a majority of respondents, it may not 
provide sufficient evidence that society does not recognize a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for this use of gun scanners, especially by 
comparison with the ninety-three percent of respondents who supported 
using the devices at the "entrance to a school where students have 
previously brought weapons." [footnote omitted]216 
The use of non-binary concealed weapons detection technology 
poses questions for applications of a range of non-binary technologies.  Public acceptance 
of these technologies, at least for some limited uses is also significant. The current 
approach of the TSA to try and mold this non-binary technology into the model of a 
binary system in object identification offers some interesting prospects for general rules 
about governance for surveillance systems. 
(2)  CCTV as a Detection Technology. While the non-binary 
magnetometer technology has been found to constitute a search, some traditional non-
binary techniques for object detection have generally been viewed as not implicating any 
protected privacy concern.  Chief among those technologies is CCTV.  Like 
magnetometers, CCTV systems have long been used in connection with object 
identification.  For example, CCTV has also been used to identify suspicious objects 
warranting follow up search. They have also been used in a variety of commercial and 
employment contexts as anti-theft devices. 
The application of this non-binary technology seems to be covered 
by the “plain view” doctrine. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, “it is well established that, under certain circumstances, the police may seize 
evidence in plain view without a warrant.”217  Where a person is observed through CCTV 
to be in possession of what appears to be a piece of contraband, the plain view doctrine 
supports police action.   
While there would seem to be little controversy over using cameras 
at fixed points or perhaps in conjunction with x-ray machines or magnetometers to assist 
in the detection of contraband items like weapons, the technology does not significantly 
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enhance the existing technology.  This is particularly true where the contraband is 
concealed from view, which is usually the case. The growing field of video analytics may 
help to enhance the value of object detection by automating the process of object 
search.218   
The value of this technology dramatically shifts, however, when 
the object of detection becomes the physical traits of an individual who may be wanted 
for some crime.  That is the value proposition of facial recognition technology.  If this 
technology could be used in a binary fashion, like concealed weapons technology to 
identify persons who are wanted on a warrant or other judicial court order, it is difficult 
to see what constitutional argument could be mounted.  Those individuals wanted on a 
warrant have no constitutionally protected interest to remain at large.219 
The use of face recognition technology has already been piloted in 
both the United Kingdom and in the U.S.   However, the promise of facial recognition 
technology has not yet been realized by the existing technology.  For example, in 2001 
the Tampa, Florida police department began utilizing facial recognition software in 
connection with camera systems in its entertainment district, Ybor City.220 Where the 
photographic image was designated by the computer system as matching a wanted person 
in the database, officers could be dispatched to investigate.  
The success rate of facial recognition systems piloted thus far has 
been less than impressive.  The ACLU has reported that Tampa abandoned use of the 
system within months of its rollout with no arrests having been made. The Tampa police 
deny abandoning facial recognition; instead, indicating they are configuring the system to 
work with more cameras.221  Testing at the Palm Beach Airport resulted in a positive 
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identification rate of only 47% over the four-week test period.  There were also some 
1,081 false alarms generated (a rate of two to three per hour of operation) from a facial 
database of only 250 photos.222   
Despite the absence of positive results in the early years of this 
decade, facial recognition technology has made improvements. In 2003, the New York 
Times reported that tests conducted by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) found substantial improvement over systems tested in 2000.223 
Results of similar assessments conducted by NIST in 2006 show further progress. 224 
Moreover, government funded research for facial recognition technology was estimated 
to be in excess of $48 million dollars as of January 2001, and has likely grown since. 
In light of the government demonstrated interest and growing 
efficacy of facial recognition technology, an understanding of how the technology 
functions is important. Use of facial recognition in conjunction with CCTV is actually a 
merger of two surveillance technologies, digital CCTV with embedded software and 
biometric facial recognition technology.  The biometric portion of the technology is 
described as follows: 
F[acial] R[ecognition] T[echnology] works by combining photographic 
images with computer databases. After an image is captured by a camera, 
a computer program measures some of the 80 or so nodal points on your 
face, such as the distance between your eyes, the width of your nose, the 
depth of your eye sockets, and the length of your jaw line. The technology 
then turns the nodal measurements into a numerical code called a 
"faceprint." A properly working face recognition system supposedly can 
match a person standing in front of a camera with a record from a database 
including tens of millions of faceprints.225 
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In addition to the biometric database of faceprints there is also a 
requirement for the development of software for the operation of the CCTV system.  This 
involves programming software that operates the CCTV system so that the faceprint 
database can be matched against the live CCTV images.  This matching process is done 
based on a system of mathematical formulas called algorithms.  These algorithms 
themselves may contain biases.  As Lucas Introna and David Wood note in their work on 
algorithmic surveillance, the algorithms used to power facial recognition software contain 
biases.  These biases occur in the process of reducing the results of photographic images 
into the algorithms that power analysis.  For example, software that is based on “template 
based algorithms” which are predicated on the gallery of templates (facial shapes) that 
vary among the population tend to have greater predictive accuracy rates for minority 
populations because their faces differ most from the templates.226      
The existence and extent of biases caused by algorithms used in 
any given system need to be addressed and understood before the imposition of any facial 
recognition system.  The introduction of, for example, racial biases in the software 
employed implicate fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection concerns.  In 
addition to biases based on race, Introna and Wood point out that the algorithms may also 
impact the efficacy of the system based on a variety of other factors including: sex; 
lighting condition; position of the subject’s head when being scanned by CCTV; and the 
presence or absence of glasses or facial hair.227 Until the issues of accuracy can be more 
successfully addressed, facial recognition technology will have little practical use.  
Moreover, because the algorithms are included in code written for software systems that 
are often proprietary in nature and involve extremely complex mathematical formulas, it 
is difficult for an assessment to be conducted by most purchasers before implementation.      
When the accuracy and bias issues are finally resolved, the 
application of facial recognition technology holds great promise for identifying 
individuals particularly in areas that require great security.  However, even if those 
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questions were answered a significant question remains regarding what faces should be 
placed in the database for matching and identification.  Placing the faces of those 
individuals wanted pursuant to warrant or some court order would likely raise little 
concern.  However, the placement into that database of individuals determined to be of 
general law enforcement interest raises significant legal questions both in terms of 
maintaining such a database (what criteria warrants identifying someone as suspect) and 
use of the database (what do law enforcement officers do if a suspect person is found—
how and why should they be treated differently).  These two questions will be treated 
more in depth with regard to the tracking of suspect persons.  However, the current use of 
computer based networks to identify sex offenders so they can be precluded from 
accessing areas like schools, and the government maintained “no-fly” lists, provide 
concrete examples where facial recognition software might be helpful in maintaining 
security. 
One additional feature of automated CCTV surveillance is what is 
known as an “anonymization” or “video masking” features.228 Just as algorithms can be 
introduced through software to identify facial features, different algorithms can be 
introduced to block or blur facial features. This anonymization feature could be used to 
make binary a CCTV system facial recognition program designed to look only for 
specific persons.  If, for example, the system could be successfully programmed only to 
look for individuals wanted on a warrant and to block the facial features of all other 
persons, it would seem that such a system would meet the type of binary system 
requirements outlined above.  Of course, this anonymization technology is in its infancy 
and like the facial recognition technology requires future development.     
Building on the analysis outlined in the Simmons article, there 
needs to be an examination of standards of reliability for use of search technologies to 
identify suspect items and persons based on physical characteristics.  This analysis 
combined with an understanding of what types of threats (e.g. explosives, chemical 
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weapons, biological weapons or conventional firearms) should be subject to search 
utilizing this technology is a matter for further research and analysis.  
2. Area Observation and Monitoring Technology 
Area observation and monitoring for public safety purposes is a broader function 
than simply law enforcement.  While deterring and preventing crime are certainly 
functions of many programs involving surveillance, they are not the only public functions 
served by those technologies.  The availability of area observation and monitoring 
equipment may prove critical to a range of other public safety activities.  Situational 
awareness provided by those technologies can serve to facilitate public safety response, 
whether that be through dispatch of police assets or fire and emergency medical service, 
(EMS) in response to an event.  Area observation and monitoring technology can help to 
ensure compliance with safety regulations through programs like red light or speed 
enforcement or be utilized to adjust traffic patterns to meet requirements of emergency 
situations or even the daily rush hour.  While observation and monitoring technologies 
play a role in terrorist and crime prevention and control, they can also play important 
roles in response and management of public safety service to public areas.  Oftentimes, 
this latter function of area observation and monitoring technology is overlooked.   
The preferred method of area observation and monitoring involves the use of 
CCTV.  While a range of other surveillance technologies are available for this purpose, 
they all have significant limitations.  Sensor devices like ground surveillance radars, 
motion detectors, thermal sensors and pressure sensors, can be used to secure perimeters 
and areas, but the information gleaned from them is limited.  They can be triggered and 
distorted by a range of environmental factors.  For example, a fence line equipped with 
pressure sensors will alert when the fence is disturbed.  The operator seeing the 
disturbance will have no way of knowing what caused it.  It might be a downed tree limb, 
someone passing by and touching the fence, an animal attempting to pass through or an 
intruder entering the premises.  Moreover, even where an intrusion can be ascertained, 
data for marshalling a response is much more limited.  For example, unless the grounds  
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of the property are equipped with additional detection devices there will be no way to 
track any perpetrator, see if he or she is armed, what they look like or gather other 
pertinent data to manage response. 
Contrasted with other sensors, cameras provide much greater depth of information 
for both law enforcement and emergency response. Cameras can be used in the perimeter 
security context described above can not only provide information as to the nature of 
activities resulting in compromise of the perimeter, they can also be utilized in directing 
the response.  Utilizing cameras, the persons directing response can provide precise 
information about the nature of the intrusion.  Descriptions of the intruders, armament, 
direction of flight; all those pieces of information can be provided by CCTV.  This 
information can be critical for shaping real-time response and also for the legal process of 
prosecuting offenders.   
Area observation and monitoring, whether with cameras or other sensors, is 
already widespread in communities for a wide variety of purposes.  Some of those 
purposes bear little relationship to law enforcement.  One example of a family of 
technologies that monitor activities in the public space is the host of sensor technologies 
related to traffic movement.  This family includes sensors on the roadways that are used 
to report traffic times and conditions.  Recently several states have introduced data 
scanning devices to facilitate traffic movement at toll plazas through specially created 
sensor lanes.  The I-Pass program in Illinois is one example.229  These technologies are 
often augmented with CCTV technology to record noncompliance. Another traffic related 
use is red light monitoring cameras.  This program involves placement of license plate 
reading cameras at intersections to monitor compliance with traffic signals.   These 
cameras are credited with 40 percent reductions in red light violations at the intersections 
in cities that employ them.230 Recent scholarship on the use of these cameras confirms 
                                                 
229 Illinois Toll Highway Authority, I-Pass, General Information, About I-Pass, 
http://www.illinoistollway.com/portal/page?_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&_pageid=133,1471150 
(accessed January 13, 2007). 
230 Thomas Barlas, “Lawmakers Allow Municipalities to Implement Red Light Program,” 
http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/local/atlantic/v-page2/story/7526811p-7428234c.html (accessed 
January 13, 2008). 
 96
they affect driver behavior, but a question is raised as to whether or not those effects 
cause more accidents and injuries.231 This study points to the need for additional 
research. 
The use of sensors including CCTV to secure public buildings and some pieces of 
critical infrastructure has long been recognized and accepted by the public.  For example, 
perhaps among the most secure public spaces in the U.S. are courthouse buildings, which 
are routinely equipped with contraband detection devices like magnetometers, and 
frequently have extensive CCTV systems.    
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, the advent of CCTV cameras to support 
public programs for observation and monitoring is a rapidly developing phenomena 
across the country.  The conduct of government observation of open areas has long been 
supported by the Supreme Court.  This even includes private areas that are privately 
owned.  Beginning with the “open fields” doctrine articulated in United States v. 
Hester.232   There the court noted “…the special protection accorded by the Fourth 
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to 
the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common 
law.”233 The decision has been reaffirmed by a string of more recent Supreme Court 
cases from the mid-1980s.  Those cases include: Oliver v. United States,234 California v. 
Ciraolo,235 and Dow Chemical Company v. United States.236  Significantly, the Dow 
Chemical case directly involved the use of cameras to record the observations made.   
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Given the fact that government can monitor and observe activities on private lands under 
the “open fields doctrine.” It is difficult to see how such observations of public properties 
cannot be permissible.   
Some of the critics of CCTV programs contend that CCTV programs are of 
questionable efficacy.237  However, there seems to be little evidence on either side of the 
efficacy debate.  In a report prepared by the California Research Bureau analyzing CCTV 
programs in the mid to late 1990s, Marcus Nieto concludes “[g]enerally, the data 
suggests that CCTV video surveillance is successful in reducing and preventing crimes 
and is helpful in prosecuting individuals caught in the act of committing a crime.”238   
The General Accounting Office (GAO) in a 2003 Report concerning CCTV 
surveillance programs of the United States Park Police and Washington D.C. Metro 
Police concluded the following with respect to efficacy: “[m]easuring CCTV 
effectiveness is difficult because of the lack of comparisons of similar areas with and 
without CCTV to show a direct cause and effect relationship, and because it is often used 
in tandem with other law enforcement tools.”239  The GAO reported that during its 
investigation city officials had the following observations about efficacy:   
Most CCTV users in the selected U.S. cities whose systems were fully 
operational at the time of our visit did not statistically measure the 
effectiveness of their CCTV systems. They perceived it to be difficult to 
measure, although officials in the selected cities said that CCTV had been 
very effective in, among other things, detecting and investigating crime, 
monitoring areas for public safety, and enhancing security. Officials 
provided anecdotes to demonstrate their system’s effectiveness. For 
example, an official in one city said that the CCTV cameras filmed a drug 
transaction that resulted in an arrest.240 
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Information about efficacy of public CCTV surveillance is not limited to the 
United States. In fact, the GAO report notes the experience of the United Kingdom. The 
GAO observed the following with respect to the United Kingdom’s studies of efficacy. 
A study undertaken on behalf of the Home Office, found mixed results for 
the crime prevention effectiveness of CCTV. However, in October 2002, a 
Home Office official said that the Home Office had provided funding for 
an evaluation of effectiveness for 17 CCTV systems as part of a CCTV 
initiative begun in 1999 for the implementation of 684 local government 
operated CCTV systems in the UK. The evaluations are to be completed in 
November 2004. Home Office officials cautioned that using crime 
statistics as a measure of effectiveness may not be a good measure. They 
said that arrest rates might increase because the CCTV cameras view more 
criminal activity and police are reacting to more reports originating from 
CCTV control centers. They also said that increased crime rates are 
notnecessarily bad because it may mean more crimes are being reported 
that had previously gone undetected. Furthermore, one CCTV user in the 
UK said that the effectiveness of various CCTV systems could vary due to 
differences in CCTV supervisory personnel, training, and procedures.241 
A 2002 British Home Office Study concluded that CCTV programs only reduced 
crime to a “small degree” and called for the need for further study on the matter.242 
In light of the state of research on the issue of efficacy of CCTV systems, it seems 
that there is little on which policymakers can rely on beyond anecdotal evidence.  The 
types of empirical evidence that groups like the ACLU now apparently are requesting 
would likely require years to generate.  While the need to place cameras in some areas 
and then use other areas as controls, not utilizing them would be politically unfeasible 
and prohibitively expensive. 
Just as questions of efficacy remain with respect to crime reduction, similar 
questions remain with respect to preventing terrorism.  Opponents of CCTV point to the 
fact that London, which arguably has more cameras than any major city in the world, has 
been the subject of terrorist attack. Such an argument hardly constitutes evidence of lack 
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of efficacy. The conclusions of these opponents ignore, however, the role of CCTV in 
assisting authorities in identifying terror suspects and their confederates and facilitating 
arrests of suspects.  Also ignored is the increased cost surveillance systems imposed on 
the operations of terror organizations.       
Beyond the debate over efficacy with respect to crime control, there seems to be 
little argument that CCTV provides substantial benefit in a number of other public safety 
contexts.  CCTV can clearly provide command and control assistance to those directing 
first response assets.  Having situational awareness of crime scenes or disaster scenes can 
facilitate the dispatch of appropriate resources.  As noted above, these systems also have 
substantial benefits for traffic management and safety.   
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the important evidentiary value of CCTV 
images in its recent decision in Scott v. Harris.243  There the court took the unusual step 
of appending footage of a police chase to its opinion.  The Court concluded the CCTV 
images clearly evidenced the danger of the conduct of a fleeing motorist  
In light of the case law and commentary discussion of the binary search concept, 
the privacy features of camera surveillance could likely be enhanced by the addition of 
developing technologies such as anonymization.244  CCTV systems can also be adapted 
with “intelligent video” software programmed with algorithms to identify and alert 
operators to patterns of behavior that warrant scrutiny by system operators.245   These 
behaviors include things like approaching secure perimeters, accessing areas where entry 
is unauthorized, leaving behind backpacks or packages. Like facial recognition 
technology, intelligent video technology is relatively new and will be required to mature 
before large scale implementation.   
Use of CCTV equipped with these features may serve to reduce the need for 
continual surveillance and provide greater protections for privacy.  For example, 
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anonymizing images may serve to address concerns raised by critics like Marc Blitz246 
and Christopher Slobogin247 who contend in their comprehensive examinations that 
increased CCTV surveillance will adversely affect important privacy concerns with 
regard to anonymity. Use of automated intelligent video to screen for behaviors of 
concern may help to mitigate some of the concerns raised by Jeffery Rosen who found 
voyeurism and inappropriate conduct in his examination of British CCTV operators.248 
While these technology solutions will not eliminate concerns, they may serve to mitigate 
them. 
3. Tracking of Suspect Persons 
In addition to technologies that detect and provide for observation across a wide 
area, there is a fast growing field of technologies that can be used to track the movements 
and actions of individuals.  CCTV systems equipped with face recognition software is 
just one example of such technology.  A wide range of other technologies can be used for 
that purpose.  It is the tracking of individuals that seems to be the surveillance function 
that  raises the most concerns with commentators like Blitz.249  
The tracking of individuals can be accomplished through a range of technologies. 
Developing technologies for tracking include GPS,250  cellular and RFID systems.251 
Tracking can also be accomplished through biometric measures that utilize some type of 
reading mechanism like a CCTV system enabled with facial recognition software, or 
identity cards or credentials that are read or scanned.  Unlike the observation of areas 
where attention is focused on behaviors only while an individual is in a certain specified 
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geographic space, or detection that occurs over a brief time period, tracking is a function 
that occurs over a more extended period of time.  
William Herbert, in his work on human tracking technology, notes the multiple 
uses already in existence.  Use of this technology is by no means limited to the 
government.  Tracking systems are used for a range of purposes, some desirable, some 
benign and some a little disconcerting.  He observes: 
GPS, RFID, cellular technology, and biometrics are utilized by the 
government to conduct surveillance, employers to monitor employees, 
school districts to track their students, rental car companies to monitor the 
use of rented vehicles, and parents to keep track of their elusive 
teenagers.252 
Herbert further notes that many of these technologies are largely unregulated.253  
Examining each of these technologies in turn it is clear they can potentially impact 
privacy both separately and in combination with other technologies like CCTV. 
a. RFID Technology 
RFID technology involves the communication of digital information 
through radio waves from a RFID chip or tag to a reading device. 254 This technology is 
already being used in a wide number of commercial venues for supply chain 
management.  Tags are placed on items or products to ascertain their whereabouts in the 
delivery process or in managing inventory.255    
In the public realm, RFID is being widely used in many states as part of an 
attempt to reduce traffic congestion.256  The Illinois I-Pass system with over 3 million 
transponders in use is but one example of these systems.257  Utilizing a radio transponder 
                                                 
252 Herbert, “No Direction Home,” 413. 
253 Ibid. 
254  Dalal, “Chipping Away at the Constitution,” 485. 
255 Ibid., 488. 
256 Ibid., 490. 
257 Illinois Toll Highway Authority, 
http://www.illinoistollway.com/portal/page?_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&_pageid=133,1471150 
(accessed January 13, 2007). 
 102
that is placed in the vehicle it can be tracked as it passes a reader’s location, namely, toll 
plazas.  The I-Pass is linked to an account and funds are withdrawn to pay the toll.  While 
the I-Pass has the advantage of allowing a motorist to pass through toll plazas without 
stopping, it does leave behind a digital record of the motorists’ presence.  The RFID 
system is also integrated with a camera system to record the license plate numbers of 
vehicles that pass through the I-Pass toll lanes without the I-Pass transponders.  These 
individuals are issued bills or citations for failure to pay the toll.   
The integration of the two technologies RFID and license plate reading 
CCTV cameras provide a powerful example of how technology can be used to track 
movement.  While the intent of these systems was just to expedite traffic flow and ensure 
compliance with toll collection, they have been used to monitor whereabouts of 
individuals. These records have been subpoenaed in criminal and civil cases to establish 
the whereabouts of individuals.258  
RFID technology is also a component of an effort to expedite international 
travel.  In response to the Western Hemisphere Security Initiative259 that requires the 
presentation of passports and or other identifying information to pass into Canada or 
Mexico, several border states are currently investigating or piloting the use of RFID 
technology in driver’s licenses.  The “enhanced driver’s licenses” are being contemplated 
or issued in several states including Vermont, Arizona, Washington, Michigan New York 
and Texas.260   Washington is planning to issue enhanced driver’s licenses beginning in 
2008.261  These driver’s licenses contain RFID chips with identifying information.  These 
enhanced drivers licenses would be used at border crossings in lieu of passports. The 
RFID chip in the license would be read by sensors as persons pull up to border 
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crossings.262   Privacy advocacy groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
are raising concerns about the use of data from these systems.263 
b GPS Technology 
Similar concerns are raised with regard to GPS and cellular tracking 
technology.  The ability to track wireless communications though GPS and cellular 
technology already exists and is programmed into most all wireless communications 
devices that individuals use.  David Phillips examines the public safety and private 
concerns that drive the placement of location tracking features into wireless devices.  He 
notes that the “primary motivating force behind wireless surveillance is the 
implementation of emergency response.”264  Using cellular or GPS technology, cell 
phones and other wireless communications devices provide information to public safety 
personnel answering points to allow police, fire or EMS responders to locate a caller.  
The installed surveillance technology is also required so that law enforcement with 
proper court authorizations can conduct wiretaps.  A third factor driving surveillance is 
commercial.  It allows the carriers to determine location and use for purpose of marketing 
their services.265   
While this GPS or cellular surveillance function in wireless 
communication devices performs an important public safety function, it can be used for 
tracking in other contexts.  William Herbert in his work on the legal implications of 
tracking technologies discusses the growth of use in the area of employment.  Using GPS 
and RFID technologies, employers can monitor employee “… work performance and 
employee location.”266 Hebert notes that other researchers have coined the phrase 
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“geoslavery” to characterize this phenomenon of human tracking technology.267  Herbert 
also notes the ability of RFID technology not only to facilitate tracking, but to catalogue 
data encoded in the RFID chips.  For example, doctors in both the U.S, and United 
Kingdom have experimented with RFID implants that would allow doctors to access data 
about the patients.   
Arrayed against technology that allows for active tracking of individuals 
using GPS and RFID technologies, there is little in the way of law or regulation. 
Commentators universally agree that the issue of government use of GPS and RFID 
technology to track individuals is a matter that has not been addressed by the Supreme 
Court. 
The two cases that have come closest to addressing the matter are Knotts 
and Karo.  Both cases involve use of battery powered beepers that had been employed 
law enforcement into containers carrying chemicals used in drug manufacture.  Both 
involved law enforcement tracking of the beepers over the public way.  In Karo the 
tracking also occurred within a residence. The Court upheld the use of the beeper in 
Knotts and rejected its use in Karo, While the significant distinguishing feature between 
the two cases seemed to be the fact that the technology was applied within the home in 
Karo and only in public areas in Knotts some of the Court’s observation in Knotts raise 
questions about applicability of the case to technologies like GPS and RFID. 
For example in Knotts, the Court noted that the beeper was a tool used in 
addition to visual surveillance to track the individuals.  With regard to GPS technology, 
however, no visual surveillance would ever be required.   The whereabouts of the item 
could be easily monitored from one central location.  Moreover, there is an important 
dimension of scale. The capacity of beeper surveillance is very limited.  GPS and RFID 
technology would allow for the monitoring of vast numbers of individuals 
simultaneously. In light of the power of RFID and GPS monitoring, it is unclear how the 
Court would treat, large scale use of such information technology.  Concern would 
doubtless be enhanced if these systems could be linked to CCTV surveillance systems.   
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Herbert reviews some developments that have occurred in state courts and 
legislative enactments that have limited public and private uses of GPS and RFID 
technology.  He advocates legislative solutions to the problem.  Commentators like Blitz 
and Ottenberg suggest that the Supreme Court can and should expand privacy protections 
against governmental use of technology as the Court did in Kyllo.  As noted above two 
states, Oregon and Washington, have ruled that privacy protections in their constitutions 
prohibit this activity in the absence of a warrant. 
c. Biometric Technologies 
In addition to the tracking of individuals through devices like GPS and 
RFID there is also a universe of tracking technologies based on monitoring movements of 
individuals through use of biometrics.  In the realm of physical tracking, biometrics 
involves “… the automated methods of identifying a person based on unique physical 
features.”268  
The application of biometrics to tracking is essentially performed in one of 
two ways, identity verification and identification.  Rudy Ng in his work artfully describes 
the distinction: 
In a typical application, an individual's physical traits are scanned by a 
machine and then a comparison is made to a database containing 
previously stored information about that individual. [footnote omitted]. 
This process is used to positively identify the individual and is referred to 
as verification, or one-to-one matching. [footnote omitted].  For example, 
one-to-one matching could be used at a security checkpoint before 
allowing individuals access to restricted areas of a building. [footnote 
omitted].  Biometric scanning can also be used to identify a person by 
comparing their biometric data to all of the records that have been stored 
in the database. [footnote omitted].  This process is referred to as 
identification, or one-to-many matching. [footnote omitted].  For example, 
one-to-many matching could be used to identify an unknown person by 
trying to match their biometric data to the data of known individuals saved 
in a database. [footnote omitted].269 
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Biometric measurement can be taken from a wide variety of areas of the 
body.  The most commonly used biometric has been that of the fingerprint.  Fingerprint 
matching has been employed in law enforcement as a source of positive identification 
since the early twentieth century.  Once done through a process of comparison by trained 
technicians, digitized fingerprints can now be read through automated processes.  The use 
of fingerprint based biometrics has expanded to a wide range of verification and 
identification systems.  For example, Herbert talks about biometric used for employee 
timekeeping functions.  “Increasingly, employers are replacing traditional time sheets 
with biometric technology to monitor time and attendance. [citation omitted].”270  
Fingerprints are hardly the only biometrics measure that can be used for 
identification.  In fact, several other biometric technologies come from the hand alone.  
Those biometrics include: hand geometry and vein pattern identification.  The latter 
technology, introduced in Japan in 2004 has gathered large acceptance in the 
international banking community for its accuracy and the ability to defeat efforts at 
imitation.271  Margret Betzel summarizes several other technologies that can be used for 
identification purposes.  Those technologies include physical features like DNA, facial 
scan and iris scans.  She also discusses activity or behavior based identifiers like 
signature and keystroke identification.272  The federal government is investigating uses 
for a wide range of technologies to establish identity.273  
This verification and identification function of biometrics is extending 
well beyond the employment context.  The transportation industry, largely under the 
direction of the DHS through Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA)  is exploring a wide range of biometric 
technologies to safeguard the transit system.  The technologies being piloted by these 
organizations include implementation of fingerprint based biometrics and iris scan 
technology. 
An example of a fingerprint based biometric program is the U.S. Visitor 
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, seeks to track the 
comings and goings of foreign nationals.274  Initiated in 2004, the US-VISIT275 includes 
the use of two biometric measures, photographs and fingerprints.  The program works as 
follows: 
US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name, 
nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g., digital 
fingerprint scans and photographs) to verify the identity of those covered 
by the program. The program applies to certain visitors whether they hold 
a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a visa waiver 
agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. 
[footnote omitted]. U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and most 
Canadian and Mexican [footnote omitted] citizens are currently exempt 
from being processed under US-VISIT upon entering and exiting the 
country. [footnote omitted].276 
The purpose of the program was to register all foreign nationals as they 
entered and departed the country.277 Biometric samples in the form of fingerprints as well 
as photographs are taken and registered when a person enters the U.S.  They are then 
checked when the individual leaves the U.S. Recognizing that the collection of this data 
involves sensitive personal information, DHS has enacted privacy guidelines.278 
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This type of tracking to gain control of U.S. borders was strongly 
advocated by the 9/11 Commission.279  The program is looking to expand from a 2 finger 
scanning program to 10 fingers beginning in November, 2007.280 However, because of 
cost and operational problems in processing biometric information upon exit, the U.S.-
VISIT program concluded that portion of its technology pilot was unsuccessful.281  The 
US-VISIT program management office has been examining the use of RFID 
identification technology for exit processing.  However, this identification only RFID 
technology, which is not encoded with biometric data, does not appear to meet 
congressional mandates. 282   
In addition to utilizing biometrics to secure borders, there are programs 
being piloted by the TSA to enhance system security and expedite travel through positive 
identification of passengers.  These programs use a process of biometric verification of 
persons subjected to background screening so that screening at airports can be expedited.  
The concept is that trusted or registered travelers who have received background checks 
can be subjected to reduced on-site screening requirements.  The program actually 
involves a series of private operated programs under the generic heading of Registered 
Traveler (RT) program.283 
These RT programs involve the collection of biometric data in the form of 
fingerprints or iris scans.  When the traveler is registered the biometric measurement is 
taken.  A background check of the individual is conducted and if the person is found to be 
a low threat through a security threat assessment conducted in accordance with standards 
set by the TSA an encoded travel card is issued.  The traveler presents the card when 
traveling and is processed through a separate screening lane once a biometric reader 
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verifies identity.284 Realizing the sensitivity of information collected and used in this 
process, the TSA has recently promulgated a set of guidelines on safeguarding 
information gathered.285 
While the US-VISIT and RT programs are designed to address 
identification and verification issues amongst the general public, the federal government 
is also currently piloting biometric based “smart cards,”286 identification cards coded 
with biometric and identifying data, for persons working in the transportation industry.   
Smart cards contain micro chips or memory chips and microprocessors.  Unlike magnetic 
swipe cards that require access to data bases to function (like a credit card), smart cards 
equipped with memory chips can perform defined operations. Smart cards with micro 
processors can “…add delete and manipulate information.”287  
One example of smart card technology, the Travel Worker Identification 
Credentials (TWIC), would allow the federal government to positively establish the 
identity of all persons working in the transportation field.288  Similar ideas have also been 
propounded for law enforcement personnel and emergency responders.  The concept of 
TWIC is to place biometric identification data like digital photographs and fingerprints 
into a uniform identity card that can then be used to authenticate the identity of vetted 
personnel at access points in transportation facilities.  The TWIC card would presumably 
become the basis for access control within critical areas of transportation facilities.  Only 
individuals with TWIC cards would be allowed access to sensitive areas.289 
As with the RT and US-VISIT the managers of the TWIC program 
recognize the sensitive privacy concerns with regard to collected data.  General 
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information about the program outlines some measures taken to safeguard the 
information.  These mostly govern the collection of the data into a centralized protected 
database.290  However, these measures appear to be much less extensive than the 
guidelines established for RT and US-VISIT data.   
One final example of a proposed federal program with implications for 
human tracking is the REAL ID program. The REAL ID Act of 2005291 is a program to 
ensure state issuance of verified identity documents that can be used by the federal 
government.  On January 10, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security issued a final 
rule that provides guidance to states for issuance of compliant drivers licenses and 
identity cards.292  
The REAL ID program requires states to issue complying drivers licenses 
and identity cards so that their citizens can access federally controlled facilities. Pursuant 
to the final rule:  
beginning on May 11, 2008, citizens of States that are not REAL ID 
compliant may not use their driver’s licenses or identification cards for 
official federal purposes such as boarding federally regulated commercial 
aircraft or accessing federal or nuclear facilities. If these citizens do not 
have other acceptable forms of identification (e.g., a U.S. passport), they 
may suffer delays due to the requirement for enhanced security screening. 
REAL ID-compliant States are those that have both requested and 
obtained an extension of the compliance date from DHS, or have been 
determined by DHS to be in compliance with the Act and the final rule.293 
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Compliance is required by 2009 with the ability of extension until 
2011.294 While the REAL ID program does not currently contain any requirement for 
biometric analysis or information in conjunction with issuance of licenses or 
identification cards, both signatures and digital photographs are required.295  Both these 
pieces of data can form the basis for future biometric analysis.  It should also be noted 
that the requirements of REAL ID are being aligned to be compatible with the enhanced 
driver’s license program that uses RFID chips to encode data on driver’s licenses.296  
Encoded REAL ID licenses with the RFID features of enhanced driver’s licenses offer 
powerful mechanisms for human tracking. 
4. Cyber Tracking 
Tracking of human activity is not limited to the physical dimensions of public 
space.  Developing technology allows for the tracking of individual activity in cyberspace 
as well.  Two recent forays by government agencies into the tracking of activity in 
cyberspace have been well documented.  They raise further concerns about the ability of 
government to track individuals in public space. 
One program operated by the federal Bureau of Investigation is a computer 
program formerly known as “Carnivore”.297 Through the “Carnivore” program the FBI 
was able to trap internet communications of suspect individuals without application for a 
warrant.  The Carnivore program involved the installation of a collection computer at an 
internet service provider (ISP) to collect all incoming and outgoing email from an 
internet address.  While the content of the email was not reviewed (although it was 
stored), the addresses of incoming and outgoing email were recorded.   
The FBI concluded that trapping the registration of the email addresses was 
likened to a pen register recording of the numbers dialed or received by a telephone.  The 
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Supreme Court had concluded in Smith v. Maryland298 that pen registers did not 
implicate fourth amendment protections because the information was already registered 
with the phone company that used it for billing.  Thus, there was no expectation of 
privacy in the numbers of calls made or received. While some privacy protections are 
afforded to this type of internet search through the provisions of the ECPA,299 those 
protections are less than requirements for eavesdropping on electronic voice 
communications, especially in the areas of judicial oversight and minimization of 
unrelated information.  
Carnivore demonstrates the ability of the government to monitor individual 
conduct which can relate directly to the most intimate and private thoughts.  Utilizing 
Carnivore the government can track all of an individual’s electronic contacts.  It can also 
collect and store the subject of those communications for later review if a warrant is 
issued.  Commentators have noted this poses substantial implications for personal privacy 
in the digital age.300    
Similar challenges are posed by the FBI’s keystroke logging systems like “Magic 
Lantern.”301  Utilizing programs like Magic Lantern, the government is able to access 
computers remotely and then monitor all the activity on the keyboards.  This information 
is particularly useful in decrypting encoded messages.  It also allows the key loggers the 
ability to reconstruct any activity that occurred on the computer.  While the actual 
analysis of this data may not occur until after a warrant is secured, the entry into the 
system and collection of the keystroke data has been determined by at least one court not 
to constitute a fourth amendment violation.302 
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5. Summary 
As demonstrated above, biometrics, particularly when combined with 
technologies like CCTV or smart cards, provides significant capacity for government and 
others to monitor individual movements and activities.  The ability to track extends not 
just to physical space, but to cyberspace as well.   The range of protection to address data 
collected through these programs is relatively small.  While case law exists in some states 
to address some aspects of tracking and some federal statutory restrictions exist in the 
area of tracking in cyberspace, many aspects of tracking technology are largely 
unregulated. 
The existence of this tracking technology, while not commonly used, at present, 
by local law enforcement, remains a possibility in the not too distant future.  While these 
programs are designed for allowing access to enter the country, travel on aircraft or work 
in sensitive areas of transportation facilities, they raise the distinct possibility of tracking 
individual movement over a period of time. In addition to allowing for tracking activity at 
any given point in time, the digitization of this new surveillance technology allows for 
the creation of massive databases collecting activity over time. Sets of data that are 
collections of public record raise additional concerns. 
Tracking technology, be it GPS, RFID, or biometrics, linked to databases and 
other technologies like CCTV provides powerful tools for monitoring large aspects of 
human conduct.  Combined with technological enhancements in database management 
they provide a significant capacity for monitoring movement over time.  The use of this 
technology in an individuated manner raises substantial concerns for the states of privacy 
of both anonymity and reserve.  It is the existence of these databases and the enhanced 
ability of government and others to mine them that pose significant concerns for two of 
the four states of privacy with the state of reserve particularly at risk. 
B. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE DATA 
MANAGEMENT 
Just as the ability to collect surveillance data has grown with developments in 
technology, so to have there been improvements in data base management.  The 
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development of digital technology has vastly increased the capacity for storing a wide 
range of information.  It has also increased the ability of manipulating large amounts of 
data across different data bases.  The result of these developments is to allow massive 
compilations of data by government and large corporate entities that can operate and 
maintain sophisticated computer systems.  
As noted earlier, development of these systems has not gone unnoticed by the 
Supreme Court in both Whelan, and Reporters Committee, the Court observed that the 
government’s growing ability to compile and analyze data pose significant concerns.  
These data compilations ultimately undermine an individual’s right of reserve, as Westin 
characterizes it, the right to keep to one’s self and to control dissemination of information 
about one’s self.  
Three recent government efforts in compiling massive databases point out: the 
capabilities of government to establish and manipulate large compilations of public 
information for security purposes; the attendant privacy issue implications of the creation 
and use of those compilations; and the cost to government when privacy concerns are not 
addressed. Looking at these integrated surveillance databases provides insight as to the 
issues surrounding compilation and use of databases populated with data from 
surveillance technology, whether that technology includes CCTV, GPS, RFID computer 
tracking or information from any combination of those technologies. 
The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) is a security 
measure that has been used in the screening of commercial airline passengers for over ten 
years.  Initiated by air carriers in 1998, pursuant to grant funding by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), the purpose of CAPPS was to enhance aviation security.  CAPPS 






Since the late 1990s, prescreening has been conducted using a computer-
assisted system that, based on certain criteria and behaviors, identifies 
passengers that may pose a higher risk to aviation security. These higher-
risk passengers and their baggage are subject to additional and more 
thorough screening.303  
Post-9/11 as the nation sought to tighten security in the commercial aviation 
industry, the function of passenger screening was transferred from air carriers to the 
federal government.  In addition to transferring responsibility for screening programs, the 
federal government, through the TSA, sought to expand the scope of the CAPPS 
database.  Thus, the CAPPS II project was initiated to expand the data reviewed in 
connection with the issuance of boarding passes. 
The CAPPS II project sought to conduct more detailed analysis of the background 
of passengers than was conducted under the original CAPPS program that just looked at 
passenger behavior (i.e., purchase of tickets in cash, purchase of only one-way tickets).  
CAPPS II was designed to operate in the following manner.  Air carriers were to be 
required to obtain the name, address, phone number, and date of birth of potential 
passengers.  That information was to be forwarded for a check against commercial 
databases to establish a score as to the confidence in the individual’s identity.  That 
scored information would then be processed by CAPPS II through a compendium of 
classified and unclassified government databases to specify a risk category for each 
passenger.  The exact number and identity of databases to be queried has not been made 
public by TSA.  Once a risk category is identified (either acceptable risk; unknown risk; 
or unacceptable risk) the information would be transmitted to the air carrier for encoding 
on the boarding pass.  At the passenger-screening checkpoint, the encoded information 
would dictate the level of screening applied. 304  
While the CAPPS II planners paid some attention to issues like privacy concerns 
and data security, the Government Accountability Office (USGAO) in its 2004 review of 
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the program found the TSA’s efforts inadequate.  The report noted that the TSA had not 
placed use limitations with regard to data collected.  It also failed to provide for 
individual participation in the process so an individual could know what data was 
collected about him or her.  Additionally the USGAO found inadequate procedures for 
redress and safeguards for data security.  
The USGAO was not the only organization to raise concerns about CAPPS II.  
Privacy advocacy groups like the ACLU also voiced concerns.305  When Delta Airline 
agreed to provide information for a pilot of the CAPPS II program, in March 2003, there 
were calls for a boycott of the airline.306  Criticism was not limited to domestic sources.  
Concerns about the CAPPS II were expressed by foreign governmental organizations like 
the European Union whose citizens as air travelers were subject to the CAPPS II 
database.307 In the face of this criticism, the TSA announced it was abandoning the 
CAPPS II program and, in August 2004, noted the creation of a new computer screen 
program “Secure Flight.”308 
While the August 2004, media announcement of Secure Flight indicated testing 
would begin before the end of 2004, the program has yet to be implemented. Secure 
Flight continues to suffer from a number of the same criticisms raised about its 
predecessor CAPPS II. A 2005 report by the USGAO assessing Secure Flight indicates 
that many of the same privacy issues confronted by CAPPS II remain unresolved: 
… TSA has recognized that Secure Flight has the inherent potential to 
adversely affect the privacy rights of the traveling public because of the 
use of passenger data, and has begun to take steps to minimize potential 
impacts on passengers and to protect passenger rights during the testing 
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phase of Secure Flight. However, TSA has not yet clearly defined the 
privacy impacts of Secure Flight in an operational environment, or all of 
the actions TSA plans to take to mitigate potential impacts. TSA also 
drafted a redress process to provide passengers who believe they were 
inappropriately delayed from boarding their scheduled flights because of 
Secure Flight a means by which to appeal these decisions and possibly 
correct erroneous data found in the terrorist screening database or in 
commercial databases, should TSA decide to use commercially available 
data. However, TSA has not yet clearly defined how it plans to implement 
its redress process for Secure Flight, such as how errors, if identified, will 
be corrected, particularly if commercial databases are used. In addition, 
although DHS and TSA have taken steps to address international privacy 
concerns in developing Secure Flight, such as limiting Secure Flight to 
prescreening only domestic passengers, issues remain, particularly with 
regard to the European Union.309 
The TSA continues to work toward implementation of the Secure Flight program.  
A notice of proposed rulemaking on the program was issued for public comment in 
August 2007.310  The TSA has most recently projected implementation of the Secure 
Flight program for 2009.311 
The federal government alone is not the only governmental entity that has sought 
to use complex data compilations to conduct surveillance of individuals though inter-
related database searches to identify “suspect” persons and conduct.  Another example of 
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Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project.312  This project was a DHS funded 
program managed by the State of Florida.313  The project concluded in December, 
2005314  
The MATRIX project involved computer aided analysis of a range of public 
records. The program boasted the ability to search up to 20 billion records.  Those 
records include telephone and cell phone records, financial records and location records.  
The Congressional Research service report on MATRIX noted that the records utilized in 
MATRIX included:  
… a broad array of public data, ranging from motor vehicle driving 
records to bankruptcy filings. While much of these data have been 
available to law enforcement, they have not been previously queried, 
cross-referenced, and analyzed with computers. According to the 
MATRIX website, such records include the following: 
• pilot licenses issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration; 
• aircraft ownership; 
• property ownership; 
• U.S. Coast Guard-registered vessels; 
• state sexual offender lists; 
• corporate filings; 
• Uniform Commercial Code filings or business liens; 
• bankruptcy filings; and 
• state-issued professional licenses.[citation omitted] 
According to the MATRIX website, available records also include records that 
have historically been available to law enforcement agencies. Such records include 
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• criminal history records; 
• department of corrections information and photo 
images; 
• sexual offender criminal history files; 
• driver’s license information and photo images; and 
• motor vehicle registration information.[citation 
omitted]315 
By aggregating all these data sources, none of which would independently be 
afforded Fourth Amendment protection, detailed profiles of individuals could be 
created.316 
These systems are a source of great concern among civil rights groups concerning 
the potential impact they have on personal privacy.317 Despite the fact that the MATRIX 
program used records that were commonly available to law enforcement, the program 
drew substantial criticism from privacy advocates.318  The MATRIX program failed in 
part due to criticism over the program’s handling of privacy concerns. 
In its report reviewing the MATRIX program the DHS Privacy Office noted: 
…the MATRIX pilot project was undermined, and ultimately halted, in 
large part because it did not have a comprehensive privacy policy from the 
outset to provide transparency about the project’s purpose and practices 
and protect against mission creep or abuse. The recommendations of the 
Privacy Office rest on the basic premise that information programs such as 
the MATRIX pilot project can protect privacy, while increasing homeland 
security. Building privacy into the architecture of an information program 
can help ensure that the program achieves its objectives while 
safeguarding individual privacy.319 
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The failure of the MATRIX pilot to properly address perceived privacy concerns 
was a costly one.  The project involved an expenditure of $12 million in federal funds. 
That funding included $4 million from the Department of Justice and $8 million from 
DHS. Before the project concluded, it was being piloted in 16 states covering half the 
U.S. population.320 
Unlike Secure Flight and MATRIX, which have not left the pilot stage, the FBI is 
operating a complex computer based analysis system through its Carnivore program.  As 
noted above Carnivore enables the FBI to track activity of a person on the internet.  
However the program has many other features.  
Carnivore is a device capable of collecting and monitoring all online 
activities from e-mail to web surfing at a particular Internet service 
provider (ISP). [citation omitted] According to the FBI, Carnivore would 
be configured so that it could return certain sought-after information. 
[citation omitted] It would accomplish this by capturing all of the 
information that passes through an ISP, and then extracting only the 
sought-after information. [citation omitted] For example, if the FBI sought 
to determine with whom a particular individual was corresponding via e-
mail, Carnivore could be configured to "filter out" all other information, 
including the content of that individual's e-mail. [citation omitted] While it 
would chew all the information that came through the Internet, it would 
only digest the sought-after information. Carnivore, therefore, can be 
programmed to limit the information viewed by human eyes. [citation 
omitted] In many respects, Carnivore is the mirror image of the net-wide 
search. Instead of "going out" onto the net to search for information, 
however, the device collects information as it passes through one of the 
Internet's many gateways. Like an information roadblock, it screens all 
traffic, but pulls over only the data packets it has been programmed to 
capture.321 
While Carnivore is reportedly used only pursuant to court order, it affords 
potential access to massive amounts of data.322  In full collection mode the system not 
only looks at the addresses of email and net searches, but the contents of those 
transmissions.  Unlike wiretaps where the operators are required to turn off the tapping 
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equipment when a conversation is determined to be outside scope of the court ordered 
overhear, Carnivore electronically records all the information.323  The Carnivore system 
demonstrates a powerful capacity to store and manipulate massive amounts of data.  
Privacy concerns over the Carnivore program came to the fore in the wake of a 
July 2000 article in the Wall Street Journal and resulted in a congressionally conducted 
hearing and an independent review of the system by the Illinois Institute of Technology 
Research Institute (IITRI).324 While the IITRI report concluded that the Carnivore 
program could be operated within constitutional guidelines, it did note the power of the 
program with respect to data collection.325  The IITRI report observes that “[w]hile the 
system was designed to, and can, perform fine-tuned searches, it is also capable of broad 
sweeps. Incorrectly configured, Carnivore can record any traffic it monitors.”326 Among 
the IITRI report’s  recommendations were: separating Carnivore into two versions, one 
for full collection and the other simply to monitor address information, like a pen 
register; and improvements to enhance the audit and compliance features of the program 
to ensure against misuse.327 Commentators note that despite the fact the IITRI report 
recommended some changes to Carnivore, the highly redacted report has left many critics 
skeptical of the program.328 Subsequent to the IIRTI report’s publication, the “Carnivore” 
program’s name was changed to “DCS 1000.” 329 
One of the more recent government forays into the area of using computer 
technology to analyze massive streams of data is the DHS’ ADVISE project.  ADVISE 
which stands for Analysis Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic 
Enhancement is a massive computer program to monitor computer data about 
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individuals.330  ADVISE is a data mining technology that accesses a wide range of data 
bases to identify threat behavior.331 As DHS describes the ADVISE program: 
The ADVISE pilot initiatives use a data mining approach to glean insights 
from large amounts of data across various sources. Data mining is the 
process of knowledge discovery and predictive modeling and analytics, 
traditionally involving the identification of patterns and relationships from 
databases.[citation omitted] Data mining has been used successfully for a 
number of years in the private and public sectors for a broad range of 
applications.332 
In that respect ADVISE seems to combine the aspects of systems like Carnivore, 
MATRIX and Secure Flight into one super computer program to identify suspect 
conduct.  
At the time of the 2006 Christian Science Monitor story about this program it was 
noted that DHS had provided little information about the program.333 Subsequent audits 
of the ADVISE program may provide some insight into the absence of information.  It 
appears that the ADVISE program which was created in the Science and Technology 
Directorate of DHS failed to coordinate development with the DHS Privacy Office.  The 
results were fatal to continuation of the ADVISE pilot program.  The DHS Inspector 
General’s Report notes: 
S&T planning and management activities for ADVISE have been 
insufficient to support effective implementation of the program. … 
Program managers also did not address privacy impacts before 
implementing three pilot initiatives to support ADVISE. DHS has 
discontinued its three ADVISE pilot programs, pending completion of 
such privacy assessments.334 
 
                                                 
330 Mark Clayton, “US Plans Massive Data Sweep,” Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2006, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0209/p01s02-uspo.html (accessed January 27, 2008). 
331 Ibid. 
332 U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, ADVISE Could Support 
Intelligence Analysis More Effectively, July 2, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-
56_Jun07.pdf (accessed January 27, 2008). 
333 Clayton, “US Plans Massive Data Sweep.”   
334 U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, ADVISE Could Support 
Intelligence Analysis More Effectively,  8. 
 123
Suspension of a massive computer surveillance project in the face of privacy 
concerns should have come as no surprise to DAH administrators.  As the DHS Inspector 
General’s Report observes:  
Due to the ease with which automated systems can be used to gather and 
analyze large amounts of previously isolated data, a number of concerns 
about potential misuse of personally identifiable information have been 
raised. Prior federal data mining efforts faced challenges in balancing the 
benefits and risks of this activity. For example, the Total Information 
Awareness program, a Department of Defense research and development 
data mining program to defend against the threat of terrorism, faced 
considerable negative publicity and was ultimately shut down by the 
Congress due to privacy concerns.335 
C. SUMMARY 
The four computer-based surveillance data analysis systems outlined above 
provide some obvious lessons for administrators regarding developing digital technology.  
Primarily, these systems indicate how powerful computer based systems are at 
manipulating large amounts of information.  As the Secure Flight, MATRIX and 
ADVISE examples illustrate, data can be aggregated and inter-related over a wide range 
of activities.  While such databases present a number of prospective benefits for law 
enforcement, they also raise the prospect of potential abuse. 
Secondly, the construction and operation of these databases will engender 
significant opposition from privacy advocacy groups.  As the MATRIX program 
demonstrates, that opposition can come even when the information utilized in the 
database is “public” information that is already routinely accessed by governmental 
entities.  The power of these systems and their potential for abuse require attention to 
privacy protections.  The failure to do so may result in project cancellation and 
reformulation.  The postponement of the ADVISE pilot demonstrates, the importance of 
incorporating privacy considerations early in the planning process.  Moreover, as 
Carnivore demonstrates calls for additional privacy protections can even occur in 
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programs that are administered under court supervision.  The placement of access control 
and accountability mechanisms into complex surveillance database management is 
crucial.      
The failure to adequately address privacy management in the operation of 
surveillance databases can be quite costly.  As noted above the federal government 
invested some $12 million in the now disbanded MATRIX system.  The Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a privacy advocacy group, reports that the TSA has 
allocated $38 million in federal fiscal year 2008 for Secure Flight.  This amount in 
addition to the $144 million expended since 2004.336  This sum is in addition to the funds 
allocated for CAPPS II.  All these federal funds have been expended for computerized 
analytic systems that have yet to proceed out of the pilot stage.  The ADVISE program 
with a reported cost of $42 million to date is also on hold.337 Yet the cost should not only 
be measured in dollars.  The failure to accommodate privacy concerns has resulted in 
postponement, and in some cases, elimination of programs that had potential to assist 
government in addressing terror threats.  Moreover, as the CAPPS II experience 
demonstrates, the failure to properly account for privacy concerns may prove to be an 
impediment to international cooperation. 
Perhaps the most significant lesson that can be drawn from analysis of the 
Carnivore, ADVISE, Secure Flight, and MATRIX systems is the fact that that where 
there is commitment to privacy the programs are moving forward.  The Carnivore 
program, while perhaps not perfect, has a much greater degree of protection in place.  
Although it should be noted that even where the application of the technology is 
controlled by a court supervised order, there is a need for privacy protections to be an 
integral part of operational policies and procedures. 
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VI. FOREIGN APPROACHES TO PRIVACY PROTECTION 
As many jurisdictions in the United States look to develop enhanced surveillance 
systems to deal with complex problems of homeland security, crime, and even traffic 
management, the experience of the United Kingdom and on the European Continent in 
governance of those systems may prove instructive.  This is particularly true with respect 
to addressing privacy concerns in system operation.  Moreover, as the U.S. seeks to 
engage with the United Kingdom and other European partners to combat the terror threat 
through the sharing of information about individuals, understanding and meeting the 
privacy concerns of those nations will facilitate information flow. 
Examining debate, or perhaps more appropriately in countries like the UK, the 
absence of debate, over the implementation of CCTV systems demonstrates different 
philosophies of how those systems should be operated and their relationship to protecting 
elements of individual privacy.  Comparing these philosophic differences, the governance 
structures developed to effectuate them and the effect they have on CCTV programs can 
help U.S. policymakers better understand how privacy oriented regulation will influence 
American use of CCTV.  It can also provide a roadmap for addressing legitimate privacy 
concerns and avoiding potential roadblocks to the successful implementation of CCTV 
programs. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF CCTV IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom has perhaps the most highly developed camera system in the 
world.   Beginning in 1993, the United Kingdom, in response to an Irish Republican 
Army attack at Bishopgate in central London, developed a strategy to use CCTV camera 
surveillance to enhance security of the area. 338 The strategy was to use CCTV 
surveillance at all entry points into central London to create a “ring of steel” checking the  
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license tags of all vehicles entering the area.  The project involved not only installing a 
network of cameras throughout the City, but integrating those cameras with databases 
containing vehicle registration data. 
From these beginnings, the use of CCTV in the United Kingdom has expanded 
exponentially.  The “ring of steel” was subsequently integrated with cameras operating in 
institutions like banks and offices in London.339  The expansion of the CCTV network, 
referred to as “Camerawatch,” was the product of a meeting with over 400 organizations 
involving 373 different systems with over 1200 cameras.340 Significantly, the U.K.’s 
CCTV system is a blend of public and private cameras that focus on publicly accessed 
areas. 
The expansion of cameras was not limited to the issue of terrorist prevention in 
the City center.  It has expanded to an extensive network of speed monitoring cameras on 
roads throughout Great Britain.  This network has expanded from a network that 
produced 300,000 enforcement actions in 1996 to over two million actions in 2004.341  In 
addition to enhancing traffic safety, this increase in enforcement activity raises over 113 
million pounds in revenue per year.  Significantly, just as the network of cameras has 
expanded the British government has also sought to expand its capabilities in reading the 
license registration of vehicles from thirty-five million reads per day to fifty million by 
2008.342 
Expansion of the camera system in the United Kingdom is a high priority of the 
government.  Throughout the 1990s, the government spent over 78 percent of the 
available funds for crime prevention on CCTV systems,343  but funding for camera 
initiatives has not come solely from the government.  For example, in the period from  
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1994 to 1999 the government’s “CCTV Challenge” generated 31 million pounds in 
government funds with 58 million pounds of private funds to install some 580 camera 
systems.344  
The result of the efforts in the United Kingdom is the development of perhaps the 
most sophisticated camera networks in the world.  Current estimates place the camera 
coverage in the United Kingdom at as many as 4.2 million cameras.  This amounts to one 
camera for every 14 people in the country.345 
The increase in surveillance capability through use of CCTV cameras parallels 
developments in other areas of surveillance technology like, biometrics, GPS and RFID.  
Developments in these tracking and monitoring technologies, combined with enhanced 
ability to integrate these data sources through digitization and computer technology, has 
caused the British government to implement measures to control the collection and use of 
surveillance data.  
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CCTV IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
Unlike the United Kingdom, CCTV camera usage on the European continent has 
to date been significantly less robust.  In their work surveying European use of CCTV, 
Hempel and Topfer, chronicle the use of  CCTV in cities in Germany, Denmark, France, 
Austria, Hungary and Italy as of their studies publication in 2002. 346  That study shows 
that governmental use of CCTV on the European continent is primarily confined to areas 
like transit centers (airports, train stations and light rail systems).  Other areas commonly 
covered include government buildings and museums.  In the private sphere, CCTV is 
common in monitoring financial institutions, retail chain stores, gas stations, shopping 
malls and hospitals.  Of 1400 such locations surveyed in six European capitals (including 
the UK), a third were monitored by CCTV.347   
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While there is common use of CCTV outside the U.K. to monitor critical 
buildings and centers, the use of CCTV to monitor activity (exclusive of traffic) in public 
areas like city streets is greatly reduced.  While the U.K. was reported by Hempel and 
Topfer to have 400,000 cameras monitoring such areas in over 500 cities the numbers are 
much lower on the continent.348  In 2005, France was reported to have only 40,000 
cameras in the public areas.349  They report 300 towns in France with CCTV systems to 
monitor public areas and 20 cities in Germany.   In some countries like Denmark, there 
are no CCTV systems in place to conduct surveillance of public streets.350   
The degree of CCTV utilization does fluctuate significantly between countries.  
For example, while 40% of the accessible public space studied in the U.K. was monitored 
by CCTV, that number was only 18 % in Austria.351  The significantly lower utilization 
rates for CCTV  across Europe is likely due to concerns over privacy and a considerably 
more well developed body of law on this subject when compared to the U.K. However, in 
the future, the continental use of CCTV may see some significant expansion. In recent 
years, the governments in Germany352 and France353 have indicated an interest in 
expanding CCTV surveillance systems, primarily in response to terror threats.  In 
Denmark, the government has opened for public debate the issue of expansion of CCTV 
coverage to public areas.354 
While government proposed expansion in Germany is envisioned along current 
lines of CCTV coverage (at transit centers), the expansion proposed by the French 
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government is far greater.355  In July 2007, the French government announced its intent 
to triple CCTV coverage across France.   The goal of the government is to combat 
terrorism by covering as much area as possible with CCTV.  Video images from the 
expanded system would be maintained from 48 hours to one week depending on CCTV 
site.356  This policy shift represents a departure from the more cautious expansion of 
CCTV in France that has characterized that country to date. 
C. GOVERNANCE OF CCTV SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Comparing the U.K.’s experience in CCTV implementation with development in 
the regulatory environment provides helpful insights not just for the management of 
CCTV networks themselves, but across the field of information technology.  The U.K. 
system has developed in an environment with little initial regulation.357  Even now, much 
of the control constitutes self-regulation with little concentrated central governmental 
controls.358  
1. Development of UK Governance 
In his work on development of regulation in the U.K., Webster notes three phases 
in implementation of CCTV.359  The first phase characterized as the “Era of Innovation” 
extended from early to mid-1990s.360  During this period there was little in the way of 
regulation of CCTV.  As CCTV networks began to propagate rapidly in the U.K. in the 
mid-to-late 1990s use of the systems was largely controlled by self-regulation.  Webster 
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characterizes this as the “Era of Uptake.”361  As CCTV users developed their systems, 
they developed their own governing rules and began sharing best practices.  The national 
government through the Home Office supported this development through funding 
programs designed to create partnerships between police and local officials.  The final 
phase outlined in Webster’s work is the “Era of Sophistication” from the late 1990’s 
forward.362 This period is marked by some nonspecific legislation addressing the issue of 
privacy protection, the development of a CCTV Code of Practice that finds force in the 
Home Office funding process, and “agreed purpose/working practices /technical 
standards of systems.”363  The former two measures are government initiatives.  The 
latter measures are products of the self regulation process by camera networks.   
a. Co-Regulation and the Code of Practice 
This process of regulation both from the government and from the 
networks themselves is characterized by Webster as “co-regulation.”  He defines the term 
as follows: 
Co-regulation implies a development of self-regulation. It implies the 
coexistence of traditional regulation and self-regulation in such a way that 
responsibilities about the provision of the technology are shared between 
the regulating and providing agencies [citations omitted]. Co-regulation 
therefore implies a new set of relationships in the policy arena, between 
government, industry and service providers, as all ‘stakeholders’ are 
involved in forming and implementing the rules that are to be applied as 
regulation. Co-regulation also allows for the possibility of formal and 
legislative regulatory measures. However, instead of formal measures 
being imposed on service providers it emerges from within the policy 
environment via negotiation with interested parties in the policy network.  
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It is through this co-regulatory process that the CCTV networks of the UK 
are being governed. 
The three legislative pieces that contribute to this co-regulation system 
were promulgated largely after the exponential proliferation in CCTV systems had 
already occurred.  Those statutes include: “The Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA);” 
“The Human Rights Act 0f 1998 (HRA);” and “The Crime and Disorder Act (CDA).”  
Importantly, none of those statutes specifically refers to CCTV.  The provisions of 
Article 8 of the HRA only address the privacy implication of CCTV in a general fashion.  
The article provides generically to protect individual rights to privacy by requiring public 
agencies to respect those rights.  The CDA simply requires police and local authorities to 
work together to develop and implement crime fighting strategies.  It also mandates 
community consultation and information sharing.  While many CCTV systems were 
implemented pursuant to these strategies, there are no specific CCTV requirements.  
Perhaps the most important of the statutes from a regulatory perspective is 
the DPA.  The DPA generally refers to privacy rights of individual in collected data of a 
personal nature. Any question that CCTV images come under DPA protections was 
resolved in 2000 with the issuance of specific regulatory guidance.  To effectuate the 
terms of the DPA with respect to CCTV the British Data Protection Commissioner 
promulgated a CCTV Code of Practice.  This Code of Practice is a mechanism for legally 
enforceable regulation of CCTV under the DPA.  In developing the guidance the Data 
Protection Commissioner noted: 
This Code of Practice has the dual purpose of assisting operators of CCTV 
systems to understand their legal obligations while also reassuring the 
public about the safeguards that should be in place. It sets out the 
measures which must be adopted to comply with the Data Protection Act 
1998, and goes on to set out guidance for the following of good data 
protection practice. The Code makes clear the standards which must be 
followed to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and then 
indicates those which are not a strict legal requirement but do represent the 
following of good practice. 364 
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To ensure compliance with the DPA requirements the Code of Practice 
sets out to address the following principles for regarding data: 
 
• fairly and lawfully processed;  
• processed for limited purposes and not in any manner 
incompatible with those purposes;  
• adequate, relevant and not excessive;  
• accurate;  
• not kept for longer than is necessary  
• processed in accordance with individuals’ rights;  
• secure;  
• not transferred to countries without adequate protection.365 
 
The Code of Practice accomplishes its objectives by providing general 
standards for implementation of both public and private CCTV systems.  These standards 
address: “Initial Assessment Procedures” (outlining the purpose of the scheme and the 
persons/organizations responsible for implementation)366; “Siting the Cameras” 
(outlining the process for ensuring camera placement supports scheme design, minimizes 
unintended impact, and notifies the public of camera placement)367; “Quality of Images” 
(ensuring the image quality can be used for law enforcement purposes)368; “Processing 
the Images” (ensuring proper security during retention periods and destruction in 
accordance with schedules)369; “Disclosure to Third Parties” (limited and only under 
specified circumstances)370; “Access by Data Subjects” (providing data subjects with  
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information on the purpose of surveillance and the ability to access their data)371; and 
“Other Rights” (measures to minimize damage caused by data subjects in processing 
data)372.  
Consistent with Webster’s theory of co-regulation, the Data Protection 
Commissioner notes that the Code of Practice was prepared in consultation with 
operators of CCTV systems. It was posted in draft on the Commission website for 
comment before being finalized.  Additionally, the Commissioner notes the need to keep 
the Code under constant review in light of “changing technology.”373 
In addition to the regulation of the CCTV systems provided by the Data 
Protection Commissioner, regulatory guidance is provided by the following entities: 
Police Scientific Development Branch (technical advice on camera/system 
configuration); British Standards Institute (administrative standards for CCTV system 
operation); Home Office “CCTV Initiative” (funding guidance for support for CCTV 
systems) ; CCTV User Group (industry designed model practice and procedure guides for 
CCTV operation); Local Government Information Unit (model code for CCTV operation 
collected from local governments); and Home Office Research Group (studies of CCTV 
efficacy).  These organizations serve as resources for cities and villages as they develop 
and implement their CCTV strategies.374 
While these regulations in the Code of Practice address the major issues of 
privacy protection, they are not overly restrictive.  Perhaps the most burdensome 
requirements fall in the areas of signage, access by third parties and access by data 
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b. Signage, Third Party Access, and Subject Access 
As to the Signage requirements, the provisions of the Code of Practice are 
fairly specific.   Signs must be clearly “legible” and “visible”375 notifying persons they 
are entering an area monitored by CCTV equipment.376  The signage is required to advise 
individuals the purpose of the CCTV scheme, the person or organization operating it and 
contact information.  While it has some exception for signage the operator must make a 
factual showing that such covert surveillance is required.   Such activity is anticipated to 
be limited in scope and duration.377  
While the regulations are quite clear, strict regulatory enforcement of the 
signage requirements appears to be lacking.  In his work examining the issue of signage 
and CCTV surveillance in London, Cole, notes that only a quarter of the signs observed 
meet the Code of Practice requirements.  This may be a function of the fact that the Code 
of Practice did not come into effect until well after many of London’s CCTV systems had 
been activated.  It also may be a function of what Gras refers to in her work as a lack of 
“effective regulation.378”  With regard to the UK’s regulatory structure Gras observes: 
Regulatory bodies in the UK notoriously lack resources and are reliant 
upon the good-will and co-operation of those they are regulating and their 
activities are frequently triggered by a specific complaint…[citation 
omitted]. These issues become all the more relevant in the data protection 
field where breaches of regulation will not leave any physical trace.379 
Aside from the issue of regulatory compliance, there is some question 
about the real purpose of the signage requirements.  Cole posits in his work that the 
signage requirement is not really a measure to protect individual rights.  Rather, it is a 
method to enhance the designed effect of government to alter public conduct. Cole 
observes: 
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At a more theoretical level, it is the view of this paper that the signage 
used to advise of the presence of CCTV – whether it complies with the 
code or not – has another and altogether different effect, namely, it [sic] 
emphasizes the existence of surveillance and thereby amplifies its effect. 
In fact, the signage that does not comply with the code might be said to 
have greater influence in this respect.380 
In addition to the question of UK compliance with its own signage 
requirements in the operation of the system there also questions of compliance with the 
HRA. Under Article 8, privacy protection may well apply to certain aspects of public 
conduct, particularly where a photographic record was retained.  In the case of Peck v. 
United Kingdom,381 the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) concluded a 
government release of CCTV images of a person attempting suicide in public constituted 
a violation of Article 8 of the HRA. 
In reaching its conclusions the ECHR noted that it had previously 
concluded that the actions of merely monitoring conduct in public places through the 
application of CCTV did not implicate individual privacy concerns.  However, the court 
noted that recording and release of data regarding individual conduct raised different 
issues.  As to the release of that data, the ECHR found clear impairment of protected 
privacy interests.  In a unanimous opinion, the ECHR held that the actions of the local 
city council in releasing the data images of Mr. Peck’s 1995 suicide attempt to the local 
media was a violation of protected privacy rights. 382 
Whether and to what extent the ECHR policy will affect UK policy with 
respect to cameras remains to be seen. Gallagher notes that even after the Peck decision, 
the media continues to broadcast images captured on CCTV.  He also observes that 
advisories sent to police agencies and the Home Office’ webpage continue to suggest that 
CCTV surveillance in public places affects no protected privacy interest.383 
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With regard to individual subject access to the CCTV system, the Code of 
Practice clearly provides comprehensive rights for subject access to CCTV maintained 
about them.  In practice, these provisions seem largely underutilized.  As the Data 
Protection Commissioner notes in the Full Report on the “Surveillance Society”: 
This right requires a ‘data controller’ to provide to each individual 
information on all the data they hold on her and details of any processing 
it has been subject to. This goes some way to rectifying the asymmetry of 
power of the surveillance gaze, particularly where consent to use our 
personal data has been implied, rather than positively granted. However, large 
numbers of people do not know their rights, fail to exercise them, and receive 
little help from others in doing so.384 
Given the extensive requirements for subject access, it is questionable 
whether such provisions could be complied with if there were a high volume of 
individual requests for information on data collection by the CCTV system. 
c. Public Opinion 
Despite the issues of instances of non-compliance with the regulatory 
requirements, public support for CCTV systems seems to remain high.  Perhaps these 
attitudes even encourage some of the questionable government conduct.   All the 
commentators that have evaluated the issue have concluded that British public solidly 
accepts video surveillance.  In a recent Home Office Study on the matter it was noted that 
between 69% and 96% of the surveyed populations with CCTV favored its use. 385 
Members of the public concerned about civil liberties abuses were rather low between 
12% and 19%.  While there was a small decrease in support of CCTV cameras after 
installation, that decrease seemed to be a function of concerns about efficacy rather than 
ones related to civil liberties.386 
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2. Conclusions 
While the U.K.’s experience in implementation of CCTV systems has not been 
without criticism both from the perspectives of efficacy and civil liberty implications, the 
system remains strong, popular and is expanding.  The U.K. has moved from a totally 
unregulated system to one that relies extensively on the concept of co-regulation. The 
Full Report on the “Surveillance Society” notes that as the CCTV systems develop and 
integrate with other technologies that impact individual privacy there may be a need to 
enhance privacy protections, perhaps through the requirement of “privacy impact 
assessments”387 or “surveillance impact assessment.”388  These processes are akin to 
environmental impact assessments except they are focused on the privacy and societal 
effects of the implementation of surveillance systems.  The Report also notes that the 
U.K. should look to developments in other countries for best practices in regulating 
rapidly developing surveillance technology.389  In this regard, at least from the 
perspective of the Data Protection Commissioner, the development of future systems may 
be closer to European models that place greater focus on CCTV system impact. 
D. CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN CCTV GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES 
While each European country has slightly differing models of governance, they 
all seem to follow a general scheme focused on privacy protection.  Examining the 
German and French governance systems, demonstrates an approach to CCTV that is 
fundamentally different from the UK scheme.  Both systems have more restrictive 
approaches to the use of CCTV in public places.  The German system is generally more 
restrictive than the French.  As noted above, in response to potential terrorist threats, both 
systems are moving to expand the use of CCTV.  The French seem to be taking steps to 
alter their governance structures to accommodate this.  The Germans seem only to be 
expanding CCTV in the areas in which it currently operates. 
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1. Germany 
Perhaps the most extreme protections for privacy are found in Germany.  In fact, 
Privacy International, an international privacy rights advocacy group, rates Germany as 
the most protective nation for privacy rights.390 Under German law there is a strong 
constitutional argument that “…mere observation of a scene in which no individual is 
identifiable via camera, is an interference with a German citizen’s basic rights and 
therefore requires specific legislation.”391 Such provisions exceed the protections of the 
HRA, which as noted in the Peck case, extends no protections to the mere surveillance by 
camera of conduct in public places.  The effect of the German constitutional provisions is 
to make public camera surveillance arguably unlawful in the absence of specific statutory 
authority permitting it. 
Gras notes most of the German states (Länder) have enacted legislation to permit 
the use of CCTV  systems by police.  However these 16 Länder codes vary in the 
authority they grant to police and local authorities. Those differences are characterized as 
follows: 
a) Länder with no legal basis for CCTV surveillance as British people 
know it, b) states allowing video surveillance by the police in certain, 
relatively well-defined situations and c) states with a wider ranging legal 
permit for police and occasionally other public authorities, to install 
CCTV systems, to make recordings and to store these for a relatively long 
period of time [citation omitted].392 
This legal structure not only makes for uneven application of CCTV systems 
across Germany, it also constrains system implementation because positive legislative 
permissions are required before systems can be implemented. 
In addition to requiring specific statutory authority before a CCTV system can be 
implemented, the German constitution requires that concepts of proportionality and 
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appropriateness be met.  Proportionality requires that the level of intrusion be gauged in 
accordance with the problem to be addressed.  CCTV designed to address minor disorder 
problems would likely not withstand scrutiny under this constitutional provision.393 The 
appropriateness requirement means that the use of CCTV cameras must be shown to be 
effective against the type of harm sought to be remedied.  Moreover, this principle of 
German constitutional law requires that the method be “… the mildest possible method in 
the sense that it interferes as little as possible with the rights of those affected.”394   
The requirements of proportionality and appropriateness have served to compel 
police agencies seeking to install CCTV systems to engage in crime analysis prior to 
placing the systems.  Gras, speculates that while such analysis may not be mandated by 
law, it has made police administrators cautious in implementing systems.  This, in turn, 
has kept German systems relatively small and few in number.395 
In addition to placing restrictions on government use of cameras in public areas, 
the German constitutional protections also serve to restrict private camera use.  In 
addressing the legitimate concerns of property owners, German law recognizes 
differentiation in protections that should be afforded personal privacy expectations.  In 
essence, German law recognizes three levels or spheres of privacy including intimacy—
which is afforded absolute protection.  The two other spheres, the private and the 
individual spheres, are subject to some protections but those are absolute.  In cases where 
there is to be allowance for interference with a privacy right, the actions of the private 
party in installing the CCTV must be proportional to the harm sought to be prevented.396  
In measuring proportionality under German law, certain factors are important to 
consider.  Surveillance limited to a certain defined space is more likely to be found 
acceptable, if the surveillance is placed in such a way and marked so that persons not 
choosing to be observed can avoid observation.  While some systems such as those at 
train stations cannot be avoided, without forgoing the right to travel, the ability of persons 
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to protect their privacy is important.  This, of course, means that there needs to be 
signage or some form of notification of the presence of CCTV.397   
Where the requirements of proportionality, particularly notice, have not been met, 
German courts have been reluctant to use the CCTV evidence.  For example, in one case 
where a retail customer was charged with theft by changing price tags on merchandise to 
secure lower prices, the court declined to admit the CCTV films.  The store’s use of 
CCTV without notice to the customers was determined to be an action “…to secure 
evidence of a crime and not to prevent damage to the owner.”398  Because the CCTV 
usage did not advance the interest of preventing damage, its use was deemed outweighed 
by privacy concerns. 
While Germany is experiencing pressures to expand its CCTV networks, its 
commitment to privacy protection remains strong.  The continuing focus on privacy has 
undoubtedly contributed to the small size of German CCTV networks.  Even where 
Germany has announced plans to expand surveillance that expansion is limited to the 
public areas, like transportation centers, where it is already permitted and relatively 
uncontroversial.399 
2. France 
While French protections for privacy are less than those provided under German 
law, there are still significant impediments to the operation of CCTV systems in France.  
Under the provisions of French legal decrees in 1995 and 1996, prior approval must be 
secured from the local prefect in each of France’s administrative regions prior to 
installations of non-police CCTV cameras. Decisions are made through the following 
process: 
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In making this decision, the Prefect must consult a local committee, the 
CDV, which is presided over by a judge. Alongside the judge, the CDV is 
manned by another magistrate, a representative elected by the local trade 
chamber, an elected politician such as the mayor and a person with 
technical knowledge (who may, however, not be a serving police officer). 
Their decision is made by majority vote and is a recommendation to the 
Prefect, which he or she will, however, almost always go by, because the 
CDV is more competent to make the decision than he or she is. The 
Prefect’s decision is final but can be contested before an administrative 
court (i.e., is subject to judicial review). An applicant must prove that the 
area one wishes to protect by CCTV is an object particularly liable to theft 
or attack.400 
Under this process, some 38,250 CCTV installations were approved by 1999.  
Gras notes that in 1999 alone 4500 requests were received with 4200 approved.  
However, most of the installations were for locations like banks, gas stations, and retail 
stores that had traditionally operated such camera systems. Gras concludes that while the 
French legal system could be successful in regulating CCTV, it is not clear how the 
system will work especially since police cameras are excluded.401 
French restrictions on CCTV installation and usage may well be eroded by recent 
changes in French law.  In September 2005, anti-terrorism legislation was introduced to 
expand the ability to use CCTV.  One measure would permit CCTV surveillance of 
public streets in the vicinity of potential terrorist targets, like synagogues, mosques, 
power plants and transportation centers.402 Under the new law, CCTV images would be 
retained for one month.403  The legislation also served to undermine the process of 
requiring licensure for CCTV systems operated in public places by private parties.  Under 
the provisions of the new law, private parties would be permitted to install CCTV  
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in public places "likely to be exposed to terrorist acts", and in places open 
to the public when they are "particularly exposed to risks of aggression or 
theft". Obviously, this covers almost any public or privately-owned place, 
including shops. In case of emergency, CCTV cameras may be installed 
prior to any [sic] authorisation.404 
The French Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of these measures 
which greatly undermine the protections afforded by the CDV process.405 Opposing this 
legislation proposed by the Interior Ministry was a collection of groups including: The 
French Data Protection Authority; the French Human Rights League and the trade union 
representing lawyers and magistrates.406  
The recent developments in French law evidence a dissatisfaction with constraints 
placed on CCTV development.  Despite opposition from civil rights groups and even 
those agencies of the French government charged with enforcement of data protection 
laws, these changes reflect a movement toward a less regulated model of CCTV system 
implementation.  Despite this opposition, public support seems to favor expansion. 
Recent polling data indicates that some 73% of the population support the government 
proposals to dramatically increase CCTV in France.407   
The changes in the French system in governance and the public opinion favoring 
the use of CCTV will likely usher in a significant expansion of CCTV systems.  Less 
clear is the issue of the use of that data.  Like the U.K., France is bound by privacy and 
data protection laws.  The changes in French law may serve to increase the coverage of 
CCTV, but expansion in the use of data gathered from CCTV is less clear.  The time 
frames for data retention remain conspicuously short. 
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In contrast to the more freewheeling approach in the U.K., the continental 
European systems, exemplified by France and Germany, are ones predominated by 
legislative approaches for regulation.  They begin from a perspective that CCTV is 
intrusive and constitutes an interference with protected privacy interests.  The systems 
seem to have differing perspectives on the degree of interference.  While as in the U.K., 
the continental European countries all adopt the DPA and HRA, the legal traditions in 
those countries is to interpret the provisions of those acts more strictly than in the U.K. 
Moreover, the protections of those acts are bolstered by laws that enhance individual 
privacy protections. 
The net result of the continental European scheme of legislative regulation to 
protect privacy rights has been to restrict the use of CCTV.  However, in recent years, as 
governments have grown increasingly concerned over the threat of terrorism, some 
countries are reviewing the restrictive nature of their privacy laws and carving out 
exemptions to permit CCTV expansion.  France, and to a lesser extent Germany, are 
examples of this trend.  This movement raises a larger question of whether legislative or 
statutory based solutions are sufficiently flexible to address rapidly developing 
technology like CCTV.     
E. LESSONS LEARNED FOR GOVERNANCE OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEMS 
The governance trends in the U.K. and on the European Continent can probably 
best be characterized as systems that initiated development from almost completely 
opposite points and are slowly moving toward a point of convergence.  The governance 
in the U.K. which started out essentially where the U.S. currently rests began with little 
or no systematic protections for privacy in public and with no legislative requirements for 
CCTV governance.  It has moved to a co-regulated system that has some general 
legislative protection for privacy.  In contrast, the continental European systems, like 
France and Germany, have started from a point where privacy protections have been 
extensive.  The French are apparently moving to embrace more relaxed regulation of 
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public surveillance systems that will allow for greater surveillance of streets parks and 
other public locations.  Similarly, it appears that German authorities are looking to 
expand CCTV networks, but primarily at locations like transportation hubs. 
1. Learning from the U.K. 
Perhaps the principal lesson that American policymakers can draw from 
experiences in the U.K. is that a flexible system of co-regulation may promise the most 
responsive way to address competing concerns of privacy and security in the 
development of rapidly growing technology like CCTV.  While the initial unregulated 
approach utilized by the U.K. afforded an opportunity for rapid expansion of CCTV 
systems, the need for some regulation became apparent.  The scheme of working with 
CCTV developers and users in identifying best practices as a basis for regulation seems 
to be an effective way to manage rapidly developing technology.  The failure to develop 
this scheme early in the U.K.’s development process may mean that systems that cannot 
be made to conform to the new regulations may need to be dismantled.  While there is no 
evidence of this to date, the late development of a regulatory scheme creates that risk. 
The guidelines in the U.K.’s CCTV Code of Practice might provide a good 
starting point for U.S. policy development.  These regulations seem to address many of 
the privacy  concerns raised by CCTV systems.  The general nature of the Code of 
Practices provides great latitude to local governments in system development.  It allows 
for the development of best practices that can be shared among CCTV system developers 
and users.  While some of the concepts may have to be adjusted to conform to legislative 
realities in the U.S., the solutions envisioned by the Code of Practice may result in the 
rethinking of some U.S. legal concepts.  For example, development of policies to protect 
individual privacy may intersect with issues of freedom of information.  Even in the U.K. 
where privacy was not initially viewed as a legal requirement, similar to current 
jurisprudence in the U.S., there is a growing sense that CCTV and the growing capability 
for surveillance of activity in public space has some implication on privacy.  Addressing 
those concerns is essential to continued expansion of surveillance technology in public 
space. 
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The ability of third parties to access public surveillance data may need to be more 
restricted as it is under the U.K.'s Code of Practice.  Such a concept would require 
revision of provisions of many freedom of information laws in the U.S. which make no 
distinction between requestors who are the subject of data and other third party 
requestors.  Additionally, the distinction between actions viewed on camera and the 
recording of those actions with respect to privacy protection may be instructive for the 
U.S. 
Also instructive from the U.K. perspective is the system by which regulation can 
be implemented.  As in the U.K., much of the development of public CCTV systems is 
funded by grant programs issued by central government authorities.  In the U.K., it is the 
Home Office.  In the U.S., the primary grant funding source is the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  Like the Home Office, DHS can use its funding authority to 
impose technical and procedural requirements on fund recipients in the operation of their 
CCTV systems. Careful use of this authority can develop a co-regulation environment in 
the U.S. that has the same flexibility as in the U.K.   
In addition to the scale of the scope of the U.K. CCTV system, the U.S. can also 
draw lessons for the versatility of that system to address a range of societal issues.  While 
anti-terrorism is certainly a major concern driving the implementation of CCTV systems, 
they also have differing uses in the U.K.  Ordinary crime control is clearly one of those 
uses.  While the success of CCTV in crime control has not been clearly demonstrated, the 
public confidence in those measures clearly remains high.  Certainly, the enhanced 
community perceptions of safety are of value.  The use of such systems to enhance the 
economy of flagging intercity shopping areas is one tangible example of the benefits of 
such community confidence.  
In addition to anti-terrorism and crime control the traffic control and enforcement 
use of cameras is also extremely high in the U.K.  This serves to not only enhance public 
safety, but also provides a significant government revenue stream through enforcement 
activity.  Such a use in the U.S., providing similar revenue benefits, would afford 
government a revenue stream to support CCTV system maintenance and expansion.  
 146
A final lesson from the U.K. would be in the power of the private sector 
cooperation in the establishment of comprehensive CCTV networks.  The CCTV systems 
in the U.K., have from the start been cooperative arrangements between government and 
the private sector. This doubtless has allowed increased expansion with limited 
investment of government dollars.  While such a system certainly raise information and 
privacy concerns for the U.S., it also offers the prospect of increased surveillance 
capacity without government being forced to bear the entire burden. 
2. Learning from the Continental Experience 
The experience of the continental countries like France and Germany in 
recognizing potential privacy impact in the data collected through CCTV and the need to 
protect it provides a valuable example for the U.S.  It is a lesson currently being learned 
in the U.K. While the U.K. seems to strongly maintain the notion that activity on any 
given day in the public space is afforded no protection from government scrutiny through 
CCTV, the recording and subsequent use of that data does present issues long recognized 
on the continent.  This is exactly the lesson of the Peck case which follows strongly in the 
legal traditions of the European Continent.   
The emphasis on privacy protection, particularly in German law, will help attune 
U.S. policymakers to the potential long term impacts on individual privacy rights of data 
gathered from comprehensive CCTV systems.  This concern over data, rather than simply 
the surveillance systems themselves, is an important concept.  This is particularly true as 
surveillance systems become more advanced.  Addressing the use of compiled data 
gathered through surveillance requires a comprehensive approach to the issue of CCTV 
use, as well as the use of other technology enhanced surveillance techniques. 
The German concept of spheres of privacy subject to protection in differing 
manners provides an interesting analytic model for assessing both surveillance techniques 
and measures for preserving and safeguarding data.  Acceptance of differing levels of 
privacy subject to differing levels of protection is not inconsistent with American 
jurisprudence.  These concepts could be easily incorporated into legislative or regulatory 
schemes for CCTV governance. 
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With regard to the process of governance, the legislative approaches taken in both 
Germany and France, demonstrate the constraining nature such approach has on 
technology. Unlike the system in the U.K. which has greater ability to adapt to the change 
in technology, the continental systems do not allow for rapid response to technology 
changes.  Doubtless that is why the CCTV systems on the Continent are significantly 
underdeveloped when compared to the U.K.  The recent movement by the French 
government away from its legislatively imposed control system for CCTV placement 
suggests the government perceives it is interfering with legitimate anti-terror tools.  
Requirements for advance showing of such benefits will likely doom most CCTV 
projects. The recent French legislative changes seem to be an expression of 
understanding that in some areas CCTV surveillance is acceptable without further 
evidence or support.  However, the relatively short retention period for gathered data 
suggests a balance with concerns over data protections. 
3. Summary    
The experiences from the U.K. and Europe provide some interesting perspectives 
on how CCTV can be managed in the U.S.  They provide insights on issues like: 
 
• Privacy in public places and in the collection and maintenance of CCTV 
surveillance data. 
• Rights of data subjects 
  Notice (signage) 
  Access 
• Rights of the public and third parties 
• Regulatory versus legislative governance of CCTV 
• Management of CCTV camera installation (appropriate siting and uses for CCTV) 
 
As jurisdictions in the U.S. move forward with their programs for development of 
CCTV, these issues will need to be addressed.  Moreover, these issues are common to a 
range of technologies developed and applicable to surveillance of public activity.  While 
discussions of the experiences and solutions developed in the U.K. and Europe should not 
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be read to be determinative of the same result in the U.S., the issues are the same and the 
range of solutions are relatively limited.  Thus, by examining the application of policy 
and its result in foreign contexts, U.S. policymakers will be better able to manage CCTV 
development in the U.S. 
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VII. CHICAGO EXPERIENCE IN SURVEILLANCE 
Chicago has had a long and checkered history with respect to the issue of 
surveillance.  The experience of the city provides valuable lessons in both the operation 
of unregulated and over regulated surveillance programs. This experience provides an 
example of consequences that can befall jurisdictions that do not act to properly govern 
surveillance programs.  It also provides insights into the operation of a large CCTV 
surveillance system under the provisions of a court sanctioned consent decree.    
The story of the surveillance in Chicago is succinctly outlined by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals.  Judge Posner, in the 2001 opinion in Alliance to End Repression, et al., v. 
City of Chicago, observed the following about the history of surveillance in Chicago. 
From the 1920s to the 1970s, the intelligence division of the Chicago 
Police Department contained a unit nicknamed the "Red Squad" which 
spied on, infiltrated, and harassed a wide variety of political groups that 
included but were not limited to left- and right-wing extremists. Most of 
the groups, including most of the politically extreme groups, were not only 
lawful, and engaged in expressive activities protected by the First 
Amendment, but also harmless. The motives of the Red Squad were 
largely political and ideological, though they included a legitimate concern 
with genuine threats to public order. Demonstrations against U.S. 
participation in the Vietnam War that climaxed in the disruption of the 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968, race riots in Chicago 
and other major cities in the same period, and the contemporaneous 
criminal activities of the Black Panthers, the Weathermen, and Puerto 
Rican separatists, all against a backdrop of acute racial and Cold War 
tensions, political assassinations (notably of President Kennedy, Senator 
Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.), and communist subversion, 
fueled a widespread belief in the need for zealous police activity directed 
against political militants.408 
Judge Posner later characterized the surveillance program of the City as 
“organized systemic and protracted.”409 
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Litigation over Chicago’s surveillance practices began with a complaint filed as a 
class action in November 1974 by a confederation of religious community civil rights and 
civil liberties groups called the Alliance to End Repression (Alliance).410  Eleven months 
later a similar action was filed by the ACLU and the two actions were joined. In all, the 
actions represented the interests of 24 organizations and 32 individuals.  Defendants 
named in the two suits included the City of Chicago and various city officials.411 In the 
seven years of litigation that followed over half a million documents were produced by 
the City and approximately 100 depositions were taken of city employees and other 
witnesses.  The district court in summarizing the litigation characterized it as “the whole 
history of this lawsuit is one of vigorous hotly contested litigation.”412  
The unrestrained surveillance activity of the Chicago Police Department was 
ended in March, 1982, when the City entered into a settlement agreement and an 
expansive consent decree.  That decree provided for extensive regulation on the City’s 
use of investigative techniques.  The protections of the consent decree went well beyond 
the protections afforded by the First Amendment.  In fact, the court in approving the 
settlement and entering the decree noted that legal relief granted went well beyond the 
“… legal relief that plaintiff would have obtained if the case had gone to trial.”413  Judge 
Posner later characterized the decree as one containing a “…dizzying array of highly 
specific restrictions on investigations… .”414 
The initial consent decree contained restrictions on a range of investigative 
techniques including the use of electronic technology.  The minimization requirements of 
the decree made the use of any electronic surveillance impossible in the absence of 
suspicion of criminal conduct.  Even in circumstances where the investigation targeted 
criminal conduct, if it also related in any way to first amendment conduct, as that term  
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was broadly defined in the decree, extensive administrative approvals were required for 
the investigations to be initiated.  Documentation collected pursuant to investigations 
could only be held for a limited period. 415  
The consent decree also contained provisions requiring that notice and training be 
provided to all employees so they would understand their obligations under the decree.  It 
also provided for internal and independent external compliance audits. Audit results were 
to be made public.416       
The restrictive provisions of the consent decree severely curtailed the ability of 
the City to use surveillance technologies. The City operated under the decree for over 20 
years with regular audits being conducted and no significant findings.  However as 
concerns about domestic and international threats increased, it sought to modify the 
decree.  Noting that the provisions of the decree were more restrictive than the provisions 
of the first amendment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the requested relief 
in January 2001.  In doing so the court noted 
The decree impedes efforts by the police to cope with the problems of 
today because earlier generations of police coped improperly with the 
problems of yesterday. Because of what the Red Squad did many years 
ago, today's Chicago police are fated unless the decree is modified to labor 
indefinitely under severe handicaps that other American police are free 
from. First Amendment rights are secure. But under the decree as written 
and interpreted, the public safety is insecure and the prerogatives of local 
government scorned. To continue federal judicial micromanagement of 
local investigations of domestic and international terrorist activities in 
Chicago is to undermine the federal system and to trifle with the public 
safety. Every consideration favors modification; the City has made a 
compelling case for the modification that it seeks.417 
While the decision freed the City from many of the procedural restrictions of the 
earlier consent decree, the City remained bound by decree to ensure compliance with first 
amendment protections in any surveillance activities it conducted.  Moreover the failure 
to meet first amendment requirements would also be punishable under the decree.   Also 
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significant to the court was the fact that the City was not seeking to remove the audit 
requirement from the modified decree.  It noted that “…the requirement of outside audits 
will make it more difficult for the Chicago police than for their counterparts in the other 
big cities to commit constitutional violations undetected.”418 
Subsequent to the entry of the modified consent decree, the City initiated an 
expansive camera program.  In a recent Chicago Tribune editorial, the following 
observation is made of the camera program.    
Aware of it or not, you stroll and drive through Chicago in the web of a 
virtual dragnet. City of Chicago cameras monitor you and those around 
you. How many cameras? The official answer? "In the thousands." 
Chicago's five years of experience have established that those cameras can 
be as effective as they are inhibiting. They're reliable, unbiased witnesses, 
capable of checking authority as well as those who wrongly accuse 
authority of misdeeds.419 
This program was fully implemented under the terms of the modified consent 
decree with its audit features to protect the first amendment rights of citizens from 
intrusion by surveillance. 
The experience of Chicago provides three significant lessons for policymakers.  
The first lesson is that unregulated surveillance activity can have disastrous 
consequences.  The conduct of the Chicago Police Department’s Red Squad resulted in 
protracted litigation against the City and entry of a consent decree the severely 
constrained legitimate police surveillance activity. 
The second lesson from the Chicago experience is that complex and restrictive 
regulation will retard the use of surveillance technology like CCTV. Prior to the 
modification of the consent decree, little use was made of surveillance technology like  
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CCTV except in connection with criminal investigation.  As the court noted in Alliance 
II, Chicago operated under “…considerably greater constraints than police officers in 
other cities.”420   
The final lesson is that some regulation and external oversight to ensure 
compliance will not impede development of digital sensor systems.  Chicago is still 
operating under a modified decree with the same audit requirements it has had since the 
mid 1980s.  Those restrictions have not impeded progress in developing complex CCTV 
surveillance network.  In fact, the external audit function may well be contributing to the 
system accountability noted by the Chicago Tribune editorial.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS, GOVERNING SURVEILLANCE 
TECHNOLOGY 
The technology assessment in this paper recounts a dizzying array of 
technological developments that have occurred in recent years in the field of surveillance.  
Those advances have occurred in both the areas of collection and management of 
surveillance data.  The question confronting citizens and policymakers alike is how to 
square those developments with existing protections for privacy and assess where there 
are gaps requiring additional protections.  In short, the question is how to govern this 
growing technological development.   
Governance will require a flexible system that can expand and address a range of 
both collection and analytic tools.  While CCTV is the first of the collection technologies 
to spread across the U.S., it will hardly be the last.  The digitization of information allows 
multiple surveillance platforms to provide information to common or related databases.  
Developing a method to govern that information is likely the key to a successful 
governance strategy. 
A. PROBLEMS POSED BY TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE  
As a starting point, it is important to consider that the advent of technological 
development affecting privacy is not something new.  Courts, legislatures and 
administrators have been wrestling with these issues for a long time.  Many technologic 
developments over time have affected how we view privacy and personal space. Those 
developments have served to reduce the spheres of separation that many have 
characterized as privacy.   
The development of modern modes of transportation issues like trains, cars and 
airplanes has reduced the physical distances that formerly facilitated seclusion.  
Development of the telephone has moved communication into areas once thought private 
and apart.  Laws have had to be passed to prevent the unauthorized intrusion of  
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telemarketers in our homes.  The fact that some aspects of technology may limit some of 
the states of privacy may be acceptable so long as the essential function that privacy 
provides to a free society is not lost.  
Privacy advocates have long warned of the impending danger that technology 
poses to privacy.  Consider the words of Warren and Brandeis writing in the 1890’s for 
the Harvard Law Review:  
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be the protection of the person, and for securing to the 
individual what Judge Cooley calls “the right to be let alone.”  
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devises threaten to make good the prediction that “what is whispered in 
the closet shall some day be proclaimed from the house-tops.”421 
Despite the concerns raised by Warren and Brandeis, the advent of photography 
did not result in the destruction of privacy.  Nor did it result in criminal or civil liability 
for those who took photographs of persons in public places.  
The opponents to application of developing surveillance technology today raise 
similar concerns about the effects of technology on privacy. While attention should be 
paid to the power of modern technology, there is no reason to believe that privacy will be 
severely limited or destroyed in the way privacy advocates contend.   Many of the 
important aspects of privacy are well protected even in the face of new technology.  
Deconstructing privacy as the monolithic concept that some commentators offer is 
helpful in analyzing the steps government policymakers should take to preserve the 
essential elements of privacy. 
If privacy is broken down and analyzed in the four states that Westin proffers, the 
advent of much of modern surveillance technology really would be found to have little 
effect on two of those states of privacy.  Constitutional protections of the home and 
intimate relationships are very strong.  There is little to suggest that developments in  
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public surveillance technology will affect the states of privacy of seclusion and intimate 
relationships.  The states of privacy threatened by recent developments in surveillance 
technology are those of anonymity and reserve.   
1. Threats to Anonymity 
As to anonymity, three observations are important.  First, it should be noted that 
there is already some degree of protection for that state of privacy.  As many privacy 
advocates correctly point out, anonymity does have value in promoting speech and 
assembly.  These important components to democratic governance are values recognized 
and protected by the Constitution. To that end, courts have rejected government programs 
and requirements that have been shown to chill the exercise of rights to speech and 
assembly protected by the first amendment. Thus, the protection that privacy advocates 
seek is already provided by the Constitution.  Where surveillance techniques are used by 
government to undermine anonymity and chill the first amendment rights of individuals, 
such practices are already prohibited by existing first amendment jurisprudence.    
A second argument against the impact of surveillance on anonymity, particularly 
visual surveillance, is that such surveillance compels social conformance.  This is the 
Panopticon effect that Foucault discusses.  The degree to which the phenomena of the 
Panopticon affects behavior is not one that has been adequately quantified and warrants 
further study.  Privacy advocates seem to suggest that the effect would be significant.  
However, those same advocates suggest that CCTV is ineffective in limiting criminal 
behavior.  It seems counterintuitive that surveillance would have no effect on criminal 
behavior where there can be a substantial penalty for nonconformance and yet have 
significant effects on other types of behavior.  Moreover, it is unclear why a degree of 
social conformance in public, even it is shown to be fostered by surveillance, is 
necessarily an undesirable thing. 
The fact that anonymity can lead to some extremely undesirable and anti-social 
activity seems well documented in social psychology literature.  The work of Zimbardo 
and others suggest that anonymity has negative aspects. That surveillance can have some 
positive effects on social conformance and compliance with law seems well proved by 
 158
initial use of such cameras in monitoring traffic and issuing citations.  For example, some 
jurisdictions have found substantial reductions in dangerous traffic infractions like red 
light running when cameras are emplaced. As Foucault notes, the effect of the Panopticon 
is not necessarily a negative.  The Panopticon does more than reinforce positive behavior.  
Beyond the issue of social conformance, the concept of the Panopticon offers a prospect 
of true government accountability.  If the system in which the Panopticon operated 
provides adequate transparency, it allows citizens a mechanism of observing and placing 
a check on their government. 
A final note with regard to concerns over anonymity is drawn from the 
availability of technology in society at large.  While privacy advocates raise concerns 
about government use of surveillance technology and its impact on expectations of 
anonymity in public those concerns do not seem to account for the widespread use of a 
range of surveillance technology already existing in the public sector.  The existence of 
CCTV has long been a feature in retail establishments across the country.  The 
development and proliferation of video recorders and even cell phones capable of taking 
video makes CCTV surveillance controlled by private individuals and entities almost 
commonplace.  The existence of a privately controlled surveillance society seems already 
at hand. 
It is difficult to see how in the face of this expansion of surveillance technology, 
completely uncontrolled by the government, that anonymity is not already affected.  If 
anonymity is affected simply by the capture of one’s likeness on a CCTV camera, what 
difference does it make that it is a government or private camera?  How is it that the 
imposition of government surveillance should be more impactful?  The physical act of 
capturing the image is the same. 
The only reason why there may be more concern about capture of images by 
government cameras than private ones seems to be in the ability of the government to use 
that information.  It seems then that it is the ability of government to relate the image to 
other information that establishes identity.  In short it is not the surveillance itself that 
destroys anonymity it is the capacity of government to use databases and relate CCTV  
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surveillance information to other sources that destroys anonymity.   Thus, it would seem 
the key to mitigating the effect of surveillance on anonymity is placing controls on the 
use of surveillance data not on its collection. 
2. Threats to Reserve 
In addition to affecting anonymity, it also seems clear that modern surveillance 
technology constitutes a threat to reserve.  In fact, it is this threat to reserve that is 
perhaps the most disturbing feature of technology.   The ability to individuate massive 
amounts of information gathered from a variety of sources and relate it all back to a 
specific individual is a distinguishing feature of modern surveillance technology.  As 
computers and digital systems become more sophisticated the amounts of information 
that can be amassed and analyzed quickly is growing exponentially.  Unchecked and 
unregulated growth of government’s capacity to control and manipulate information 
about individuals leaves them unable to control what information will be shared and with 
whom it will be shared. This is the essence of reserve.  
The types of technology for collection of data on individuals are widespread and 
growing.  CCTV, especially combined with biometrics, RFID or GPS technology allows 
for extensive tracking of individual movement.  The ability to interrelate different 
surveillance technologies through sophisticated databases allows individuals to be 
tracked almost anywhere.  That tracking ability even applies to movement on the internet.  
The databases that contain information about individual movement take significant 
control over the ability of individuals to regulate the dissemination of information about 
themselves.  
As with anonymity, the key to preserving reserve would seem to lay more in the 
control over databases containing information than in the control over techniques of 
collection.  The threat to reserve rests not in any one recorded event or public record, but 
rather, in groups of records or recorded events collected over time.  Arrayed against the 
growth of databases that can do just that, incorporating large amounts of disparate data 
over time, there is little in the way of legal protections.  
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The Supreme Court has, on two occasions, noted the existence of this problem 
without specifically addressing its constitutional implications.  It has, however, suggested 
an analytical framework that would be helpful to administrators who are attempting to 
design surveillance database systems that are consistent with legal precedent. That 
framework focuses on two basic elements: a legitimate governmental need to collect the 
data; and adequate safeguards to protect the privacy rights of individuals in the 
information maintained by the government.   
B. ASSESSING GOVERNMENT USE STRATEGIES AND TAILORING 
GOVERNANCE 
An interesting feature of the Whalen decision is the Court’s examination of the 
government use of the information.  The Court in upholding the scheme seemed 
persuaded by the important government purpose to be accomplished, not merely the 
individual expectation of privacy.  The Court also seemed satisfied that the government’s 
collection efforts were designed to support the use strategy.  In the areas of public 
surveillance where the Court has previously indicated that privacy expectations are not 
implicated, it might be helpful to construct differing rules based on the government’s 
interest in conducting surveillance or its use of the surveillance data.   
Where the government is conducting surveillance for purpose of determining the 
existence of dangerous contraband, especially in areas where the contraband may have 
disastrous or catastrophic consequences, the government surveillance collection efforts 
should be given greater latitude.  In fact, the Supreme Court seems to have already made 
such an accommodation through its “special needs doctrine”.  Moreover, where the 
intrusiveness of such searches can be minimized through application of accurate binary 
technology, use of surveillance technology may also be acceptable even where the 
contraband sought is less of an immediate danger.   
Application of surveillance technology consistent with this governmental use has 
implications for data collection in connection with those programs.  Surveillance 
programs consistent with government use, data gathered to detect the presence of 
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contraband or wanted persons has little or no utility after the individual or contraband is 
gone.  Thus, the retention period for maintaining this data should be relatively short. 
The same is true of surveillance technology designed for observation of areas. If 
the governmental purpose is to use technology to guide response or secure those areas 
against dangerous behavior, there is little need for extensive retention of data.  While 
some retention may be required to look for pattern behaviors over a period of time (i.e., 
behavior that might suggest surveillance of a critical facility or testing of security 
procedures) retention should be relatively short.  Where suspect behaviors are identified 
and there is a desire for longer retention, some enhanced standard like reasonable 
suspicion should be applied to requests to extend retention.  Retention might also be 
extended where the area of observation occurs around critical facilities or critical portions 
of facilities that may potentially serve as targets for terrorist (e.g., airport perimeters or 
areas around air intake systems of large buildings).  
Where governmental use of surveillance data is just for observation related to 
activities in directing response or looking for suspicious or dangerous conduct, and 
retention of data is for a limited period, it is difficult to see how the privacy interests of 
anonymity or reserve are significantly impacted. To ensure that this type of area 
surveillance technology is utilized only for the purposes of general observation to direct 
response or secure areas against dangerous behavior there are a number of developing 
technologies that can be employed to enhance privacy protection.  Application of 
technologies for anonymizing information, particularly CCTV data as it is taken or 
stored, provides an enhancement to protect both anonymity and reserve interests of 
individuals.  Limiting through intelligent or smart video technology the collection or 
storage of data to only that which is determined to be dangerous is another technology 
solution that may mitigate privacy concerns.  
Granted, defining suspicious or dangerous conduct may not always be easy, but 
some conduct surely can be agreed to warrant attention (i.e., individuals who enter posted 
areas for no trespassing or throwing items over perimeter fencing at a secure facility).  
Other types of conduct such as loitering around a facility or standing in public area 
observing activity at a given place over time are more ambiguous.  The exercise of law 
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enforcement discretion in determining what behaviors will be monitored or declared 
“dangerous” or “suspicious” will no doubt be the subject of some controversy.   
The advantage of using technology for monitoring such conduct is that there will 
be a clear auditable trail of behavior that has been identified for monitoring.  That 
conduct will be reduced to algorithms for entry into the monitoring system.  The 
existence of an auditable trail of exactly what the government has been watching is a part 
of the positive feature of the Panopticon that Foucault mentions in his work. 
It is in the cases where the government is utilizing surveillance technology to 
track individuals either physically, on the internet or over time through database analysis 
that real issues of impairment to the privacy interests of anonymity and particularly 
reserve are impaired.  While the use of technology to follow individuals through public 
space has been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Knotts, it is not clear whether that 
ruling would be applicable to widespread application of such technology without a 
warrant issued based on probable cause or at that very least on some reasonable suspicion 
on the part of law enforcement officers that the subject of such surveillance is or has been 
involved in some critical conduct. 
In examining the governmental uses for surveillance technology it seems that only 
the use of technology for individual tracking warrants more detailed procedures to guard 
against misuse.  Only tracking is predicated on the maintenance of extensive amounts of 
data over extended periods of time.  It is the data rather than the collection mechanisms 
that is the matter of most concerns with respect to privacy.     
C. APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE 
The strategies for managing technologic developments in surveillance run the 
gamut from approaches that essentially involve doing nothing to extremely restrictive 
strategies.  It seems there are two significant areas that need to be addressed in 
developing or assessing governance strategies.  The first is focused on what restrictions 
should be placed on collection activities. The second approach focuses not so much on 
collection but on use of information gathered.  Approaching the problem from the 
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perspective of regulating and controlling the use of information gathered rather than 
extensive concern over the collection mechanisms seems to provide a more flexible and 
comprehensive governance strategy that protects the main privacy interests of 
individuals.   
On one end of the spectrum is the position that administrators need do nothing to 
regulate surveillance of public sector cameras.  So long as collection is limited to activity 
in public space, the existing case law does currently support such an approach.  However, 
as the scope of such surveillance expands and databases with the information become 
more sophisticated, the protections from current case law become more and more 
attenuated.   
Moreover, courts are not the only source of potential opposition to the 
introduction of advancing surveillance technology.  While oftentimes individuals 
subjected to surveillance at any given time will take the attitude of “I’ve got nothing to 
hide,” as  Daniel Solove and other privacy scholars note, as pieces of trivial information 
become catalogued and organized, public perception and concerns about threats to 
privacy may well turn.  The need to hold this aggregated information private is important.  
In this regard, Solove discusses the private civil action filed by customers of Northwest 
Airlines when their passenger data was supplied to the government’s CAPPS II 
project.422  Solove argues the unsuccessful attempt to enforce the privacy policy of 
Northwest Airlines illustrates the need for some legal mechanism to enforce privacy 
promises for collected information.   
The failure of government to realize that aggregated data may raise concerns that 
discreet pieces of information do not; may result in building large and complex 
surveillance collection and analysis tools that are delayed in implementation or ultimately 
cannot be used. Such a reality has already been experienced by government with respect 
to a number of projects like MATRIX, CAPPS II and ADVISE.   The failure to properly  
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account for privacy concerns can cost millions of dollars in project delays and revisions. 
It also results in the inability to utilize technologies that may be helpful in securing public 
safety. 
While there are differing approaches to how surveillance technology and the 
information from it should be governed, those proposals generally coalesce around a few 
central principles.  Perhaps the best exposition of principles to guide development and 
use of surveillance technology are the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) 
developed in the late 1970s.  These principles, designed in conjunction with 
governmental agencies in Europe and Canada, provide a basis for governmental programs 
designed to protect individual privacy.  These principles have the advantage of being 
flexible and are internationally accepted.  In fact, they form the basis for the European 
Union’s Data Protection Act of 1995 and the Canadian Standards Association’s Model 
Code for the Protection of Personal Information.423  Because these principles have wide 
acceptance for privacy management, they provide key insight for the development of 
governance structures.  
The FIPP operates on five principles with respect to organizations that receive and 
collect personal data of individuals.  Those principles include: Notice/Awareness; 
Choice/Consent; Access/Participation; Integrity/Security; and Enforcement/Redress. 
While the FIPP are designed to address personal information given in relation to 
consumer practices, for example credit card purchases, these core principles provide an 
evaluative tool that has can be applied to surveillance data. 
1. Notice/ Awareness  
This principle addresses the need for organizations involved in information 
collection to advise the subjects of surveillance regarding its occurrence and the purposes 
to which data collected will be applied.  Information available to the public should 
include identity of the “…entity collecting data,” “… uses to which the data will be put,” 
identity of “…any potential recipients of the data,” nature of the data collected and means 
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of doing so, whether compliance is voluntary and the means of assuring confidentiality 
and quality of the data.424  The notice provisions may also include providing information 
as procedures for individual access to the data as well as redress and correction 
procedures. 
The issues of Notice/Awareness raise interesting issues for operators in the areas 
of: outlining and advising the public generally regarding the purpose of surveillance 
systems, and specifics regarding the operation of those systems.  Looking at a sample of 
strategies for governance like the Constitutions Projects’ Model Legislation for 
Establishing Public Video Surveillance Systems (the “Model Legislation”), the United 
Kingdom’s CCTV Code of Practice (the “UK CCTV Code”), and the American Bar 
Association’s Criminal Justice Section Standards for Technology-Assisted Physical 
Surveillance (ABA Standards)425 provides differing approaches to these three 
components of Notice/Awareness. 
All three of the systems examined would require as an initial matter some 
assessment of the need for the surveillance measure and the appropriateness of the tool.   
The Model Legislation would require a relatively detailed and complex process for 
adoption of a surveillance system.426 The proposed review requires creation of a 
legislatively mandated Public Video Impact Assessment that includes assessment of a 
wide range of items.427  Many of those items are difficult if not impossible to assess with 
any real empirical data. In some cases, the standards to be assessed under the Model 
Legislation are not even clearly defined.  Questions like impact on “government 
accountability” or “’spillover effects,’” i.e., potential issues of crime displacement, can 
likely never be answered.428  The net result of the detailed assessment process outlined 
by the Model Legislation will likely have the same effect that similarly detailed hearing 
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requirements have had on CCTV development in France.  The process of technology 
deployment will likely be significantly retarded. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the development of a purpose statement 
suggested in the UK CCTV Code provides little guidance for policymakers.  The UK 
system requires only an assessment of the “appropriateness and reasons for using CCTV 
or similar surveillance equipment.”429 While there is good argument for conducting and 
documenting the purpose of CCTV or any surveillance system, more description of 
considerations to be given to administrators making decisions would be helpful.   
A useful middle ground may be the ABA Standards, which recognize the need to 
examine the law enforcement interests in conducting the surveillance.  Those interests 
include, objectives to be achieved; extent to which surveillance contributes to those 
objective and nature and extent of crime involved.430 The ABA Standards also direct 
examination of the extent to which privacy is invaded by examining factors such as the 
following: 
   (A) The nature of the place, activity, condition, or location to be 
surveilled;  
   (B) The care that has been taken to enhance the privacy of such place, 
activity, condition, or location;  
   (C) The lawfulness of the vantage point, including whether either the 
surveillance or installation of surveillance equipment requires a physical 
intrusion;  
   (D) The availability and sophistication of the surveillance technology;  
   (E) The extent to which the surveillance technology enhances the law 
enforcement officer's natural senses;  
   (F) The extent to which the surveillance of subjects is minimized in time 
and space;  
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   (G) The extent to which the surveillance of non-subjects is likewise 
minimized;  
   (H) Whether the surveillance is covert or overt.431  
The ABA Standards also recommend decision makers consider the impact of 
surveillance on the exercise of first amendment rights as well as the availability of 
effective and efficient alternatives that are less intrusive.432  
The ABA Standards draw heavily upon the existing Supreme Court fourth 
amendment jurisprudence.  While no formal report or process is required by the ABA 
Standards, the ABA Standards provide important insights for officials in policy 
development.  The use of considerations based on case law should help ensure 
development of surveillance systems consistent with constitutionally protected rights.  
Moreover, the ABA Standards approach seems to have sufficient flexibility to address 
differing types and combinations of technology. 
One limit of the ABA and Model Legislation approaches seems to be that they 
only seem to recognize a law enforcement purpose as a legitimate basis for surveillance.  
There needs to be recognition of the fact that a range of surveillance technologies have 
functions beyond law enforcement.  While CCTV may be use in preventing and deterring 
crime on city streets or identifying offenders once crime occurs, they can have a wide 
range of other functions.  They can be utilized to monitor traffic and where properly 
programmed issue traffic citations.  They can be utilized to direct the resources of police, 
fire and emergency medical response.  They can enhance command and control functions 
in the event of a disaster.  In short, technologies can and frequently do have multiple 
uses. This includes other technologies examined like GPS for use in dispatch of 
emergency services in connection with 9-1-1 calls or RFID that is used to expedite the 
travel process.  Purpose statements need to recognize public safety uses of surveillance  
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technology divorced from traditional notions of crime-related law enforcement.  In this 
regard, the more generic definition standard of “…purpose of the Scheme” in the UK 
CCTV Code is perhaps a better standard.433 
A second issue with respect to notice and awareness centers on the issue of direct 
notice to individuals in areas where surveillance is being conducted.  This brings to the 
fore the debate over signage requirements.  Here both the Model Legislation and the UK 
CCTV Code require the posting of signage.  The ABA Standards offer a more flexible 
approach only requiring notice when the purpose of the camera is deterrence or where 
those “…potentially subject to the surveillance should be given the option of avoiding 
it.”434   
The value of signage in protecting privacy in public places is questionable.  
Christopher Slobogin’s empirical work would seem to suggest “…knowledge that 
cameras are present triggers a greater feeling of intrusion that knowledge that cameras 
might be present.”435 Slobogin’s research seems to ratify the existence of the Panopticon 
effect discussed by Foucault.  Such an effect would likely increase the type of social 
conformance that many privacy advocates decry.  Moreover, if CCTV cameras or other 
surveillance devices are placed around critical areas in cities it seems impractical to 
expect that somehow people can avoid them.  If, for example, city streets and 
transportation centers are subjected to camera surveillance the only option would be for a 
person to avoid streets and public transportation; such a choice would hardly be an option 
for most.   
While the public should be given notice of the imposition of camera programs and 
be made aware of the possibility of public activity being filmed by cameras, the 
requirement of signage seems burdensome and expensive with little benefit.  As noted 
above, it may generally cause more feelings of intrusion than it relieves.  Where as the 
ABA Standards suggest the purpose of the camera is other than deterrence and the 
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surveillance cannot be avoided strong argument can be made that a signage approach is 
unnecessary.  Whatever approach a governmental entity decides to take with respect to 
signage, the public should be provided notice of the existence of surveillance programs. 
One final issue with respect to notice arises when information becomes 
individuated.  When data respecting an individual becomes tagged, categorized or 
segregated into a separate dossier, both the Model Legislation and The ABA Standards 
recommend the existence of post surveillance notice to the subject of the existence of a 
court ordered surveillance.  This is consistent with procedures in Title III436 that governs 
wiretaps and the provisions of the ECPA437 for the interception of other electronic 
communications.    
In the absence of a court ruling or some statutory direction, like that offered in the 
Model Legislation, attempting to seek court approval of government use of public 
gathered information to create individual files or conduct individual tracking would be 
futile because the court would not recognize any authority to address the matter. 
Currently surveillance in public areas (excluding wiretap and surveillance under the Title 
III and ECPA) requires no court approval.  Thus no notification would be required.  
Nothing, however, precludes local governments from imposing their own oversight 
processes for individual tracking and individualized data collection and analysis.    
Given the power of the data collection and data analysis tools discussed above 
some review of tracking and individualized data collection and analysis technology 
schemes is warranted.  While courts can and do provide independent review, in the 
absence of legal authority to support such a review, governmental entities can perform 
that function internally.  Where law enforcement seeks to use technology for tracking or 
seek to use databases for individualized surveillance there needs to be a process to ensure 
there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the operation to be conducted.   
Where government engages in tracking of an identified suspect individual through 
public space with a CCTV camera tracking technology; or researching databases of 
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CCTV regarding an individuals movements, or using other tracking technologies to 
identify individual prior movements, those actions should be documented. There should 
be a clearly articulated basis for the tracking activity.  There should also be a defined 
approval process preferably with review by at least some authority in the law 
enforcement organization that is separate from the individuals conducting the 
investigation.  That reviewing authority should ensure that surveillance is only conducted 
for a specified time.  Moreover, once the surveillance operation is concluded the subject 
should be advised so that they may exercise access rights to review information gathered.  
Providing notice to the subject of the investigation allows the subject an opportunity to 
take action to ensure that proper investigative procedures were followed.  This outline 
follows the essential protections currently given to wiretap activities.438   
2. Choice/Consent        
This principle of the FIPP means “…giving consumers options as to how any 
personal information collected by them will be used.”439  At first blush, it may seem 
inapposite to management of developing surveillance technologies.  However, if we 
accept a properly scoped public purpose for surveillance systems, it may prove to be the 
most important, particularly with regard to the data produced by those programs. 
The choice/consent addressed by the FIPP really concerns the secondary use of 
consumer information.  For example, an individual who presents a credit card and the 
attendant information associated with it for purposes of making a purchase is not 
consenting to the secondary market research purposes that a vendor may have for the 
information.  Citizens should be allowed the same expectations with regard to 
surveillance systems.   The use of data gathered from CCTV cameras used to secure a 
transit station hub should not, absent the presence of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause of criminal activity, be used for the secondary purpose of tracking activity.  
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Similarly, GPS data used to ensure availability of 9-1-1 response or RFID data from atoll 
way pass should not be utilized for tracking, absent some evidence of criminal activity.   
Use and dissemination of data gathered from surveillance mechanisms should only be for 
the governmental purposes that required the data to be gathered.  This restriction on use is 
a common feature of the Model Legislation, the ABA Standards and the UK CCTV 
Code.  Implementation of this principle will likely require legislative action to eliminate 
court subpoena power and freedom of information access to the data. 
3. Access/Participation   
This principle primarily concerns the right of the individual with respect to data 
gathered concerning him or her. It allows the individual to ensure that data collected 
about one’s self is accurate and is being held in accordance with the systems 
requirements.   The FIPP notes that this principle requires simple, timely, inexpensive 
procedures to access and contest inaccuracy.  This measure is found in the UK CCTV 
Code and to a more limited degree in the Model Legislation.  The UK CCTV Code 
affords individuals who are subject to CCTV surveillance broad rights to review data 
retained by the system.  It sets forth the right of the individual to simply make an 
application to review data of himself or herself.  Compliance can be accomplished by 
providing the requesting individual with a copy of the images depicting him or her or by 
allowing them to view the images.  Brochures are prepared for the public advising them 
how to make requests.  
The Model Legislation affords more limited individual access rights.  Individual 
access is afforded in circumstances such as when the individual is provided notice that he 
or she has been subject to individualized data collection or when the individual is accused 
of a criminal act.  The ABA Standards do not require any individual access. 
While affording individual access can serve as a check against government abuse, 
providing access presents a number of technical problems.  Where the data has already 
been segregated providing access might be easy.  This would be the circumstance 
envisioned when a separate investigative file has been created and the individual subject 
notified of its existence.  However, review of data that has not been individuated poses a 
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range of problems. For example, how do technicians produce images of an individual 
when he or she is part of a crowd, without compromising the confidentiality of others?   
The process of redacting or masking other visual or surveillance information may prove 
to be extremely cumbersome, time consuming and expensive.  While individuals should 
have the ability to review data maintained by government once it has been individuated, 
it seems wasteful and unnecessary for government to be required to individuate 
information and produce it for individual review.  In this regard, the more limited review 
approach offered in the Model Legislation seems to be more workable. 
Affording individuals access to data especially when it is individuated and 
categorized is important to privacy interests of anonymity and reserve.  It is important for 
individuals to understand exactly what type of information the government is maintaining 
about them.  Accessing this information allows individuals some understanding of the 
degree to which their privacy interests may be compromised by government activity. 
4. Integrity/Security 
Integrity and security is about assuring that the data collected is uncompromised 
and accurate.  It also provides assurance that the data will only be used for the authorized 
government purposes that supported its collection and maintenance. All three of the 
examples of governance strategies, the Model Legislation, ABA Standards and UK 
CCTV Code, discuss the importance of integrity and security.  With regard to integrity, it 
is important to understand that some of the data collected may serve as evidence in 
criminal proceedings.  As such, ensuring data integrity is a critical matter.  The ABA 
Standards discuss the need for ensuring that only surveillance techniques suitable to the 
task should be used to generate data.440  
The Model Legislation mandates a range of integrity and security measures.  
These include: restricted access to surveillance systems and data storage; technical 
training for operators; and extensive recordkeeping functions to log system access by 
                                                 
440 ABA, Standards for Technology-Assisted Physical Surveillance, 2-9.1(d) (iv). 
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those who “…maintain, operate, observe, inspect or access…” the system.441  The UK 
CCTV Code imposes similar proposed requirements on system designers and 
operators.442   
 
One area of common agreement is the need to restrict access of information to 
third parties.  The general tenor of all three of the templates for governance, third party 
access should be limited.  Perhaps the most limiting of the three templates is the Model 
Legislation.  That legislation would only allow access to third parties based on some 
court finding of need.  Need is defined in extremely limited circumstances in the event of 
non-governmental parties like private litigants in civil court, it requires findings of 
“imminent harm to life or limb.”  Even as to governmental entities, the Model Legislation 
would require a finding of probable cause.  Significantly, the Model Legislation would 
exempt surveillance data from local public disclosure laws that apply to most public 
records.  Inclusion of limitations on access to data through mechanisms like court ordered 
discovery in civil proceedings or state freedom of information or open records acts points 
out a significant limitation on the ability of government agencies limiting third party 
access.  Unless specific statutory relief is provided, local governments may be compelled 
by open records laws or court procedures to provide information to third parties.   
The UK CCTV Code contains similar limitations of disclosure to third parities.  
One notable exception is to allow for dissemination of information or images where law 
enforcement finds itself in need of identifying victims, witnesses or perpetrators of 
criminal acts.  Law enforcement use of video tape information to catch individuals filmed 
in the act of committing a crime is not an unusual occurrence.  It is difficult to square 
such a practice with the provisions of the highly restrictive Model Legislation.  With 
regard to dissemination decisions, the UK CCTV Code outlines the importance of 
documenting disclosure decisions and logging access.  In light of the Peck decision the 
UK seems to be much more circumspect about release of third party information without 
a proper purpose. 
                                                 
441 The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance. 
442 France, Code of Practice, Part I, 13-4. 
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A final issue with regard to integrity and security is the issue of retention.  The 
establishment of a retention schedule and the elimination of data at the conclusion of 
retention are universally accepted requirements.   Also excepted is the notion that 
retention beyond the schedule may be appropriate for certain data (i.e., data to be used as 
evidence in a criminal proceeding). The setting of retention schedules and the procedures 
for preserving data beyond a retention schedule varies widely.  The Model Legislation 
suggests a seven day period for retention of data.  It provides for an extension of the 
period of time based on request from the operator and finding of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause on the part of the chief administrative officer of the law enforcement 
agency.   
The UK CCTV Code offers a more flexible process that is dependent upon the 
need for retention.  As an example, retention is seven days for ordinary crime control 
cameras based on the notion that evidence of criminal activity will be readily apparent 
within that time.  Images taken in City centers are kept for up to 31 days (unless extended 
for legal proceedings).  ATM cameras are kept for up to three months based on when 
account statements are received so discrepancies on withdrawals can be resolved. 
With regard to the objectives of surveillance outlined in the technology 
assessment portion of this paper, a differential schedule for retention seems to make a 
great deal of sense.  For example, where the purpose of surveillance is detecting suspect 
objects or contraband a relatively short time period for retention of 72 hours to seven 
days makes sense.  Where the object of surveillance is to observe a critical facility, a 30 
to 60 day retention period might be needed to ascertain patterns that might suggest the 
location was being scouted. Where tracking activities are occurring retention may need to 
be longer than 30 days but here there should be some reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to believe there is criminal activity and an extended retention can be authorized by 
a supervision authority, whether that authority is a court or senior law enforcement 
official.  The ABA Standards also noted the importance of retention. 
The integrity and security of the system is of critical importance to reserve.  
While the individual may feel discomfort in knowing that information is in the possession 
of the government, an understanding of the rules for release of the information and the 
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fact that it will not generally be released to others allows for some restoration of the sense 
of reserve.  If the surveillance system is secure, individuals can rely on the fact that 
confidential information will generally remain confidential. 
5. Enforcement/Redress 
The final FIPP principle is for there to be some mechanism for enforcement and 
redress to be incorporated into the system.  The reasoning behind these provisions is that 
they will ensure government compliance with its own rules.    Without them there is 
concern that regulations will be “…Suggestive rather than prescriptive.”443  The FIPP 
notes that compliance can come from self regulation or externally imposed in the form of 
civil actions or civil and criminal penalties through government action.  
The Model Legislation utilizes all three mechanisms to ensure compliance.  It 
recommends audits of the operation of CCTV systems, private causes of action for 
individuals whose rights are violated by government misuses of data or improper 
collection, as well as a range of civil and criminal penalties. The Model Legislation also 
contains provisions for discipline of employees who misuse the video system and 
provisions that would exclude from evidence any information acquired in violation of the 
Model Legislation.   
The UK CCTV Code and the ABA Standards are somewhat more circumspect in 
the recommendations they make with respect to enforcement and redress.  Both 
recommend the importance of audit and review to ensure compliance with written 
direction for system operation. Both the ABA Standards and the UK CCTV Code suggest 
that information about the system and assessments of it should be open for public 
scrutiny.  Neither recommends a private right of action.  The ABA Standards do suggest 
that government accountability can be satisfied by internal rules and application of 
exclusionary relief where appropriate under state or federal law. 
The goal of these enforcement and redress measures is to not just to enhance 
compliance. It should also be to instill public confidence in the fact that surveillance 
                                                 
443 U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Fair Information Practice Principles. 
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systems are operating within established guidelines to accomplish their stated purposes. If 
organizations have detailed written polices that detail operational requirements, combined 
with audits and assessments made available to the public that should serve to assist in 
accomplishing those goals.  Those measures, combined with the ability of citizens to 
correct errors with regard to their records and discipline for government employees who 
misuse the system would seem to be adequate to address compliance issues.  The 
extensive civil remedy provisions in the Model Legislation providing for damages and 
attorneys fees seem excessive especially in light of existing remedies for violations of 
constitutionally protected rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
D. SELF-REGULATORY OR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
While either a self-regulatory or legislative scheme would work to establish 
governance, it is likely that a combination of the two approaches would likely be the best 
strategy in developing governance. The advantage of self-regulation is that it is generally 
more effective in addressing complex and fast developing technology. Self-regulatory 
solutions allow for quicker ability to adapt to new developments in technology and adopt 
the best practices from other jurisdictions.  
The experiences in the UK compared to France or Germany seem to ratify the fact 
that self-regulation provides a more flexible environment for CCTV to flourish.  The 
strict legislative procedures in France and Germany have constrained the development of   
CCTV surveillance.  While comparing the effect of regulation to legislative solutions 
across differing national and legal systems provides much room for error, it would seem 
that self –regulatory approaches would provide a more fertile basis for CCTV growth. 
The more significant question is whether a self-regulatory system will adequately 
protect privacy interests.  The experience in the UK provides a mixed result on this point.  
The Peck case certainly demonstrates a weakness in protection occasioned by that self 
regulatory environment.  Similar evidence of weakness is seen in the apparent lack of 
compliance with regulatory signage requirements.  This is not necessarily a failure of a 
regulatory approach as much as it is a suggestion that insufficient resources are dedicated 
to enforcement and compliance. 
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An effective approach in governance will likely require a combination of 
legislative and self-regulatory measures.  Only legislation can provide for exemption of 
CCTV and surveillance data from dissemination under public records law.  Only 
legislative solutions can restrict the application of court rules for production of 
information in connection with civil proceedings. Legislation might also be useful to 
provide an oversight structure to independently audit or monitor CCTV or surveillance 
operations in a state. 
As to the development and day-to-day operation of a system, self- regulation 
likely provides a more effective tool for management. With effective enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms in place abuses can be prevented.   Operation in a self-regulatory 
environment is more consistent with current law enforcement operational practices. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATORS 
This thesis likely raises more questions for addressing developing surveillance 
technology than it provides answers.  That is because some of the clear answers 
administers seek do not exist or compete with other claims and values.  What this thesis 
does present is a range of issues that administrators will certainly confront as well as 
some approaches, successful and unsuccessful, in addressing those problems. 
Two issues seem to be almost universally established and accepted by all the 
commentators who have addressed the issue of developing surveillance technology.  
First, developing surveillance technologies are growing in power both with respect to 
ability to collect and manipulate data.  While this thesis has examined some of those 
technologies there are many others in development.  Second, these technologies will 
require some controls or regulation to ensure that privacy interests are protected.  Failure 
to provide for adequate governance will likely lead to some form of legal intervention 
and loss of public support for surveillance programs.  With those two facts in mind, the 
following are recommendations for consideration by policymakers exploring the 
implementation of CCTV or developing surveillance technology. 
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1. Privacy is not a Monolithic Concept 
Privacy has several aspects and functions in society.  Certain aspects or states of 
privacy like seclusion and intimacy have significant protections.  Other states like 
anonymity and reserve have lesser protections.  Moreover, the function of anonymity can 
serve both positive and negative societal functions. In developing and applying 
technology, administrators should be aware of what aspects of privacy are being affected 
and how those effects can be mitigated.  
2. Privacy is Constitutionally Protected 
Despite suggestions of some commentators, privacy is afforded significant 
protection by the U.S. Constitution and those protections can and do extend into public 
areas. In designing and implementing surveillance systems, administrators must be 
mindful that if those systems are shown to chill first amendment speech through 
destruction of anonymity, they will not be permitted.  Administrators also need to 
understand that if systems are designed or operated in a discriminatory fashion, they may 
well be shut down for violating the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment. Accordingly, governance of technologically enhanced surveillance programs 
should include clear statements prohibiting operator conduct that violates first and 
fourteenth amendment protected rights and ensure proper training for operators in that 
regard. 
3. Fourth Amendment Concerns in Public Surveillance must be 
Addressed    
The contours of the fourth amendment have evolved over time and will likely 
continue to evolve with respect to use of surveillance technology.  The ABA Standards 
provide an excellent exposition of factors that administrators should consider in 
application of technology.444  In addition to those factors, administrators should focus on 
the following fourth amendment principles in developing strategies. First, the notion that 
the Constitution does not afford privacy protection to contraband can shape development 
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of procedures for surveillance designed to find suspect items or persons where 
surveillance techniques are accurate and nonintrusive.  Second, the special circumstances 
doctrine may afford greater latitude for implementation of surveillance procedures that 
can be related to substantial threats.  Finally, with respect to human tracking technology, 
while the Supreme Court has upheld use of this practice in public space, there is serious 
question as to whether it would approve widespread application of such techniques 
particularly in the absence of some legal justification like reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to believe it was related to criminal conduct.  
4. Technology Design Should Seek to Mitigate Privacy Impacts and 
Enhance Protections   
Administrators should look to shape technology development to address 
constitutional concerns. For example, where possible, technology looking for suspect 
items or persons should be designed to be binary in nature.  When designing observation 
systems, smart video technologies employing masking, anonymization and behavioral 
pattern recognition should be explored and where possible employed.  Administrators 
should also be assured that only appropriate technology is employed at locations and that 
it is properly maintained and operated. The UK Code of Practice provisions on Siting the 
Camera,445 Quality of the Images,446 and Processing the Images,447 provide helpful 
insights. 
In addition to system designs that mitigate impacts in collection, there are also 
protections that can be built into systems to provide privacy protection.  Aligning 
automated system design to support governance policies is an important feature.  
Automated systems can and should be designed to limit access by operators only to the 
information and functions in collection essential for that person to do his or her job.  
Access control features should be designed to prevent unauthorized access.  The system 
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447 Ibid., 11. 
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should also be designed with a reporting function that allows for the generation of audit 
reports to review access to files or activity by operators.  
5. Developing Computer Technology Presents Challenges for Data 
Management 
The development of complex computer systems that can interrelate large amounts 
of public surveillance data poses significant issues for administrators.  It is quite likely 
that management of the data gathered by surveillance technologies poses the greatest 
danger to privacy.  Review of standards in accordance with the internationally accepted 
FIPP in the preparation of governance schemes will assist administrators in developing 
governance schemes that address privacy concerns.  Legislative and regulatory templates 
like the Model Legislation, ABA standards and UK CCTV Code of Conduct provide 
different ways in which governance can be achieved consistent with the FIPP.  While a 
regulatory versus legislative solution would likely be more flexible and easy to 
implement, some issues like third party access will likely require at least some legislative 
action. 
6. Ensure that Practice Conforms to Written Policies Through: 
Supervision, Training, Discipline, and Retraining of Employees; and 
Internal and External System Audits 
The development of policies that provide for safeguarding data, limiting use and 
surveillance activity to approved governmental purposes and otherwise protecting 
privacy does not ensure that such activities will actually occur.  Policies are not self 
actuating.  A properly governed system ensures that the employees operating it are 
adequately supervised.  Any employee authorized to access the system must be trained 
particularly in the legal and ethical obligations in using the system and the data it 
generates.  Those employees should be periodically retrained to ensure that the message 
of proper usage is reinforced.  Where employees are found to be violating policies and 
misusing the system or data it generates, they should be disciplined. 
In addition to measures taken to ensure that individuals operate the system 
consistently with governance requirements, internal and external audits should be 
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conducted at regular intervals.  Given the computerized operation of CCTV and other 
digitized surveillance systems, the creation of automated audit reports showing actual 
operation of the system should be relatively easy to create and monitor.  The audit results 
should be publicly available.  This will afford some of the transparent system operation 
that Foucault concluded was one of the beneficial feature of the Panopticon.  The use of 
detailed public audit can help the public to better monitor activity of government even as 
government is observing them. The inclusion of an external audit, in addition to internal 
ones, affords the public additional confidence in the rectitude of government conduct.  
This concept has worked well in Chicago. 
7. The Pace of Change in Technology Requires Periodic Review of 
Policies and Practices to Ensure They are Meeting Governance Goals 
One final recommendation concerns the need to ensure that governance strategies 
keep pace with technological change.  The range of technologies that can be linked to and 
interrelated with CCTV is large and growing.  The pace of technology development is 
extremely rapid.  Governance strategies of today will doubtless need to be retooled and 
recalibrated to address the new features and capacities of tomorrow’s technology.  
Governance structures should include provisions for regular review and update to ensure 
that technology developments are addressed and that new technologies are introduced to 
enhance protections for privacy. 
F. SUMMARY 
As the use of technology enhanced surveillance grows across the country, more 
and more communities will need to address the issues of data collection and maintenance.  
Law enforcement and public safety officials will press to ensure that their use of 
technology to prevent, protect and respond to a range of public safety concerns.  
Policymakers in developing a scheme to harness the powerful tools that technology is 
developing must also work to ensure that “the fight to be let alone” is accounted for and 
respected. 
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The continuing developments in surveillance technology and information 
processing are significant. To address the issue of governing surveillance technology and  
its accompanying databases, there are several approaches offered by both domestic and 
international sources.  A range of these approaches can be found in attempts to address 
CCTV.   
Certainly there needs to be concern in the deployment of technology to ensure 
that it does not invade private spaces (i.e., the CCTV camera that inadvertently or 
deliberately peers into a bedroom window, or the application of backscatter x-ray 
technology to show body features). However with developments in technology collection 
mechanisms can and should be shaped to minimize the likelihood of even accidental 
intrusion into private areas.  For example, cameras in public areas can be equipped with 
technology to blank out views of private areas.  Intrusive technologies like backscatter x-
ray can be developed or operated in a binary format only indicating the presence of 
contraband items.  
On one extreme is the approach offered by groups like the ACLU.   Those groups 
seek to halt the introduction of the CCTV as a surveillance device, at least until the 
efficacy of such systems can be proven by empirical study.  However, the time and 
resources required to conduct such studies would defacto result in discontinuation of 
CCTV projects.  While the ACLU’s call for more careful consideration of CCTV projects 
is not without some merit, the approach of creating barriers for technological 
developments in surveillance technology will only serve to deprive government of useful 
tools for accomplishing a range of legitimate and important activities. 
On the other extreme are the proponents of employing surveillance technology, 
who cite fourth amendment case law and announce that there is no privacy concern with 
respect to surveillance in public areas.  As noted in the analysis above, such a 
blunderbuss approach is not only inaccurate, it will likely lead to potentially crippling 
restrictions on surveillance programs imposed through legal actions and lack of public 
support.  Privacy interests do pervade the public space and must be protected. 
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The middle ground between the extreme is reached through the development and 
employment of governance strategies outlined above.  Those strategies can and should 
control operation and deployment of surveillance systems consistent with privacy values 
and drive development of technology to account for and address privacy concerns.  It can 
provide government with a comfortable way to use technology consistent with privacy 
interests.  Perhaps more importantly, rather than presenting the public with the specter of  
a government that spies and snoops on innocent activity, it offers the prospect of a 
government watchful of only those matters essential for protection. Successful 
governance should allow the use of CCTV and other developing technologies to be 
viewed not with dread, but, rather, like the guardian dreamed about in the Gershwin tune:  
 
There's a somebody I'm longing to see 
I hope that he turns out to be 
Someone to watch over me448 
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